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In To Advance Their Opportunities, Judson MacLaury, retired Department of Labor (DOL) historian, traces the evolution of 
federal policies toward African American workers from World War 
I to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This is a valuable 
contribution to our understanding of this topic, not only because of 
Judson MacLaury’s knowledge of his subject, but also because this 
book is based on a thorough review of the relevant literature and 
unpublished materials at the DOL and the National Archives.
MacLaury’s focus is on the federal executive, which was much 
more responsive to pressures from African Americans than the 
Congress, where a small number of segregationists could use 
Senate rules, especially the filibuster, to block civil rights legisla-
tion. Southern segregationists were able to acquire seniority and 
inordinate influence in the Democratic Party because most African 
Americans in their regions were disenfranchised and, before FDR’s 
second term, most black voters and community leaders supported 
Republicans.
African Americans’ ability to influence the federal government 
began to change when migration out of the rural South greatly 
enhanced their political power. These migrations accelerated signifi-
cantly during World War I, when the cessation of mass immigration 
from Europe opened urban job opportunities to African Americans. 
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Black political power was enhanced both by their movement to urban 
areas (North and South), where racial oppression was more visible, 
and their movement from the one-party South, where they were dis-
enfranchised, to two-party areas outside the South where black vot-
ers could significantly influence close elections. The urbanization of 
African Americans also strengthened civil rights organizations like 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) and the National Urban League (NUL), as well as unions 
like the influential Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (BSCP), led 
by A. Philip Randolph.
The dramatic expansion of direct and indirect federal employ-
ment during the New Deal period enabled the Roosevelt admin-
istration to expand African American employment. In addition, 
millions of black workers participated in New Deal programs like the 
National Youth Administration (NYA), the Civilian Conservation 
Corps (CCC), and public employment programs. That said, African 
American participation in these recovery programs was generally 
below their relative unemployment rate, which approached 50 per-
cent, about double the overall rate. And while progress was made in 
reducing discrimination against black participants, unequal treat-
ment characterized even the best of these programs.
There was, moreover, a continuing tug-of-war between a few 
influential pro–civil rights New Dealers—like Interior Secretary 
Harold Ickes, Labor Secretary Frances Perkins, presidential adviser 
Harry Hopkins, and FDR’s wife Eleanor—and those who were influ-
enced by militant segregationist politicians. The progressives were, 
however, supported by black community protests against discrimi-
nation in New Deal programs and in federal employment. FDR, 
who had never shown much interest in race matters, had to balance 
appeals from the progressives and opposition from segregationists 
in his own party.
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Because FDR thought sustainable, broadly shared prosperity was 
not possible unless all major groups were included, his administra-
tion did much to help African Americans. And, despite their con-
tinuing protests against discrimination in federal employment and 
by government contractors, most black leaders and voters, who had 
previously strongly supported Herbert Hoover, made a dramatic 
switch to the Democratic Party and voted overwhelmingly for FDR 
in his reelection campaign. 
The depression—and most New Deal recovery programs—ended 
with World War II, which opened a new chapter in the march toward 
racial equality. Although discrimination continued, and was even 
sometimes acquiesced to by staunch civil rights champions like Harry 
Hopkins and Frances Perkins, African Americans doubled their 
proportion of federal jobs from 5 percent to 10 percent. Although 
most of these jobs were in lower pay grades, the administration also 
increased the number of black professionals and administrators.
The tight World War II labor markets boosted the expansion of 
black employment, especially among defense contractors. Under 
intense pressure from the black community, including a threatened 
march on Washington, FDR issued an executive order creating the 
Fair Employment Practice Committee (FEPC) to outlaw discrimina-
tion by federal contractors.
The proposed march on Washington, led by A. Philip Randolph, 
was particularly embarrassing to FDR because discrimination 
exposed a serious weakness in America’s fight to “make the world 
safe for democracy.” Indeed, the tension between tolerating discrim-
ination while fighting totalitarian regimes made American leaders 
more likely to act on antidiscrimination pressures. As President 
Johnson remarked, “Race relations don’t look the same from the 
banks of the Potomac as they do from the banks of the Pedernales” 
(where his ranch was located).
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The experiences of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations 
revealed the strengths and weaknesses of executive orders and vol-
untary fair employment programs. The use of executive powers 
enabled administrations to combat discrimination despite Con-
gressional opposition. The executive orders were enforced mainly by 
moral suasion and the threat of contract cancellation or debarment. 
Presidents likewise could use their “bully pulpit” to persuade the public 
that discrimination was not only bad for the economy, society, and pol-
ity, but also weakened America’s contest against totalitarian regimes. 
Voluntary antidiscrimination programs had some advantages in 
changing private employment practices. These programs were intro-
duced not only because of inadequate support for civil rights legis-
lation, but also because legal processes were more effective against 
specific overt discriminatory acts than against the more pervasive 
and entrenched institutional forms that permit discrimination to 
persist even after it has become illegal. One of the clearest effects 
of executive-order-based programs was to give those employers and 
unions who were inclined to adopt fair practices some protection 
from adverse reactions by racist customers or members.
Despite these advantages, executive orders and voluntary 
approaches had many shortcomings: they lacked the credibility 
afforded by Congressional action; they were relatively ineffective 
against determined defenders of the status quo; government con-
tracting sanctions had limited impact on unions, which were not 
parties to the contracts; government agencies were reluctant to can-
cel contracts because they were more interested in the goods and 
services provided than combating discrimination;1 and administra-
tions likewise were deterred from vigorous enforcement by pow-
1 This defect was overcome somewhat by the Carter administration, which not only 
demonstrated its willingness to cancel contracts, but also consolidated enforcement 
in the Department of Labor.
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erful members of Congress, who controlled their budgets. These 
weaknesses, and subsequent experience, demonstrated that volun-
tary programs are more effective when backed by the threat of vigor-
ous enforcement.
The limitations of executive orders and voluntary programs estab-
lished the political bases for the civil rights acts of 1964 and 1965, 
which were passed with strong political leadership from President 
Lyndon Johnson and vigorous opposition from many Republicans 
and Southern Democrats. It would, however, be a mistake to assume 
that the civil rights acts ended discrimination. Affirmative action 
programs were required to address institutional discrimination that 
was beyond the reach of statutory law.
An example of the kind of targeted affirmative action programs 
that produced significant change was the apprenticeship outreach 
programs that greatly increased the number of minority apprentices. 
Joint employer-union apprenticeship programs had a long history of 
discrimination against minorities and women, which meant that few 
counselors recommended that black students prepare for appren-
ticeable occupations. As a result, when the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
outlawed discrimination by unions and apprenticeship sponsors, 
there were very few qualified minority applicants to take advantage 
of these opportunities. Institutional discrimination causes people to 
avoid programs they believe will not accept them. Pragmatic civil 
rights leaders like A. Philip Randolph responded to this impasse by 
creating specific outreach programs to recruit, prepare, and place 
qualified minority apprentices. Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz 
commissioned an evaluation of these programs, which documented 
their success.2 The Department of Labor then funded these programs 
2 Ray Marshall and Vernon Briggs, The Negro and Apprenticeship (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1967).
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on a larger scale, causing minorities in apprenticeship programs to 
approximate their proportion of the work force by the end of the 
1970s.
The outreach concept was applied successfully to the Minority 
Women’s Employment Project, directed by Alexis Herman, later sec-
retary of labor in the Clinton administration. Federal employment 
programs provided opportunities for millions of African American 
workers while the administration of these programs trained many 
black leaders.
Judson MacLaury’s research leads him to three central conclu-
sions: “First, there were significant, measurable advances for African 
American workers; second, the concept of affirmative action was 
born and underwent considerable development during this period; 
and third, most major actions by the executive were only taken in 
response to pressure, direct or indirect, from the African American 
community.”
The evidence fully supports these conclusions. Despite a coun-
terattack on affirmative action during the 1980s and 90s, it seems 
fairly clear that reducing institutionalized discrimination requires 
positive action to include those who have been excluded, in tandem 
with legal measures to combat specific, overt acts of discrimination.
The evidence likewise demonstrates the critical importance of 
continuous pressure from the victims of discrimination; even well-
meaning political champions of equal opportunity seldom assign 
as high a priority to effective remedies as the victims themselves. 
Political champions are often satisfied with token breakthroughs, 
while the victims rarely, if ever, are. This reality is well understood 
by civil rights leaders and sympathetic politicians alike. A. Philip 
Randolph, for example, demonstrated the moral power of open 
and massive protests against a sympathetic, but cautious, president 
who tolerated discrimination, despite his dedication to democracy 
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and broadly shared prosperity. Randolph often told his followers: 
“Your friends can help you but they can’t save you; you have to save 
yourselves.” Similarly, in his 1963 letter from a Birmingham jail, 
Martin Luther King Jr. wrote: “Freedom is never voluntarily given 
by the oppressor; it must be demanded by the oppressed.” President 
Johnson, the consummate politician, understood this principle very 
well. He told a group of labor and civil rights leaders who called on 
him to support the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that this legislation was 
good for them and the country and he was all for it, adding: “Now 
go make me do it.”
The lessons from To Advance Their Opportunities are as valuable 
for other victims of discrimination—especially women—as they are 
for African Americans. Indeed, MacLaury writes that women, for 
example, were excluded from the CCC and other important New 
Deal programs. It is also noteworthy that President Truman, a civil 
rights champion who defied members of his party and, among other 
things, desegregated the armed forces, nevertheless acquiesced to 
pressure from male members of his cabinet not to reappoint Frances 
Perkins, the most effective and influential secretary of labor in 
history.
The elimination of discrimination against people for reasons 
unrelated to merit therefore will require a combination of strong 
leadership from public and private officials, but especially from the 
victims of discrimination.
The evolution of the slow march to equal opportunity reveals 
the interaction between attitudes and behavior. In employment 
situations, discrimination is only partially responsive to attitudes. 
Changed behavior is required to overcome specific overt racial dis-
crimination. Affirmative action and African American performance 
in all sectors of American life changed racial attitudes. Barriers to 
further change were created by racial politics, which appealed to 
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whites through thinly veiled racist code words. The fact that racial 
appeals have to be veiled is a sign of progress; the fact that they are 
made at all shows how far we still have to go.
It could be that a number of developments will cause even thinly 
disguised racial appeals to be less effective in the 21st century. After 
the initial breakthroughs—the positive effects of tokenism—African 
Americans’ accomplishments in all sectors of national life chal-
lenged the enduring myth of inherent racial differences. A second 
important force for change was the rise of both black political and 
black economic power after the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which 
enabled two pro–civil rights Southerners, Jimmy Carter and Bill 
Clinton, to get elected president despite losing the Southern white 
vote. Racist appeals were further weakened by welfare reform and 
the decline in urban violence, which made many code words much 
less effective, and by growing embarrassment about the treatment 
of African Americans throughout most of our history. This is not to 
argue that racism is dead—only that it has become much less accept-
able and there are fewer ways to camouflage racist signals. 
Judson MacLaury’s detailed study of efforts to reduce 
discrim ination against African Americans is important because it 
teaches the kinds of actions and leadership required to combat the 
deadly effects of discrimination against people for reasons unrelated 
to their personal merit.
Ray Marshall
June 2008
Mr. Marshall was secretary of labor during the Carter administra-
tion, 1977-1981.
I n June 2013 I had the opportunity to meet with Holly Mercer, the current director of Newfound Press, and her team. We discussed 
the original 2008 printing of this book and unanimously agreed that 
after a little touching up and redesign, the book should be reintro-
duced to the public as a reprint. Holly thereupon assigned Jayne 
Smith of her staff to prepare a thorough copyedit. While I did not 
change the factual substance of the original publication, I did work 
with Jayne on the editing, and along the way I reshaped some of the 
language. 
I can only hope that my own efforts have made this a better book. 
I am convinced, however, that Jayne’s dedication and sharp edito-
rial skills have made it a more solid and professional publication. 
Applying her thorough knowledge of the Chicago Manual of Style, 
she has introduced a sound and consistent style throughout the book. 
She also created the new design, and I recently learned that she had 
played a key role in completing the layout and design of the 2008 
printing as well. I thank her for all her superb work.
Like the original publication, this reprint, both hard copy and 
online, does not come with an index (always a sore point with book 
reviewers). But none is really necessary. Hard-copy users need only 
to visit the book’s website at the University of Tennessee (http://
newfoundpress.utk.edu/pubs/maclaury2), where they can create 
their own virtual index.
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The year 2014 is a highly auspicious and appropriate one for a new 
printing of a book dealing with fair employment of black workers. 
For one thing, 2014 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 and its Title VII, which banned racial and other discrimi-
nation in virtually all private employment. It also marks the one-hun-
dredth anniversary of the beginning of World War I, an event I write 
about that indirectly triggered the Great Migration, which in turn 
set in motion both vast social change in the United States and also 
the birth of engagement by the federal government with the African 
American workforce.
Furthermore, in this year the presidential administration of 
Barack Obama, the first African American and indeed nonwhite US 
president, is a ripe old five years of age. Without the Civil Rights Act 
and the Great Migration, it is doubtful that Obama would ever have 
been in a position to be elected in 2008 or reelected in 2012. At the 
conclusion of my Epilogue to the 2008 printing, I raise the issue of 
when our country will truly be able to say that it is at last color-blind. 
To paraphrase Ronald Reagan in 1980, are we better off (more equali-
tarian) five years later? I believe that with Obama’s election, with 
greater recent acceptance of gay men and women as legally married 
couples and full participants in the American mainstream, and with 
greater tolerance of diversity of all kinds, we have taken a few giant 
steps in that direction. Now we need to secure that hard-won prog-
ress and demand that it continue.
Judson MacLaury
January 2014
After the abolition of slavery, African Americans were soon oppressed at the local level by discriminatory Jim Crow 
laws and practices that made the vast majority of them second-class 
citizens. Because of that, disproportionate numbers of them were rel-
egated to low-paying, low-prestige employment. It was not until the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, that it was made a violation of 
federal statute law to discriminate against African Americans in the 
workplace.
Long before the Civil Rights Act, however, the feder al  govern-
ment had begun to recognize the importance of African American 
workers to the economy and the legitimacy of their desire for, and 
right to, an equal chance to share in its opportunities. This book is 
the story of the origins and growth of the federal executive branch’s 
role in addressing the emergence of black labor in the national econ-
omy and in improving their opportunities for good jobs. It will show 
that, beginning with the Great Migration of black workers out of the 
rural South to the industrial North and Midwest during World War 
I, the federal government slowly initiated a series of steps to deal, 
at least partially, with the economic issues and social problems that 
arose. A key finding of the book is that virtually every major step the 
government took was the result of strong pressure from the growing 
civil rights movement.
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The story of executive branch action is divided into three eras. 
“Part I: Crisis-Driven Federal Action from World War I through the 
Great Depression, 1914-1940” shows how the government operated 
initially in an ad hoc way, responding to circumstances resulting 
from the two world wars that bookended the Roaring 20s and the 
Great Depression. “Part II: Institutionalization of Executive Action, 
1940-1960” and “Part III: Culmination of Executive Action, 1960-
1964” describe the development of policy, implemented through 
presidential executive orders and other measures, into a more con-
tinuous and systematic effort.
As the book shows, in the period from 1914 to 1964, the federal 
government operated primarily in the spheres where it had the great-
est control: federal employment, whether within the bureaucracy 
or on government projects; and employment by contractors provid-
ing goods or services to the federal government. Control was imple-
mented either through direct administration, in the case of federal 
employment, or through executive order and moral suasion, in the 
case of private employers. Relevant legislation and court cases are dis-
cussed, but the focus is on the executive branch, the main actor during 
the “pre-history” of government action on civil rights before Title VII.
The federal government adopted a largely cooperative, volunta-
ristic approach to seeking compliance with goals of fairness in the 
workplace. Even after it developed regulations that allowed various 
sanctions, it was generally reluctant to enforce them against violators. 
The political and social realities of the period before the Civil Rights 
Act were not conducive to mandatory enforcement of equal oppor-
tunity rules. The government did, however, seek to persuade private 
employers to take extra steps, which became known as Affirmative 
Action, to hire and promote African Americans. Governmental bod-
ies probably carried voluntarism as far as it could effectively go, until 
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the Civil Rights Act introduced a paradigm shift that ushered in a new 
era of mandatory compliance with federal antidiscrimination goals.
The literature on which I base this book is rich and extensive. 
However, that literature is a bit of a patchwork. There are excellent 
individual studies of civil rights under various presidents, but they 
do not focus on employment. There are a few studies that do focus on 
the topic, but none covers the entire period from 1914 to 1964. One 
goal of the book is to synthesize this collective historical effort.
Another goal is to show, in detail, how various programs and 
executive orders came about and how they were implemented. While 
the literature is very rich in coverage of the macro political and social 
background, there is relatively little coverage of the micro aspects. 
In order to adequately address this area, I delved into the wealth of 
government records in the National Archives and the rich collec-
tions of the Wirtz Labor Library of the US Department of Labor. 
Hopefully, the book will provide the public with a clearer picture of 
how their federal government went about promoting equal employ-
ment opportunities for African American workers.
In the interest of full disclosure, I should note that I served as 
the Department of Labor historian from 1972 until my retirement 
in 2006. As the book has been completed since I left the federal gov-
ernment, hopefully removal has provided additional perspective and 
objectivity. I would like to acknowledge those at the department who 
made my research possible. First, I wish to express my deep gratitude 
to Dr. Jonathan Grossman, my predecessor as departmental histo-
rian. He not only hired me, he encouraged me to write the book that 
he always said I had in me. I also want to thank Gary Reed, a later 
supervisor, who encouraged me to start work on this book and to 
concentrate my time and efforts on a project that he knew would 
bear fruit only years later. His only requirement was to “just write a 
PREFACE 2008
xx
good book.” I hope I have met his expectations. To Linda Stinson, 
my successor as departmental historian—words cannot express my 
thanks for the superb developmental editing job she did. She helped 
me turn an unwieldy early draft into a much more readable book. 
Finally, I should credit the Department of Labor itself for giving 
me the idea for the title, which I shamelessly stole from the law that 
created the department in 1913. The title is part of the mission state-
ment requiring the new department “to . . . advance their opportu-
nities for profitable employment” [emphasis added]. There was no 
congressional intent to make sure those opportunities were equally 
available to all, but fortunately time and change made that a pre-
eminent national mission.
Professor Robert Zieger, a labor historian at the University of 
Florida, kindly served as my unofficial adviser throughout the project. 
He reviewed my early outlines of the book and plans for research and 
writing, and he provided encouragement and support as I grappled 
with the daunting and, to me, unfamiliar challenges of writing a book.
Lastly, I want to thank the wonderful and talented people at 
Newfound Press and the University of Tennessee Library. Linda 
Phillips, chair of the press’s editorial board, shepherded my manu-
script through the review process and was a joy to work with. Casie 
Fedukovich did a superb job of copy and substantive editing. My 
book is a better one for her efforts. The book design by Jayne Rogers 
and cover design by Hannah Barker perfectly express the theme and 
period of the book. To all, my profound thanks.
I dedicate this book to the memory of my parents, James and Ruth. 
To my wife, Judy, I can only say thank you for steadfast moral support 
during the book’s ten-year, and seemingly endless, gestation period.
 
Judson MacLaury
Seattle, Washington
June 2008
The period from World War I through the Great Depression and the New Deal marked the first large-scale influx of 
African American workers into the nation’s industrial workforce. It 
also saw the initiation of significant federal involvement with and 
assistance to African American workers. It was a period of mostly ad 
hoc government responses driven first by the emergency of World 
War I and then by the Depression. The intervening period of peace 
and prosperity during the 1920s produced relatively little federal 
action in this area.
Chapter 1, “World War I and After,” focuses on several factors 
that came together in this period to affect black workers. First was 
the widespread institution of discriminatory Jim Crow practices 
in the administration of President Woodrow Wilson, prompting a 
strong backlash from the black community. At the same time that 
black workers began migrating from the rural South to fill industrial 
jobs in the North, the supply of white immigrant labor from Europe 
was drying up because of the war. The migration and America’s en-
try into the war in Europe, combined with pressure from black lead-
ers, led to federal efforts to assist black workers and fully integrate 
them economically into the war effort. The principal federal vehicle 
for these efforts was the Department of Labor’s Division of Negro 
Economics, a temporary wartime agency headed by black sociologist 
George Haynes.
Part I
Crisis-Driven Federal Action from World War I 
through the Great Depression, 1914–1940
PART 1
2
Chapter 2, “Depression and New Deal,” covers a period of remark-
able efforts by the government to assure full and equal participation 
by African Americans in the work and relief programs of the New 
Deal. The leadership of the administration of President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt included racial progressives like Harold Ickes, Harry 
Hopkins, and the First Lady, Eleanor Roosevelt. They were joined by 
an unprecedented number of senior black appointees who organized 
themselves into an unofficial “Black Cabinet” that guided and pro-
moted equal treatment efforts.
Depression–era equal opportunity efforts largely expired with 
the demise of their host agencies. However, new laws like the Wagner 
Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Social Security Act—
which instituted unemployment insurance—left a long-term legacy 
of benefits to the African American workforce.
On July 28, 1914, Austria-Hungary invaded Serbia and World War I began. This conflict set in motion a chain of events 
that would have profound consequences for the African American 
workforce and for federal government policies toward them. For 
several decades before the war, the flow of European immigrants 
was the main source of labor fueling America’s burgeoning indus-
trial economy. According to the federal Dillingham Immigration 
Commission’s reports of 1907-1910, workers from Eastern Europe 
virtually monopolized employment in many sectors of industry. By 
1915 the flow was reduced from a torrent to a trickle. In 1914 more 
than 1.2 million Europeans came to the United States; in 1915 only 
327,000 entered the country.1 European armies soaked up conscrip-
tion-age workers, and many immigrants returned to their home-
lands from the United States.
The Great Migration
While the influx of new laborers dwindled, the demand for US 
agricultural and industrial products soared. In response, the coun-
try turned to its main underused domestic source of labor: the 
black population. Concentrated largely in the rural South, African 
Americans at that time were subjected to Jim Crow laws in that 
region. Discriminatory practices, instituted in the decades after the 
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end of Reconstruction in 1877, segregated them socially and severely 
limited their economic opportunities. Consequently, the allure of 
jobs and better lives outside of the South prompted massive numbers 
to move north.
The groundwork for this large-scale relocation had already been 
laid by decades of the temporary movement of southern black labor-
ers as they took seasonal jobs in the North and then returned home.2 
But the growing threat of racial violence—including lynching, along 
with heavy flooding and boll weevil infestations that routinely com-
bined to ruin the cotton crops of black sharecroppers and tenant-
farmers—provided African Americans with a strong motivation to 
relocate permanently. During the 1910s, more than half a million 
of them left the South for good, beginning the Great Migration of 
African Americans that endured for the next half century and more. 
These migrants settled mainly in the large cities of the Northeast 
and Midwest. They found employment in industries that had for-
merly relied on European immigrants, such as railroads, packing 
houses, steel mills, and heavy manufacturing. Significant numbers 
also moved to nonurban areas, such as the coalfields of the southern 
Appalachians.3
The search by large numbers of African Americans for better 
economic and social opportunities in the cities of the North and 
Midwest brought them into contact with white workers and white 
society in a much-freer environment than existed in the Jim Crow 
South. The result was often racial friction and, occasionally, explo-
sive violence. In their new homes, free of restrictions on their voting 
rights, African Americans increasingly exercised their franchise in a 
more balanced two-party system, and thus began to affect elections. 
The result of these social and political pressures was that the federal 
government was forced to pay serious attention to the issues raised 
by the presence of large numbers of blacks in the urban industrial 
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workforce. Thus began fifty years of federal efforts, principally 
through the executive branch, to assimilate African Americans into 
the industrial workforce and to attempt to satisfy, however gradually, 
their growing desire for fair treatment.
Woodrow Wilson Administration and Blacks
Ironically, federal engagement in the issues of working African 
Americans developed under an administration that was generally 
unsympathetic, and often openly hostile, to their plight. The White 
House was occupied by Woodrow Wilson, a Virginia Democrat who 
took office on March 4, 1913.4 During the 1912 presidential elec-
tions, the Wilson campaign made a strong bid for the support of 
the growing block of black voters. Black groups worked vigorously 
for Wilson’s election, and late in the campaign, he was endorsed by 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP). While it turned out that their support was not crucial 
to Wilson, many blacks felt it gave them influence in the admin-
istration, and they looked forward to turning campaign promises 
into action for black rights. However, the executive branch was 
still dominated by segregationist Southern Democrats. As a result, 
Washington remained resistant to meeting either the political or 
economic expectations of the black community.5
Despite his campaign promises for racial fairness, Wilson actually 
favored segregation. He shared the belief, widespread among white 
Americans, that African Americans were racially distinct from and 
inferior to white people. Wilson also needed the support of Southern 
Democrats, who were uninterested in a goal of racial justice, in order 
to win their support for his main priority: an ambitious program of 
economic reform.6
While the southern states began instituting segregation and 
discrimination in the 1880s, the federal government moved in the 
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opposite direction, at least regarding its own employees. Blacks 
began to be appointed to diplomatic posts and political positions, 
and the government even held recruitment campaigns. Thirty years 
later, Wilson reversed that policy. He appointed only two blacks in 
his first two years in office, while allowing a total of twelve tradi-
tionally black positions to lapse into white hands.7 In perhaps the 
unkindest cut of all, Wilson’s Secretary of State William Jennings 
Bryan broke with the tradition of appointing black ambassadors to 
Haiti, a tradition that had been initiated with the selection of black 
abolitionist Frederick Douglass. Bryan’s naming of a white to that 
position aggrieved both American blacks and Haitians. Leaders 
from the National Colored Democratic League and the National 
Black Democratic League called on Wilson to resume the tradition 
of patronage appointments for members of their race.8
Before the Wilson administration, black participation in career 
federal government employment had been even higher than in the 
political appointment realm. Under the Pendleton Civil Service Act 
of 1883, most federal jobs were gradually removed from patronage 
and brought under a competitive civil service. By law, hiring was 
now to be based solely on merit. The Civil Service Commission 
(CSC), that administered the Pendleton Act, saw to it that qualified 
blacks had a fair opportunity to be hired. While many obtained only 
menial positions, a significant number held managerial and pro-
fessional posts. The CSC also promoted fair treatment after hiring. 
Segregation in federal offices was virtually nonexistent. As a result, 
the number of blacks in civil service positions grew steadily from 
about six hundred in 1883 to twelve thousand by 1913.9
When the Wilson administration took office in 1913, the National 
Democratic Fair Play Association objected to a federal landscape 
where white women were working alongside, or even reporting to, 
black men and women. Southern members of the cabinet were very 
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sympathetic to these concerns. At an early cabinet meeting, several 
of them complained about alleged friction between black and white 
federal employees. As a proposed solution, they called for the intro-
duction of segregation. Wilson went along with the idea, rationaliz-
ing it as being not only good for the government, but also in the best 
interest of blacks.
Secretary of the Treasury William Gibbs McAdoo (Wilson’s son-
in-law) and Postmaster General Albert S. Burleson were particularly 
strong proponents of segregation. Burleson claimed to have the sup-
port of moderate black leaders, including Bishop Alexander Walters, 
president of the National Colored Democratic League. Wilson’s cabi-
net, while not formally endorsing segregation, did not oppose as a 
body the racist efforts of Burleson, McAdoo and others.10
Consequently, Jim Crow practices were soon widely adopted. 
Such institutionalized racism affected black federal workers 
adversely in three main ways: physical segregation in the workplace, 
numerous downgrades to lower-paying jobs, and outright termina-
tion. Officially, there was no change in the CSC’s merit-based hir-
ing policies. But in May 1914 it began requiring that photographs 
be attached to all job applications, making it easier to discriminate 
against black candidates.11
Some departments adopted Jim Crow practices more enthusias-
tically than others. Not surprisingly, Secretary McAdoo’s Treasury 
Department instituted it widely. The impact of this endorsement 
was magnified by Treasury auditors’ offices being in almost every 
department of the government. Because of this presence, segregation 
and other Jim Crow practices often existed in buildings occupied 
by departments that did not support these policies. The Treasury 
Department even took the extreme step of setting up partitions in 
some offices so that white and black employees would not be able 
to see each other. While other federal agencies instituted Jim Crow 
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informally and through verbal orders, the Treasury Department was 
alone in issuing written orders. 
Albert Burleson’s Jim Crow Post Office Department was the 
largest federal employer of African Americans, and it had a wide 
national reach with post offices in virtually every county. Black 
employees in post offices and railway mail cars in the South suffered 
acutely from workplace discrimination. Elsewhere, restrooms were 
segregated in such agencies as the Government Printing Office, the 
Marine Hospital building, and the Navy Department. In some cases, 
the black restrooms had to be used by both sexes. Even more incred-
ibly, at times, bathrooms doubled as eating areas for blacks excluded 
from the regular dining rooms.12
Segregation was not universally adopted in the federal gov-
ernment, however. Secretary of Agriculture David F. Houston, a 
Southerner, did not impose it on the US Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), though racial practices were far from uniformly fair from 
one office to another within the USDA. Relatively few blacks were 
appointed as county agricultural agents, but these small numbers 
were due in part to the power of local offices to reject applicants on 
racial or other grounds. On the other hand, at the Office of Public 
Roads and the Bureau of Plant Husbandry, blacks and whites were 
allowed to work side by side. The Labor Department also remained 
relatively free of discrimination. Perhaps because adoption was not 
universal, the impact of Jim Crow on the federal workforce during 
the Wilson administration was somewhat mitigated. While the pro-
portion of black civil servants declined from 6 to 5 percent of the 
government-wide total, their absolute numbers actually increased.13
Responses to Federal Segregation
The nascent black civil rights community did not take the wave of 
federal segregation lying down. In May 1913 Ralph Tyler, a black 
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Treasury Department auditor and career employee working in the 
Department of the Navy, called on President Wilson to speak out 
against discrimination in the Bureau of Printing and Engraving and 
in the auditor’s office of the post office. More influential voices soon 
joined Tyler’s. Concerned about Jim Crow in the Wilson adminis-
tration, the NAACP concurrently authorized New York Post editor 
Oswald Garrison Villard, the chair of the body, to develop a plan 
for a “National Race Commission” and present it to the president. 
Villard was the leading white advocate of equal treatment for blacks 
and also a personal friend of President Wilson. In May 1913 Villard 
had an opportunity to present his plan to the president. At first, 
Wilson approved of the idea, but months passed and nothing hap-
pened. Villard repeatedly urged Wilson to appoint the commis-
sion, but finally Wilson informed him that he had decided against it 
because of opposition within the Senate.14
In the meantime, the NAACP collected substantial inside infor-
mation on Jim Crow in Washington, based on reports from a special 
investigator and other sources. By August 15, 1913, when it seemed 
unlikely that there would ever be a National Race Commission, the 
NAACP sent Wilson a strong letter objecting to the growing Jim 
Crow practices in the government. They followed up with a com-
prehensive publicity campaign among sympathizers, newspapers, 
members of Congress, and others, encouraging them to join the 
NAACP in opposition.15 
On November 6, 1913, Wilson unenthusiastically received a del-
egation from the National Independent Political League (NIPL), 
headed by the Boston Guardian’s crusading editor William Monroe 
Trotter. On behalf of the NIPL, a black advocacy group operat-
ing independently of the NAACP, Trotter presented the “National 
Petition Against Jim Crow and Color Segregation in the Federal 
Government,” signed by twenty thousand supporters. At first, Wilson 
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denied there was a formal Jim Crow effort. But when confronted 
with the documentation of segregation in his administration, the 
president reluctantly acknowledged its existence and vaguely prom-
ised that the situation would be “worked out.”16
The anti–Jim Crow campaigns continued and, on November 16, 
1914, a year after the 1913 meeting, Trotter led an almost identical del-
egation to Washington, this time under the auspices of the National 
Independent Equal Rights League. Meeting with Wilson, the group 
presented resolutions from the Massachusetts legislature protesting 
segregation in the federal government. Members took turns address-
ing the president and urging an end to Jim Crow. Trotter spoke 
last and made an impassioned plea for racial justice. He eschewed 
the deference normally expected in addressing the President of the 
United States, boldly rebuking Wilson for allowing rampantly unfair 
treatment of black employees in the federal government. Wilson 
responded that these employees were not being ill-treated in their 
separate work arrangements and claimed that segregation actually 
helped assure racial harmony. Trotter rejected the argument and 
asserted that because of these policies, African Americans might 
be less likely to support the Democratic Party in the future. Wilson 
took offense at this political threat, and the conversation degenerated 
into a heated argument. Although the meeting ended on a calmer 
note, this fiery confrontation between a black leader and the presi-
dent generated intense news coverage and enormous publicity for 
the movement against Jim Crow in the government. 
Presidential aide Joseph Tumulty was impressed with Trotter’s 
eloquence and continued to urge Wilson to reconsider the issue of 
segregation. While discrimination and segregation remained in 
existence for some time, after 1914 there was little, if any, further 
growth of Jim Crow in the federal establishment.17
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African Americans and World War I
With the US declaration of war against Germany on April 6, 1917, 
black support and black labor were now crucial to both war muni-
tions production and the military buildup. Administration officials 
worried, perhaps out of a guilty conscience, that German propagan-
dists would find blacks responsive to their message promoting non-
intervention by the United States and less willing to contribute to 
the war effort. Rumors abounded of German agents stirring up black 
field hands. Unsubstantiated incidents were blown out of proportion 
and widely disseminated. A black man was reported to have said, 
“The Germans ain’t done nothin’ to me, and if they have, I forgive 
’em.”18 To help counteract this perceived threat, Wilson and his cabi-
net sought to rebuild ties with the black community that had been 
damaged by the onset of Jim Crow under Wilson's administration.
As it turned out, doubts about the loyalty of African Americans 
and plots to undermine their support of the war effort were mis-
placed. After hundreds of federal investigations of alleged German 
subversion, there was no proof of a single bona fide plot to turn black 
people against the US government during the war.19 On the con-
trary, a national meeting of the NAACP and allied groups in May 
1917 resolved that blacks should enthusiastically support the United 
States and work for a victory that the delegates believed could lead 
to freedom for the “darker races” throughout the world. Further, 
while pledging absolute loyalty to the military’s aims, the delegates 
also vowed to continue seeking equal rights for blacks. These rights 
included the right to serve at all levels of the military, to fully exercise 
the voting franchise, to be free from Jim Crow practices, and to be 
safe from lynch mobs—an escalating problem of the early twentieth 
century. This resolution characterized the wartime positions of most 
black leaders who advocated loyalty to the government, but who also 
demanded fairness. 
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Meanwhile, the most pressing need after the declaration of war 
was a rapid mobilization to expand the United States Armed Forces. 
Hundreds of thousands of civilian blacks freely and enthusiasti-
cally joined patriotic rallies and volunteered to serve on the home 
front and in the military.20 Consequently, it was in the military that 
the first serious wartime issue involving blacks arose. The Selective 
Service Act of 1917 allowed the induction of black conscripts by 
local draft boards. Large numbers were drafted, but the US Army 
sought to hold to long-established traditions of discrimination. In 
an attempt to break this mold, the NAACP campaigned to convince 
Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, one of the nonsouthern mem-
bers of the cabinet, to try to improve conditions for black soldiers. 
Adding pressure on the government, in August 1917 race riots broke 
out in Houston, Texas, stemming from police brutality toward black 
soldiers.21 
In response to the military’s discrimination and the violence in 
Houston, Secretary Baker ordered the training of black officers and 
created an all-black combat division—the legendary Ninety-Second. 
This new division and several black regiments in existing divisions 
broke the barriers to military service by blacks in combat duty and 
acquitted themselves well in battle on the Western Front.22 Despite 
these opportunities, the NAACP was critical of the lack of further 
progress in the army. It objected to the facts that segregated units 
remained the norm, white officers publicly belittled the combat abili-
ties of black soldiers, and blacks were discriminated against in mat-
ters of leave and recreation.23 
In October 1917 Secretary Baker sought to respond to the 
NAACP and help defuse racial tensions. He met first with President 
Wilson and black educator Robert Moton; later he met separately 
with W. E. B. DuBois, one of the founders of the NAACP. After 
these dialogues, Baker created the post of confidential adviser in the 
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War Department to address black concerns within the military. He 
named Emmett Scott, an African American and long-time associ-
ate of Booker T. Washington, to fill the post. At that time there was 
only one other federal office dedicated to black affairs—an obscure 
Division of Racial Groups in the Bureau of Education. Scott’s duties 
included inspecting training camps and investigating discrimina-
tion claims against the military and southern draft boards. He also 
strove tirelessly to require the US Public Health Service to hire black 
doctors and nurses.24
Like the military, federal civilian agencies had a mixed wartime 
record of promoting equal opportunity and fair treatment of black 
workers. The National War Labor Board, established to eliminate 
disruptions in war production due to labor disputes, intervened in a 
number of cases affecting black workers and generally supported their 
rights. In a case involving white and black laundry workers in Little 
Rock, Arkansas, for example, the board ordered equal pay for equal 
work regardless of race. The US Railroad Administration (USRA), 
which operated the railroads after the federal government national-
ized them in late 1917, also sought with some success to equalize 
opportunities. On a number of occasions, the USRA defended the 
rights of black workers and their unions in the historically white-
dominated realm of train operations. In one notable instance, sleep-
ing-car porters were granted a pay increase after appealing to the 
USRA. On several occasions, the agency cancelled union contracts 
that discriminated against blacks. The USRA’s impact was limited, 
however, because Treasury Secretary McAdoo, a leading proponent 
of Jim Crow, was its director. Like McAdoo, many USRA investiga-
tors were far from racially progressive and usually sided against the 
rights of black railroad workers. Likewise, the USDA generally sided 
with southern farmers who feared losing their cheap black labor to 
new jobs in defense plants. The USDA helped farmers by promoting 
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local “work or fight” orders that forced black farm workers to remain 
in their jobs or else face conscription into the army.25
Secretary of Labor William B. Wilson and the War Labor 
Administration (WLA), that he directed, had the massive and dif-
ficult job of facilitating the mobilization of the labor force for defense 
production.26 Though hampered by lack of preparedness planning 
by the White House and inefficient defense procurement proce-
dures, the WLA and the Department of Labor placed millions of 
workers in defense jobs. In the process, Secretary Wilson and the 
agencies he headed were faced with the situation of hundreds of 
thousands of black workers who had migrated in search of defense 
work. Unlike the many government officials who favored Jim Crow, 
William Wilson, a former labor leader, was sympathetic to the plight 
of African Americans. The campaign against segregation in the 
government had reached the Labor Department in late 1913 when 
Secretary Wilson received letters, from groups as diverse as the 
NAACP and the New York City Republican Club, calling for equal 
treatment of black federal employees. These missives found a recep-
tive ear at the Labor Department that staunchly resisted the Jim 
Crow tide. Wilson’s biographer, Clark Wilhelm, wrote that Wilson 
“was willing to use his labor administration to help Negroes, show-
ing himself a courageous innovator.” Wilson’s second-in-command, 
Assistant Secretary Louis Post (also a white), had a strong record of 
supporting black causes. He worked for the Freedmen’s Bureau after 
the Civil War, participated in the founding of the NAACP in 1909, 
and maintained strong relations with the black leadership.27
The Department of Labor and the Great Migration
Even before the war, the Department of Labor became involved with 
black workers and the Great Migration through the work of an agency 
known as the US Employment Service (USES)—not to be confused 
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with the agency of the same name created by law in 1933. The first 
USES was created in 1915 as part of a plan to find jobs for those left 
without employment during a recession.28 However, the new agency 
built upon a preexisting Division of Information, established in 1907 
within the Bureau of Immigration that operated labor distribution 
(i.e., placement) offices at major ports to help guide arriving immi-
grants to jobs.29
The recession of 1915 proved to be short-lived, but the USES 
continued and played a surprising role in the Great Migration. A 
secretary of labor’s circular in January 1915 ordered the USES to 
expand the labor distribution network. The scope of the system was 
also greatly extended through a strategy involving the Post Office 
Department and using the Bureau of Immigration field staff to 
oversee operations. Every post office in the country was directed to 
prominently display a notice advising employers and workers of a 
new employment program. Interested parties were to fill out appli-
cation forms and turn them in to the postmaster to be sent to USES 
distribution branches where job seekers would be matched with job 
offers on a nationwide basis.30
Although the job matching system was never fully implemented, 
post offices did display notices from the Labor Department announc-
ing employment opportunities. The USES also facilitated transpor-
tation arrangements for relocating employment candidates, many of 
them southern blacks who could not afford the rail ticket north to 
a new job, by asking employers to advance one-way railroad tickets 
when needed. The trunks of new hires were checked straight through 
and consigned to the employer as security to assure reimbursement 
for the tickets.31
In this way, the Department of Labor provided an assist to 
the Great Migration just when demand for labor in the industrial 
North was swelling. In its annual report for 1917, the department 
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acknowledged that “some of the black migration northward had been 
through agencies of the US Employment Service.” Charles Johnson, 
a leading black sociologist, asserted in 1930: “Quite unwittingly the 
[department], through its practice of assisting in the movement of 
labor to acute points of demand, was giving the first impetus to the 
Negro migration.”32
By June 1916 southern planters were becoming intensely con-
cerned about the impact on production of the actual and anticipated 
shortages of cheap black labor due to migration. Rising wartime 
agricultural prices provided a strong incentive for them to main-
tain production.33 In response, they supported “work or fight” laws 
and orders to force black workers to stay in the fields. They also 
complained to their elected representatives in Washington that the 
USES was encouraging migration. Several southern congresspersons 
importuned the Department of Labor to put the brakes on. In a rare 
about-face on racial policies, the Labor Department, while continu-
ing to assist individual black workers, yielded to pressure and “with-
drew its facilities from group migration.”34
In further response to mounting criticism generated princi-
pally by southerners, the Department of Labor ordered studies of 
the migration’s economic and social impact. In the summer of 1916, 
the department sent Charles Hall and William Jennifer, black inves-
tigators on detail from the Commerce Department, on a fact-find-
ing mission to determine the impact of the migration.35 Based on 
numerous interviews with individuals of both races, the researchers 
concluded—contrary to assertions by the planters—that the migra-
tion was neither flooding the labor market in the North nor shrink-
ing the labor force in the South.36
Hall and Jennifer called for further study of the complex and 
changing nature of the migration. By 1917 they wrote, it had “excited 
widespread concern for its possible effect upon the prosecution of the 
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war.” The perceived black migration problem was now a war prob-
lem. To look into these and other issues, Secretary Wilson commis-
sioned a more thorough investigation in 1917. To supervise the study, 
he appointed Dr. James H. Dillard, a distinguished white academi-
cian and president of the Jeanes-Slater Funds for Negro Education. 
Wilson considered Dillard a credible investigator who had the confi-
dence of blacks and whites alike.37 
Dillard engaged a team of investigators from both races to con-
duct field work in several southern states. He compiled their find-
ings in a detailed report submitted to Secretary Wilson at the end 
of 1917. The report, however, was not published until 1919, but its 
purpose was to uncover both the causes of the migration and also 
its effects on the economy of the South. While Dillard worried about 
the impact of the migration on the South, he found that the effects 
were fundamentally positive. The study asserted that the movement 
of blacks to the North was a “commendable effort” that reflected 
the natural desire of human beings to improve their circumstances. 
In Dillard’s view, national progress depended upon broadly shared 
improvement that was not confined to one class or race.38 In regard 
to labor shortages in the South, he concurred with Hall and Jennifer 
and wrote that “the danger seems not to have been so extensive or so 
acute as was feared.”39
Despite Dillard’s findings, Secretary Wilson continued to receive 
complaints about alleged labor shortages. G. S. Cullinan, president 
of the Houston, Texas, Chamber of Commerce, charged that a 
Pennsylvania Railroad agent sought to hire five hundred blacks away 
from Houston by spreading a rumor that the federal government 
planned to force remaining blacks into farm work. Congressman 
John T. Watkins (Democrat–Louisiana) charged that hundreds of 
black farm laborers were heading to the north from his district. But 
it was not only the southerners who complained. The governor of 
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Minnesota called on Wilson to halt the entry of blacks into his state. 
A group of labor leaders from Illinois blamed a series of racial assaults 
in East St. Louis on the large number of black migrants in that area. 
Further, many labor unions were unhappy about the widespread use 
of black migrants as strikebreakers in the North and Midwest.40
Secretary Wilson was conciliatory toward Congressman Watkins. 
He responded that the department had no authority to interfere with 
the movement of workers and admitted it was “an embarrassing 
situation.” Wilson expressed the hope that in the North, employ-
ers would cease using black strikebreakers, and in the South, they 
would be “as solicitous as others for the welfare of the workers of 
their region.” The Labor Department’s policy, he wrote, was to bal-
ance the individual interests against the “industrial interests of the 
country as a whole.”41 To further address southern concerns about 
labor shortages, Wilson instituted a program to temporarily admit 
Mexican workers, including agricultural labor.42
Wilson was only compromising with political realities and war-
time needs, but USES Director John Densmore went beyond practi-
cal needs in responding to southern employers. When the operator 
of a sawmill charged that blacks were being lured away from his 
firm to higher paying federal munitions work in Muscle Shoals, 
Alabama, Densmore assured him that the government would 
not give black workers any information “showing what they do at 
Muscle Shoals to get [them] to move away from there. We will let 
[them] alone.”43
Birth of the Division of Negro Economics
In response to the Great Migration and continuing into the war 
period, African American leaders increasingly called for federal 
action to assist black workers. Initially spearheading the drive 
was Giles Jackson, an ambitious Virginian who was president of 
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the National Civic Improvement Association. Jackson advocated 
a self-help program for blacks that would focus on agricultural 
work. Beginning in 1916, he lobbied Washington for the creation 
of a “Bureau of Industrial Aid and Economics” that his association 
would operate under the umbrella of the Department of Labor with 
a substantial federal funding level of $700,000. The main purpose 
of the bureau was to encourage blacks to farm in the South instead 
of migrating, thereby helping to maintain food supplies and hold-
ing farming costs down. In a region where growers were increas-
ingly worried about losing low-wage black labor, this approach 
gained political support. The Richmond Chamber of Commerce and 
Senator Thomas Martin of Virginia endorsed Jackson’s approach.44
Jackson’s strategy, with its unorthodox mixture of private and 
public resources, gained enough support to have the matter taken 
up in the White House in May 1917. President Wilson’s personal 
secretary, Joseph Tumulty, referred the plan to the wartime Council 
of National Defense, which informed Jackson that Congressional 
approval of funding would be needed. Jackson petitioned members 
of Congress to approve the necessary legislation. In order to gain 
more support in the administration, Jackson joined Congressman W. 
Schley Howard (Democrat-Virginia) and members of the Richmond 
Chamber of Commerce to discuss the plan with Secretary Wilson. 
Jackson also met with Samuel Gompers, president of the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL), around the same time. Gompers, con-
cerned about the use of black migrants as strikebreakers in the 
North, endorsed Jackson’s plan and urged Secretary Wilson to join 
him. Additional support came from John A. Ross, president of the 
Associated Colored Employees of America, headquartered in New 
York City.45
Jackson’s proposal was never adopted, but it did establish the 
idea of a permanent federal office dealing with black labor issues. At 
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the end of January 1918 the National Urban League (NUL)—long 
involved in the issue of the black migration and concerned that the 
exodus was about to intensify—held a conference in New York City 
with representatives of business, social service agencies, other black 
organizations, and organized labor in attendance. The NUL’s pri-
mary focus was on winning the support of the AFL for greater union 
membership for black workers who were now entering the industrial 
workforce in droves and were, at the same time, subjected to signifi-
cant discrimination by organized labor. To supplement this effort, 
the conference included in its resolutions a call for “one or two com-
petent blacks” to be appointed in the Department of Labor to assist 
in the distribution of black labor.46
On Lincoln’s birthday, February 12, 1918, a group of black leaders 
from the NUL, the NAACP, and other bodies acted on this reso-
lution. A preliminary meeting with Louis Post paved the way, and 
the group presented Secretary Wilson with a more detailed version 
of their January conference recommendation. The memo cited the 
war emergency as creating “the most critical labor problem in its 
history.” It noted that the Department of Labor had already set up 
mechanisms to provide an adequate labor supply, deal with war-pro-
duction labor disputes, and assure decent working and living con-
ditions for war industry workers. The petitioners made it clear that 
they believed it was now time to pay attention to the black labor force 
whose migration posed a social challenge to the nation. Unlike Giles 
Jackson, who sought to keep blacks in the rural South, this group 
accepted migration as a continuing reality that required under-
standing and action to prevent further social problems in the North. 
Specifically, they asked for the appointment of “a black expert on 
labor problems” to advise the secretary of labor. They cited the ser-
vice of Emmett Scott in the War Department as a precedent. To sup-
plement the proposed "black expert," they called for the appointment 
21
WO R L D  WA R  I  A N D  A F T E R
of black assistants in the various offices of the war labor program as 
recommended in the January resolution. They also offered to suggest 
names for black appointees.47
Post forwarded their request to Secretary Wilson, along with his 
personal endorsement. Although Post felt that simply adding a black 
to the Department of Labor’s Advisory Council would be “mere race 
recognition” or tokenism, he and Wilson agreed that the department 
should pursue the matter. Post noted that “there is an absolute neces-
sity that the Department of Labor come into comprehensive and 
comprehending relations with . . . the black race.” He recommended 
to Wilson that the department hold an “authoritative conference” to 
decide how best to act on the petition. With his scribbled “Approved 
Feb. 16-18, WBW” on Post’s decision memo, Wilson endorsed the 
first step toward applying to black workers the broad federal man-
date stated in the Department of Labor’s 1913 Organic Act: to “foster, 
promote and develop the welfare of the wage earners of the United 
States, improve their working conditions, and advance their oppor-
tunities for profitable employment.” With this action, the federal 
government also began laying the groundwork for outreach efforts 
that evolved over the next half century into affirmative action.48
The recommended “authoritative conference” took place later in 
February 1918 at a meeting between several signers of the Lincoln’s 
Birthday proposal and the Department of Labor’s Advisory Council. 
L. C. Marshall, of the council, reported to Wilson that what the 
black group really wanted was to have a black adviser serving 
within the department. The council agreed with this idea. However, 
it rejected the call to have the black adviser serve on the Advisory 
Council itself because of the temporary nature of the council’s exis-
tence. They recommended that Wilson appoint a black expert who 
could provide advice and also help administer any programs that 
were developed. They left open the question of where the adviser 
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would be located and what kind of organization (if any) would be 
needed.49
Wilson followed the Advisory Council’s recommendation and 
created the position of Director of the Division of Negro Economics 
(DNE), the purpose of which was to advise him “in all matters affect-
ing Negroes.” The director would report to Wilson. To fill this his-
toric post, he appointed George Haynes, professor of sociology and 
economics at Fisk University. James Dillard, the Urban League, the 
NAACP, and others supported Haynes for the position. The appoint-
ment was effective May 1, 1918.50
Haynes, by then, was already a groundbreaking black pioneer. 
Born in 1880 to a domestic servant in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, Haynes 
graduated from Fisk University in 1903. After several years divided 
between pursuing graduate studies in sociology and working to sup-
port his mother and sister, he enrolled at Columbia University and, 
in 1912, became the first black to receive a doctorate there.
During the course of his graduate studies, Haynes focused on the 
causes and effects of the Great Migration. He became convinced that 
it was not, contrary to the hopes of many both within and outside of 
the South, about to be reversed. He believed that blacks and whites 
should apply social work techniques to ease racial friction and pro-
mote black adjustment to urban life. To that end, he helped found the 
NUL in New York City while teaching at Fisk. While working with 
the fledgling organization, he endeavored to develop cooperation 
between white and black groups. After his service at the Department 
of Labor, he returned to the field of social work, spending the balance 
of his career with the Federal Council of Churches as head of the 
department of race relations.51
As DNE director, Haynes had beaten out a powerful rival—Giles 
Jackson. Although Jackson’s original proposal for a black workers' 
program had been rejected, he received endorsements for director of 
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the DNE from the AFL, both senators from Virginia, and the White 
House. Louis Post, however, derailed the nomination because of his 
doubts about Jackson, both personally and professionally. These 
doubts were reinforced by the NAACP and other black organizations 
that considered Jackson persona non grata. W. E. B. DuBois termed 
Jackson disreputable, while the Washington Bee, a black newspaper, 
charged that he was “not fit to be a dog catcher.”52
Though he failed to land the big prize, Jackson was able to secure 
an appointment within the USES as chief of its new Negro Division. 
He took office on May 1, 1918, the same day Haynes became direc-
tor of the DNE. Jackson’s Negro Division was mandated to develop 
a program “for the mobilization, employment, and housing of black 
labor,” a mission very similar to that of the DNE.53
 Such a duplication of functions had the potential for generating 
a disruptive rivalry in leadership between Haynes and Jackson. The 
rivalry never materialized. The Negro Division and Giles Jackson 
were briefly cited in the 1918 Annual Report of the USES but were 
not mentioned in any subsequent annual reports. The fact was that, 
while Secretary Wilson had appointed Jackson to please Jackson’s 
politically powerful supporters, he never intended to allow him to 
play a significant role. Starved of staff and budget, Jackson was vir-
tually ignored. Haynes and the DNE held sole responsibility for the 
department’s efforts to mobilize black labor.54
Wilson met with George Haynes on May 1, 1918, Haynes’s first 
day in office, and laid out some initial goals for the DNE. As the 
Advisory Council had suggested, Haynes was to advise the secretary 
and other top Department of Labor officials “on matters relating to 
black wage earners” and to direct programs promoting cooperation 
between blacks and whites in both agricultural and industrial work-
places. Wilson asked Haynes to develop specific plans for such pro-
grams, based on this broad mandate. Wilson also stressed his own 
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belief that such public programs were important because blacks were 
such a significant portion of the populace, constituting one-tenth of 
the US population and one-seventh of the workforce.55
In April 1918 just before Haynes (and Jackson) took office, the 
USES prepared a memo of suggested policies for the DNE. The main 
recommendation was to create within the DNE a “Farm Service 
Reserve,” a cohort of black workers for “the farms in sections of the 
country where farmers are dependent on colored laborers.” The Farm 
Service Reserve (FSR) bore the fingerprints of Giles Jackson and was 
never adopted. Nevertheless, the USES memo played an important 
part in the development of the DNE. Clearly aimed at the South, the 
FSR also reflected the thinking of USES Director John Densmore, 
who was sympathetic to southern growers. The leadership of the pro-
posed FSR would be chosen from the black community, with special 
consideration given to leaders of secret societies who, it was believed, 
would be better able to gain the cooperation of black workers. These 
leaders would also counteract racially inflammatory wartime pro-
paganda supposedly spread by German agents through Gypsy 
fortune-tellers and others. There was to be a campaign to enlist white 
cooperation with the FSR, with strong reliance on publicity in the 
press and on support from state government and local leadership.56
The USES memo and FSR proposal soon circulated to Wilson, 
who referred it to Haynes. Haynes prepared a detailed response in 
which he expanded on its ideas and broadened its scope. Haynes’s 
memo became the basis for the DNE program.57 While not fully 
endorsing the FSR, Haynes did approve of many of its features. He 
favored utilizing black staff, tapping into black organizations, pre-
senting workers with a certificate and badge, and obtaining publicity 
from black leaders and newspapers. Haynes pointed out, however, 
that with the planting season nearly over, there was less need for 
emergency farmworkers. Yet, in his view, there remained a need 
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for long-range planning for both agricultural and industrial labor. 
Haynes also stressed that the needs of the whole country, and not 
just the South, should be considered. Furthermore, the black labor 
program would have to be coordinated with the broader mandate 
of the Department of Labor to improve conditions for all workers. 
Finally, Haynes pointed out that, given efforts in the South to forc-
ibly prevent blacks from leaving, workers would probably be suspi-
cious of any program that sought to send them back to the farm.58
Based on these considerations and building on the USES proposal, 
Haynes formulated a four-point approach to helping blacks find 
jobs, while maintaining peace between the races. First, he proposed 
that a farm reserve–type program should be part of a wider effort 
to deal with black employment in all sectors and regions. Second, 
he suggested that the plan provide a mechanism for bringing black 
and white representatives of various local bodies together to pro-
mote mutual understanding and to establish permanent commit-
tees comprised of both blacks and whites.59 Third, Haynes wanted to 
mount a careful campaign to publicize the effort among both whites 
and blacks, again using local leaders and organizations. Fourth, he 
wished to appoint black staff members (e.g., assistant directors and 
examiners) to work in the field to help administer the program. 
Though his plan was comprehensive, Haynes stressed that the most 
delicate and difficult problems will be
1. to have the colored people understand the large pur-
pose and liberal spirit of the department;
2. to find and secure the right type of black workers; and
3. to determine the approach to the local white people, 
especially in the South.
The first two are the keys to the third.60
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Post forwarded Haynes’s proposal to Wilson. To implement 
Haynes’s four-point approach, Wilson, Post, and Haynes formulated 
the guiding strategy of the DNE as follows: (1) organization of local 
interracial committees, (2) publicity campaigns to promote racial 
harmony and cooperation with the department’s war effort, and (3) 
development of a staff of blacks in the DNE to assist in those efforts 
and to work with other war agencies of the Labor Department. In 
addition, Haynes and the USES were to work jointly to keep Wilson 
informed about “industrial” (i.e., race) relations between blacks and 
whites.61
A Federal-State Partnership
The Division of Negro Economics implemented its dual mission of 
mobilizing black labor for the war effort and promoting fairness and 
racial harmony through a federal-state partnership, with an empha-
sis on the states. This effort concentrated on the regions most affected 
by the migration: the South, the root homeland of most of the nation’s 
blacks and the base for their exodus; and the Northeast and Middle 
West, the primary destinations of that migration. Assisted by a corps 
of newly appointed state supervisors of Negro economics, Haynes set 
the stage for grassroots action within the states. Grassroots action 
was implemented primarily by means of multiracial Negro Workers’ 
Advisory Committees (NWACs). Together the DNE and the state 
Supervisors of Negro Economics complemented the mobilization 
and antidiscrimination efforts of the Negro Workers’ Advisory 
Committees. These corresponding efforts were then, in turn, supple-
mented by other federal agencies.
Haynes’s first step in the national black labor program was to 
organize and set the course for the DNE. Given the triple mandate 
approved by Secretary Wilson, Haynes had to take into account 
several factors when planning new programs and establishing his 
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national organization. Primary among these was the impact of the 
black migration upon the balance of labor in both the North and 
the South. In the North, migration put the races into close contact 
and resulted in deplorable living conditions for blacks. Haynes rec-
ognized that confrontations between the races in shops and facto-
ries gave rise to “misunderstandings, prejudices, antagonisms, fears, 
and suspicions.” He considered these problems to be local issues that 
should be understood and remedied in their local context. He also 
recognized the need to forestall both black and white suspicions 
about the goals and intentions of his agency. “From the start,” he 
later wrote, “we have wanted both races to understand and firmly 
believe that the Department wishes to promote cooperation and to 
help solve local labor problems.”62 
With these factors in mind, Haynes began developing a multifac-
eted program to utilize existing governmental and nongovernmental 
bodies. The strategy was for the DNE to work with the USES, which 
was the prime placement agency for war-related jobs, and with other 
war-related agencies throughout the federal government to deal spe-
cifically with African American issues. The DNE would also coordi-
nate with private welfare organizations around the country. Finally, 
to improve black morale, enthusiasm for the war effort, and race 
relations, Haynes planned a nationwide publicity program.63
While he planned these massive coordinations, Haynes also had 
to deal with bureaucratic issues, such as planning the organization 
and finding qualified candidates to serve as staff. Wilson, mindful of 
suspicions about the program around the country and particularly in 
the South, made it clear that the DNE was largely advisory and had 
no enforcement powers. He also stressed that it was not a separate 
“Negro Bureau” but rather an integral part of the office of the secre-
tary that reported directly to him. The staff in the national office was 
kept small to reduce the visibility of the program, but this concession 
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was not as crippling a limitation as it might seem. The key compo-
nent of the organization was not the national but the state segment.64 
Appointing African Americans as DNE staff, state supervisors, and 
racial specialists in the USES was a priority for Haynes. Mindful that 
there was “serious doubt about the expert efficiency of blacks in offi-
cial positions,” he ensured that staff members were well-trained and 
fully experienced in their specialties. The job of mediating between 
whites and blacks in the workplace and promoting black morale 
required staff with exceptional human relations skills and sensitivi-
ties. Haynes was convinced that his personnel measured up to these 
standards. Appointed supervisors in key states were two experts from 
the Bureau of the Census: Charles E. Hall and William Jennifer who 
coauthored the department’s 1916 study on migration  and who served 
in Ohio and Michigan, respectively. Haynes also hired black clerks for 
his office and reviewed black appointees in the USES with whom he 
worked out a joint supervisory arrangement. DNE Assistant Director 
Karl Phillips supervised the Washington office and worked closely 
with the director. Haynes later praised the entire staff for their perfor-
mance under difficult circumstances. Looking at the broader context 
of black people functioning in a largely white world, he wrote: “Their 
services as a part of this experiment in the Federal Government’s 
relation to black wage earners has been a contribution to the experi-
ence with blacks in important administrative positions.”65
While still developing the DNE staff and program, Haynes began 
to establish contact with local leaders and groups in the states. He 
embarked on a ten-day tour in early June 1918 to meet with white 
and black representatives in the eight southern states where the 
problems of black workers were particularly urgent. Setting the stage 
for the tour was a Department of Labor press release dated May 31, 
1918. Citing problems in both the South and the North resulting 
from black migration, the department called on patriotic whites and 
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blacks to form local alliances. In the case of the South, it asked the 
alliances “to make those [blacks] who have not yet left the South sat-
isfied.” On his tour, Haynes developed what he called sympathetic 
contacts and laid groundwork for local efforts. He won promises of 
assistance from white and black educators, chambers of commerce, 
state Councils of Defense, and local offices of the USES. In many 
areas, his visits sparked the spontaneous formation of local coopera-
tive groups that proved useful in the national effort.66
Haynes chose North Carolina as the place to initiate the federal-
state phase of the DNE program. Two weeks after Haynes paid a visit 
to Raleigh, Governor T. W. Bickett called a conference of white and 
black leaders. Haynes met with the group to explain the federal pro-
gram and offer his assistance. After the conference, Bickett appointed 
a working group to set up a North Carolina NWAC, with provision 
for county and city NWACs as well. Haynes was particularly pleased 
to see the governor accept the post of Honorary Chairman of the 
State Committee. The committee organized a wide-ranging coali-
tion of educators, government officials, and representatives of the 
major towns and cities. While the participants were predominantly 
black, many white citizens were also involved. A number of cities 
and counties developed local NWACs to work with the state body. 
Haynes appointed Dr. A. M. Moore as North Carolina’s Supervisor 
of Negro Economics. Moore reported jointly to Haynes and the USES 
and worked closely with the North Carolina NWAC system. Haynes 
also helped get the USES involved in the program. The state Council 
of Defense and the governor also played major roles.67 Thanks to 
their efforts, North Carolina was able to report that several progres-
sive employers asked the NWAC for advice as they voluntarily set up 
programs for the welfare of their black employees. 
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The North Carolina system became a model for other southern 
states, with numerous variations in types of participant, organiza-
tional structure, and mission—differences which were to be expected 
in such a decentralized program. Mississippi, Florida, and Virginia 
soon held conferences and organized their own NWACs, followed 
by other southern states. The Council of National Defense played a 
key role in the development of such programs in the South, both 
through endorsements and through efforts by the state councils to 
bring white members to the NWACs.
Attention then turned to the North. Haynes selected Ohio, a 
major employer of black migrants, to lead the way in that region. 
Jointly with the USES and Governor James M. Cox (later the unsuc-
cessful Democratic nominee for president in 1920), Haynes con-
vened a state conference. Cox, who had visited Tuskegee Institute 
that year, assured an enthusiastic audience that “we . . . need [black] 
people and need them badly in the war . . . [and] in the industrial 
life of this country.”68 Ohio soon set up a program similar to that in 
North Carolina and served as a regional leader and example.
To deal with large new concentrations of blacks in Ohio’s cities, 
Charles Hall worked with the USES and also directly with the black 
workforce. He sought to assure that blacks would be able to find 
available work, the pay and hours of these jobs, and details on the 
attitudes of surrounding white communities.69 A local Ohio com-
mittee reported to the state conference that blacks were being denied 
skilled jobs in defense work. It called on the federal government to 
prohibit discrimination in contract work (see chapter 3 on the Fair 
Employment Practice Committee). An Ohio committee on black 
women in industry also called for greater attention to the needs of 
this group of workers.70
The Florida NWAC defused a tense situation caused by rumors 
that black women, receiving military allotments from family 
31
WO R L D  WA R  I  A N D  A F T E R
members in the armed forces, were refusing to work. The committee 
investigated and announced the finding that many of these women 
were actually employed.
In Illinois, a special committee reported to the state confer-
ence on the general conditions of black war workers. It found that 
union organizing in the Chicago stockyards had actually improved 
race relations, and that in other parts of the state blacks were well 
accepted. Although race riots erupted in Chicago, through the efforts 
of local NWACs and other groups in Illinois, “much friction . . . was 
removed by this cordial effort.” In several Illinois cities, these groups 
defused tense racial situations and calm prevailed.71 
The work of the states was varied and wide-ranging, including 
investigating conditions of black workers, educating blacks and 
whites on race relations improvement, helping with job placements, 
alleviating discrimination and race friction, and developing recom-
mendations for federal action. The DNE report The Negro at Work 
during the World War and during Reconstruction, published in 1921, 
provides many illuminating examples of this work. Before the end of 
the war, most large states east of the Mississippi River had developed 
a black labor program. A total of 11 states had formal NWACs, but-
tressed with 225 local committees with a membership of over 1,000. 
This aggregation of local white and black leadership generally worked 
well together, and both races gave freely of their time for little or no 
pay. Haynes noted that there was only one known case of friction 
among committee members serious enough to cause a resignation.72 
In addition to these efforts in their own backyards, the states also 
kept the Department of Labor and the DNE informed of conditions 
and morale in their workforces and assisted the department and the 
Supervisors of Negro Economics in their work.73 The state supervi-
sors worked closely with the local USES offices. When the USES was 
given the responsibility for recruiting labor for defense work, many 
T O  A DVA N C E  T H E I R  O PP O R T U N I T I E S
32
members of NWACs and state Supervisors of Negro Economics 
volunteered to assist. While not technically supervised by Haynes, 
they kept him informed of their activities and of conditions in their 
states. The supervisors assisted the NWACs and associated groups 
and also worked directly with employers and others to reduce dis-
crimination, place blacks in defense jobs, and improve black morale 
and productivity. Since the NWAC system handled the bulk of this 
work in the southern states, the supervisors were most active in the 
northern states.74
Like the NWACs, the supervisors engaged in a wide range of 
activities, but they had to be very selective since they were operat-
ing with little or no staff. One of the most notable supervisors was 
Charles Hall in Ohio. He took particular interest in housing and 
promoted the organization of black building and loan associations. 
Based on Ohio law, he developed a model constitution for such asso-
ciations and distributed this model constitution within the black 
community. The so-called Ohio Plan resulted in the establishment 
of several associations in Ohio and spawned interest and imitation 
in other states as well. In addition to his work on housing and loan 
practices, Hall acted to reduce racial discrimination “at the gate” of 
employers and won agreement from the Ohio Federation of Labor to 
allow blacks to enter freely into labor unions.75
In Michigan, Forrester Washington was a very active administra-
tor, as was William Jennifer, who followed him. Like Ohio, Michigan 
was a major migration magnet. The Detroit area saw explosive 
growth in its black population and in the resulting problems of racial 
tensions and overcrowded housing conditions. The Michigan Labor 
Department and the Detroit Urban League (DUL) were struggling 
to place blacks in war industry jobs and deal with social problems. 
These bodies welcomed the attention the Department of Labor now 
focused on the state. The fact that Supervisor Washington was former 
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director of the DUL assured good cooperation with existing local 
efforts. In his brief stint in Michigan, Washington investigated more 
than a hundred munitions factories, auto plants, and other shops 
in the Detroit area employing large numbers of blacks. He worked 
out a program to help these organizations increase the productivity 
of their black workers by providing better working conditions, set-
ting up advisory committees of black workers, and appointing more 
black foremen.76
William Jennifer took over as Supervisor of Negro Economics 
in Michigan in October 1918. He immediately embarked on a state-
wide tour to view local conditions and build coalitions with business 
groups, churches, and other organizations. In addition to inves-
tigating discrimination, helping blacks find suitable jobs, dealing 
with housing problems, and other typical activities of a supervisor, 
Jennifer organized a state conference in December, one month after 
the World War I Armistice in November. The conference quickly 
shifted its emphasis to postwar labor issues. It placed importance 
on dealing with the problems of black women workers. A special 
committee developed a program to improve working conditions for 
this group, investigate reasons why some industries hired only white 
women, and fight discrimination in wages and workplace facilities.77 
The Supervisors of Negro Economics in other northern indus-
trial states had similar agendas, with local variations. Their impact 
varied, depending on when the supervisor took office and on the 
effectiveness of existing programs sponsored by local NWACs, 
governments, and private organizations. Forrest Washington left 
Michigan to become supervisor in Illinois. One of the main proj-
ects in his new position was to promote, with the assistance of local 
NWACs, cooperative retail enterprises among blacks. Several self-
help ventures set up black-run businesses as a means of retaining 
within the community the money black residents had available to 
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spend. Economic self-help was one of Haynes’s and the civil rights 
community’s major national priorities.78
New Jersey Supervisor William M. Ashby also worked hard 
to place black workers in well-paying war industry jobs, persuade 
employers to hire black foremen, and eliminate discrimination. 
However, when deciding where to concentrate the limited resources 
of his DNE, Haynes gave less emphasis to states where problems 
were less acute, such as New York and Pennsylvania. Consequently, 
the supervisors in those states did not take their posts until the war 
was almost over, and when they did begin operations, they focused 
mainly on post-war adjustment, such as placing skilled black work-
ers displaced from shutdown munitions plants and finding jobs for 
returning black veterans.79
The Division of Negro Economics from Wartime to 
Peacetime
After all the state programs were set in motion and supervisors were 
deployed, the DNE concentrated on serving as a watchdog for local 
efforts, proselytizing (both directly and indirectly) for full black par-
ticipation in war labor production, and promoting racial harmony. 
The proselytizing was accomplished through speeches and talks that 
Haynes and his staff gave and through press releases that were circu-
lated widely to both the white and black presses. The public relations 
blitz also included distribution of prepared speeches and articles 
to be used by speakers and magazines around the country. On July 
4, 1918, an estimated two thousand orators delivered a speech pro-
vided by the DNE on “Labor and Victory,” a speech promoting the 
role of black people in the “world struggle for democracy.” Haynes 
estimated that these messages reached at least one million people a 
month.80
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During its existence, the DNE had significant interaction with, 
and impact on, other sections of the Labor Department that housed 
it. In August 1918 Post, Haynes, and others developed cooperative 
arrangements between the DNE and other Department of Labor 
offices at the local level. Post circulated the DNE’s annual budget 
around the department for comments.81 The USES adopted a plan 
developed by Haynes for hiring black war workers. The Women in 
Industry Service (WIS), forerunner of the Department of Labor’s 
Women’s Bureau, consulted with the DNE in developing a survey on 
the treatment of female black workers in war industries. The DNE 
helped locate qualified researchers to lead the WIS effort. When the 
department’s Inspection and Investigation Service started planning 
a study of black workers in northern industries, the division assisted 
in similar fashion.82
After the war ended with an armistice on November 11, 1918, the 
DNE reinvented itself for peacetime work, and Haynes saw a chance 
for African Americans to build on progress made during the war. 
In a speech titled “Grasping the Hands of Economic Opportunity,” 
Haynes pointed out that “for the first time the Negro has the chance 
to firmly entrench himself in the better occupations,” and he urged 
his black listeners to take advantage of Mr. Opportunity, as he put 
it. But holding on to wartime gains was only one of his priorities.83 
Shortly after the armistice, Haynes alerted Labor Department 
policy makers to the problem of the large numbers of unemployed 
blacks who were about to be demobilized from war industries and 
mustered out of the military.84 He also emphasized that, in the 
North, the potential for racial friction was increasing in those cities 
with new black populations, and in the South, employers needed to 
improve the often harsh working conditions blacks faced. However, 
the most critical postwar problem, in Haynes’s view, was the chal-
lenge to improve relations between black workers and their white 
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colleagues and employers. He saw the work of the racially mixed 
local NWACs as the best way to deal with these issues, and he threw 
the support of the DNE behind their efforts.85
The Department of Labor and the DNE supported local efforts 
to improve postwar race relations in a number of ways. In February 
1919 Secretary Wilson called a national conference of the NAACP, 
the Phelps-Stokes Fund, and other social welfare organizations with 
the goal of promoting better race relations and addressing black 
issues involving women in the workplace, farm workers, and train-
ing and education. Participants worked on facilitating cooperation 
among their organizations and on coordination between them, the 
Department of Labor, and other government agencies. Conferees 
called for the Department of Labor to renew efforts to improve the 
lot of black workers by taking such steps as continuing to survey 
their working conditions and training black youths for entry into 
industry. After the conference, Haynes authorized supervisors in 
states with camps for black soldiers to work jointly with the USES 
toward placing discharged veterans in civilian jobs. This task was 
made more difficult by a virtual shutdown of the munitions industry 
and a nationwide economic recession.86 
In an era of revolutions abroad, Red Scares, and racial unrest 
at home, Haynes and the DNE responded in various ways to the 
unstable social landscape of postwar America. The wartime rumors 
of German efforts to propagandize blacks morphed into a peace-
time hysteria about Bolshevik propaganda. The DNE escaped attack 
by extremists in most areas. However, in Florida, it ran into rough 
waters when whites charged that radicalism was being engendered 
in the program by leftist journals. This accusation tainted the efforts 
of both the Florida NWACs and the DNE in the minds of those 
who equated advocacy of improved conditions for blacks with 
Bolshevism. Florida Governor Sidney Catts, an erstwhile supporter 
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of the DNE during the war, succumbed to the changing winds of 
postwar politics. He charged that the division and local USES offices 
were filled with “carpetbag, negro federal officers” who advocated 
mixing of the races. Catts demanded that Wilson abolish the DNE 
and replace the head of the USES office in Florida. Wilson refused 
these demands, but under pressure to compromise, he temporarily 
suspended the Labor Department’s race relations work in Florida.87 
In the Midwest, badly housed black migrants were isolated into 
urban ghettoes and made unwelcome by resident whites. Haynes felt 
these conditions made this population “a very ripe field for critical 
developments of unrest, friction and disturbances” and a possible 
victim of efforts “to arouse the black group to radical action.” He 
reported to Wilson that the DNE had partially countered these influ-
ences by guiding newly arrived blacks to employment offices and 
social service organizations. However, he insisted, “I do not see . . . 
how we can help the situation” unless the division could hire more 
black field assistants. Unlike the Florida critics, Haynes saw this pro-
gram as a solution, not a problem.88
After bloody race riots in Chicago in July 1919, Louis Post, 
administering the Labor Department in place of the ailing Wilson, 
sent Haynes on a fact-finding mission to several Midwestern cities. 
Haynes found whites pitted against blacks because of the familiar 
syndrome of social, economic, and political disruption associated 
with the migration, but he failed to find any evidence of incitement 
by radical provocateurs. One special factor he noted was bitterness 
among black war veterans over harsh treatment by the army. In sev-
eral of the cities he visited—especially Chicago, a city with excessive 
black unemployment—he found that “the racial tension is so wide-
spread as to be in fact a matter of national concern.”89 
Haynes argued that this situation required government action. 
Blacks echoed that sentiment, as many were now looking to 
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government to solve problems of racial violence and poor living con-
ditions. Indeed, the work of the DNE, along with the state and local 
activities it spawned during and after World War I, seemed to have 
generated hope and enthusiasm among blacks and racial progres-
sives throughout the nation. Ohio Supervisor Charles Hall reported 
that blacks in his state “watched with increasing interest” the DNE’s 
activities on their behalf. They were developing an appreciation of 
government at all levels. As a result, blacks in Ohio, Hall said, felt that 
“the Government has recognized them industrially, that they now 
have a medium through which to voice their complaints, and that . . . 
they will be less subject to exploitation.” An investment banker from 
Memphis wrote to Wilson praising Haynes and expressing the hope 
that the DNE would continue its postwar work of “preserving the 
proper attitudes of the races toward each other.”90
Unfortunately, racial relations in the United States reached a 
nadir during what became known as the bloody summer of 1919. 
From Washington, DC, to Chicago and points south and west, a wave 
of violence raged against black people, fueled by the potent postwar 
mixture of unemployment, inflation, job shortages, fears of revolu-
tion and, above all, fear of black political power and social advance-
ment. In Washington, DC, lurid newspaper accounts of alleged black 
assaults on white women fomented mob attacks on blacks, who 
retaliated in kind. Two thousand army troops had to be called in to 
restore order. Similar violence broke out in Chicago, Indianapolis, 
Knoxville, Omaha, and other cities. In rural Arkansas, an estimated 
250 blacks were murdered by whites, who deeply resented and felt 
threatened by a perceived rise in the victims’ standard of living.91
Just as the bloody summer started, the department sought to 
fund the DNE for the new fiscal year beginning July 1, 1919. Haynes 
remained hopeful for the division’s future. He noted that “every-
one who has looked into it commends the work as valuable and 
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necessary.” However, the program’s timing was not good. Congress 
was unsympathetic to the continuation of the DNE. During pro-
ceedings on the Department of Labor appropriations bill, the DNE 
and two other wartime agencies were excluded from the legislation. 
In the enacted appropriations bill, funds were restored to the other 
two bodies, but not, unfortunately, to the DNE. The division was 
able to survive through fiscal year 1919 (ending July 1, 1919) only 
by borrowing resources from the US Conciliation Service and other 
Department of Labor offices. It was unable, however, to fund the sys-
tem of state NWACs, which quickly withered away.92
Despite the budgetary woes, Haynes remained optimistic and 
continued to plan for the future. He proposed a federal-state effort 
led by the Department of Labor to collect data and work coopera-
tively on black labor issues. He envisioned a joint effort “for the 
investigation of black affairs and race relations in as many locali-
ties as possible . . . as a means of having information and advice to 
improve conditions and race relations.” Unfortunately, the DNE had 
no better luck in Congress in 1920, and it went out of existence after 
the administration of Republican President Warren G. Harding took 
office in March 1921.93
The 1920s: An Age of Federal Minimalism
While the DNE disappeared during the 1920s, the social problems 
that it addressed—the urbanization of black workers and their 
assimilation into industry—only became more pressing. Spurred on 
by the booming economy of the 1920s, the black migration from the 
rural South to the cities of the North and Midwest continued at an 
accelerated pace. Part of the reason for increased migration was the 
growing mechanization in farming. These innovations reduced the 
demand for agricultural labor in the South, as elsewhere, and forced 
thousands of blacks to leave the region every year to seek work. In 
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the 1910s, the net average increase of the black population outside the 
South was 34,000 per year.94 In the early 1920s, that figure swelled to 
over 100,000 per year. 
Partly as a result of the growing concentration of African 
Americans in New York City’s Harlem in the 1920s, there was a flow-
ering of creativity in black music, literature, and art known as the 
Harlem Renaissance, which celebrated black identity and sought to 
displace negative stereotypes. This, and similar flowerings of black 
culture elsewhere, acted as magnets attracting additional migrants 
from the South. Adding to the incentive to move, Ford Motor 
Company—partly motivated by the desire to break up unions—
adopted a policy of paying black workers equal pay for equal work 
and placing a number of African Americans in high-wage jobs.
After the war, many black workers were able to retain their 
foothold within industry. Expanded black urban populations also 
increased the demand for black professionals and small business-
men. Consequently, many blacks were able to enter the ranks of the 
middle class, although the bulk of them still remained in low-skill, 
low-wage jobs.95 
Several factors combined to restrain significant federal efforts to 
promote equal opportunity for African Americans in the 1920s. The 
predominant policy of Presidents Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover 
was to minimize government involvement in the economy. The 
prosperity of the 1920s only reinforced this approach. There was also 
widespread growth of xenophobia and an explosion of membership 
within the Ku Klux Klan in many areas. This expansion of formal-
ized racism overwhelmed whatever social pressures may have existed 
on the federal government to adopt progressive racial policies. 
Federal labor policy became focused on developing and enforcing 
more restrictive immigration laws. The primary successes for black 
groups came in winning inclusion of pro–civil rights planks in both 
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the Republican and Democratic Party platforms in presidential elec-
tion years.96 In the area of federal employment, obstacles to the hir-
ing of blacks that had been raised during the Wilson administration 
remained largely in place. These obstacles included the Civil Service 
Commission’s requirement that photographs accompany federal job 
applications.97 Throughout the 1920s, the majority of government 
agencies continued to hire only white applicants for work above the 
unskilled level. The Department of Labor reported in 1928 that most 
blacks who managed to get federal jobs had been relegated to the 
lowest-paying positions. In addition, many black workers were still 
routinely segregated to minimize their contact with white workers. 
One exception during the Harding and Coolidge administrations 
was the Department of Commerce. Herbert Hoover, Secretary of 
Commerce from 1921 until he was elected president in 1928, elimi-
nated segregation in his department. Black employees in most of the 
other departments that had implemented Jim Crow under President 
Wilson continued to suffer discrimination.98 
For the most part during the 1920s, the federal government 
ignored the public policy legacy of the Division of Negro Economics. 
Nevertheless, a precedent for federal intervention on behalf of black 
workers was in place. Federal intervention during World War I—
limited as it was—had encouraged a propensity within the black 
community to look toward government (particularly at the federal 
level) for fair treatment and better opportunities. 

Lurking under the surface of the prosperous 1920s was an economically lethal combination of factors that would soon 
combine to produce the Great Depression. Millions of Americans 
were forced into unemployment and poverty that endured almost 
unrelieved until World War II. The complex causes included per-
sistent low wages, excessive speculation in real estate and securities, 
weakened international financial structures and, perhaps foremost, 
a depressed agricultural sector. Partly due to a cost-price squeeze 
on agricultural commodities in the 1920s, agriculture slipped into 
a rapid decline that, because it had become an integral factor in the 
national economy, soon dragged down the other sectors. By the time 
of the stock market crash of 1929, the country was already in deep 
economic trouble.1
African Americans felt the effects of the Depression dispro-
portionately. The agricultural decline of the 1920s forced many of 
those working on farms to migrate to seek scarce industrial work, 
and many wound up in unemployment lines. In many cases, those 
lucky enough to be employed at the onset of the Depression had only 
recently obtained good industrial jobs and fell victim to the tradi-
tional rule of “last hired, first fired.” As the economic tide ebbed, 
those already below the surface sank further. Black unemployment 
rates eventually exceeded 50 percent in many areas, double the 
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maximum general rate of 25 percent. By the early 1930s, 17 percent 
of whites were unable to support themselves, but 38 percent of blacks 
were in a similar predicament.2 
During the administration of President Herbert Hoover, the 
federal government attempted to alleviate unemployment through 
limited public works programs. However, there was no effort to 
compensate for the disparate impact of the Depression upon black 
workers. When Hoover ran for reelection in 1932, his opponent was 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Democratic governor of New York. Roosevelt 
had instituted extensive anti-Depression programs in his state, and 
he promised to do the same for the nation as president.
However, FDR had never shown much interest in racial mat-
ters, and his campaign was not strongly supported by blacks. Like 
Woodrow Wilson—in whose administration he served as assis-
tant secretary of the navy—FDR deferred, during the campaign, to 
the southerners who still dominated the Democratic Party. While 
the Republican Party platform contained a mild civil rights plank, 
the Democratic nominating convention failed to adopt one. Many 
blacks worried that a victory by FDR would put southern segrega-
tionists back in power. As a result, black voters maintained their tra-
ditional loyalty to the Republican Party and voted overwhelmingly 
for Hoover. 
The Roosevelt Administration and the “First New Deal”
While Roosevelt carried only four of the fifteen largest black wards 
in the northern states and won black majorities only in New York 
City and Kansas City, he won the election in a landslide. The country 
turned to a new president to lead it out of the Depression.3 Roosevelt 
took the presidential oath of office on March 4, 1933, vowing to inau-
gurate a “New Deal” for America. He immediately commenced a 
historic national mobilization designed to relieve the economic and 
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psychological suffering from the Depression and bring about the 
return of prosperity. In the 1930s, Roosevelt and the now heavily-
Democratic Congress greatly expanded the size and scope of the fed-
eral government and developed a number of programs that, while 
not aimed specifically at African Americans, aided them greatly. 
In practice, these programs were not always racially fair in their 
distribution of relief and employment benefits, but racial equality 
was always the goal. The participation of unprecedented numbers 
of blacks in policy-making positions in Washington increased the 
chances that African Americans would be treated fairly during the 
greatest economic crisis in the nation’s history.4
Roosevelt’s entire cabinet was confirmed by the Senate and  sworn 
in on Inauguration Day. Despite FDR’s weak stance on civil rights, 
the make up of his administration’s leadership boded well for blacks. 
One of the leading racially progressive appointees was Harold Ickes, 
the secretary of the interior. Ickes, a white, had served as head of the 
Chicago branch of the NAACP and became a champion of Native 
American rights in the 1920s.5 Frances Perkins, FDR’s New York 
State labor commissioner, was his choice for secretary of labor.6 As 
a young social worker in Philadelphia, she helped black girls arriv-
ing from the South avoid the clutches of prostitution rings.7 Another 
Albany, New York, alumnus was Harry Hopkins, who served ini-
tially as a presidential adviser before moving on to head major New 
Deal programs. Like Perkins, Hopkins had been a social worker with 
private welfare organizations. Then he joined FDR’s successful 1928 
gubernatorial campaign, won Roosevelt’s trust, and was appointed 
director of the state’s Temporary Emergency Relief Organization.8 
This trio of social progressives brought in a small army of like-
minded aides, many of them black. First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, 
who had become personally involved in a number of social issues 
in the 1920s, became a major ally of the racial progressives and an 
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influential supporter of black causes. In terms of racial attitudes, 
Roosevelt’s White House differed sharply from Wilson’s, and despite 
FDR’s personal lack of involvement in racial matters, the new admin-
istration was poised to build on the legacy of the Division of Negro 
Economics.9 
A privately sponsored Washington “Conference on the Economic 
Status of the Negro” in early 1933 sought to direct national atten-
tion to the impact of the Depression on black incomes and the black 
family.10 FDR, however, was totally focused on the broader goal of 
overcoming the Depression through aggressive federal action. Like 
Wilson, FDR badly needed the support of Southern Democrats in 
Congress, and he was willing to accommodate (to some degree) 
their racial views to win their backing for his economic recovery 
program.11
With the help of this key bloc, Roosevelt was able to quickly initi-
ate his New Deal. In its first one hundred days, he sought to stimu-
late recovery through such measures as stabilization and control of 
banking and the currency, extensive federal loans to private industry 
and property owners, unprecedented regulation of private enterprise, 
and massive relief efforts for farmers and the unemployed. Frances 
Perkins and Harry Hopkins met with FDR early on and persuaded 
him to also support a strong relief effort to help working people and 
their families.12 Thus was set in motion a cluster of laws and pro-
grams that became known as the First New Deal (1933-1935).
To relieve hunger and homelessness, Congress created the Federal 
Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) in May 1933 to fund state 
relief efforts. The FERA provided hundreds of millions of dollars in 
grants to state relief agencies. Roosevelt appointed Harry Hopkins to 
direct the massive program. Hopkins believed that work was supe-
rior to the “dole” and always sought to convince the states to pro-
vide public service jobs rather than handing out checks or goods. A 
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few areas, such as New York City, followed the jobs approach under 
the FERA, but most of the country opted for welfare because it pro-
vided quicker relief at a lower cost. Hopkins went to great lengths 
to assure that blacks across the country would receive their fair 
share of benefits. This goal proved difficult to achieve in the South, 
however, because welfare benefits were lower there, and blacks were 
often denied a fair proportion of the meager relief that was avail-
able. Partly because of this lack of access to welfare, migration out 
of the South jumped during the 1930s, and the black population in 
the North grew by 25 percent. Another problem was that migrant 
farm workers, a disproportionate number of whom were black, were 
totally excluded from relief under the FERA on the phony basis that 
aiding them amounted to a federal subsidy of their employers.13 
To help restore prosperity, on June 16, 1933, Congress passed 
the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), which created the 
National Recovery Administration (NRA). This program operated 
on the theory that ruinous competition had brought about low prices 
and overproduction—factors that helped cause the Depression. The 
NRA sought to limit production and raise prices by imposing man-
datory controls or codes in each industry. To gain the support of 
organized labor, the NRA affirmed the right of workers to organize 
and bargain collectively under Section 7a of the NIRA. The NRA 
also required that all codes include a minimum wage of up to forty 
cents per hour and overtime pay after thirty-five to forty hours per 
week, depending on the industry. Participating businesses displayed 
the distinctive NRA Blue Eagle emblem, and consumers were urged 
to sign pledges to only patronize NRA businesses.14
Committees representing business, organized labor, and con-
sumers drafted NRA codes for most industries by September 1933. 
Unfortunately, representatives of black workers were absent from 
the deliberations. Not surprisingly, the codes that emerged tended 
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to work to their disadvantage. The Joint Committee on National 
Recovery, a black watchdog group, reported a system of discrimina-
tion in the codes that resulted in lower incomes for blacks. Traditional 
“Negro occupations,” such as janitorial and household help, were 
often excluded from minimum wage and maximum hour require-
ments. Industries concentrated in the South, that still housed the 
bulk of the black workforce, were allowed to pay lower wages than 
other industries. For many other industries and occupations, pre-
existing wage differences (often based on race) were frozen in place 
by a wage differential. When blacks received higher wages under the 
codes, southern employers often replaced them with white workers. 
Echoing similar concerns expressed during World War I, employ-
ers complained that high wages—dictated by what some of them 
dubbed the Negro Relief Association—deprived them of cheap labor 
for picking and chopping cotton. Weak and biased enforcement 
allowed many employers to get away with paying subcode wages to 
black workers. Reflecting widespread dissatisfaction, black newspa-
pers came to refer to the NRA as Negroes Ruined Again or Negro Run 
Around. Few blacks mourned when in 1935 the Supreme Court ruled 
that the NIRA was unconstitutional and closed down the NRA.15
Born of the NIRA and long surviving its nullification was the Public 
Works Administration (PWA), established in June 1933. Congress 
appropriated the unusually large sum of $3.3 billion to fund the PWA 
to build public structures of all kinds to provide jobs, stimulate the 
economy, and provide badly needed new facilities and infrastructure. 
The PWA was intended to address the anomalous combination of 
hundreds of thousands of idle laborers and skilled workers, business 
inventories overflowing with construction materials; and schools, 
housing, roads, and sewer systems crumbling because of the lack of 
public revenues. Roosevelt chose Harold Ickes to head the PWA, while 
Ickes also continued to serve as secretary of the interior.16 
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To assure fairness to workers, Ickes arranged (whenever pos-
sible) to use the new version of the US Employment Service, which 
had been reincarnated and strengthened by the Wagner-Peyser Act 
of June 1933. The new USES was to refer workers to job sites and 
to do so regardless of race. Ickes believed that hiring through the 
USES would help counter the tendency of employers to give prefer-
ence in hiring to former employees, who were often disproportion-
ately white, rather than considering new applicants. The USES also 
helped open PWA jobs to blacks in unionized firms that normally 
hired through union business agents (except in the case of the indus-
trial unions). This move resulted in favoritism to whites because of 
past union discrimination. Consequently, many unions resisted the 
PWA’s use of the USES. A compromise was worked out whereby 
business agents were given forty-eight hours to place a union mem-
ber in a new position. If the union hall could not fill the position, 
the local USES office took over. The USES also handled all nonunion 
placements. To get the USES system operational as quickly as pos-
sible, the PWA agreed to finance the agency’s operating costs. By 
the end of 1934, the USES and other bodies had placed two million 
workers in PWA jobs.17
Like the NRA, the PWA set minimum wage levels. The PWA 
system was more elaborate than the NRA's, however. It took local 
variations into account, with a separate structure for each region. 
Nationwide, wages ranged from $1.00 to $1.20 per hour for skilled 
workers and $0.40 to $0.50 for those classified as unskilled, with 
workers in the southern region at the bottom of the scales. Unions 
opposed minimum wages in principle at that time, but they were 
mollified by a proviso allowing PWA to accept local prevailing union 
rates under certain conditions. Classification of workers as skilled 
or unskilled labor, a classification which had a major impact on a 
worker’s income, was a touchy issue for both union and nonunion 
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workers alike. Ickes established a Board of Labor Review to assure 
fairness and to settle any disputes in this area.18
Even before organizing the PWA, Ickes had established himself as 
a major champion of black workers’ rights in the Roosevelt adminis-
tration. In an order dated September 1, 1933, he specifically banned 
discrimination based on either race or religion in hiring for PWA 
contract work. To clarify and enforce the rule, Ickes adopted a rec-
ommendation from his staff to set racial hiring levels (in effect, quo-
tas) and make them proportional to population. He ruled that the 
number of blacks hired in a given trade had to be proportional to the 
total number of blacks in the workforce for a given area who plied 
that trade based on 1930 census data. Failure to meet this standard 
was interpreted as prima facie proof of discrimination. 
Conversely, meeting the quota was considered prima facie proof 
of compliance. The PWA was largely successful in implementing its 
quotas and did not encounter any legal challenges. While the propor-
tional hiring requirement was sometimes disregarded by individual 
contractors, blacks overall held their fair portion of PWA construc-
tion jobs and received 31 percent of total wages by 1936. With this 
policy, Ickes became the first federal official ever to set racial quotas 
for federal programs. Thereby, he set a precedent for proportional 
representation that was widely adopted throughout the New Deal 
agencies that followed and helped lay the basis for affirmative action 
in the 1960s (see chapter 9).19
Backing up Ickes’s equal treatment orders was the PWA’s 
Division of Investigations. Ickes selected Louis Glavis, an attor-
ney who actively supported minority rights, to head the division. 
A staff of 150 agents looked into issues of fraud and corruption, as 
well as unfair treatment of employees. The most common violations 
involved wages. To protect against unfair wage practices, the PWA 
required that employers publicly post wage rates in workplaces and 
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pay workers by cash or check.20 This enforcement eliminated the 
practice of payment in company-issued scrip which could only be 
spent at company-owned stores.21 
Despite its efforts for racial fairness, the PWA drew some criti-
cism from the African American community. In the summer of 
1933, Roy Wilkins of the NAACP complained that out of four thou-
sand workers at the Boulder Dam site, only eleven were black, and 
they were not fairly treated. Ickes could do little about hiring, in 
this case, because the contracts predated the PWA. However, he was 
able to improve the living arrangements of the black workers. When 
Glavis turned up instances of discrimination in Illinois’s PWA proj-
ects, Ickes ordered the state engineer to “see to it that the existing 
discrimination against blacks is remedied at once.”22
In the long run, the PWA significantly benefited both blacks and 
the economy. However, it started up very slowly because of the pains-
taking project-approval process Ickes had established. By the end of 
1933, the PWA had spent only a fraction of its initial funding. As 
unemployment soared, PWA jobs were not being generated rapidly 
enough to satisfy the Roosevelt administration. By November 1933 
there were only 250,000 workers on PWA-funded payrolls.23
At that point, the administration decided to look into a new 
approach to job creation. Harry Hopkins persuaded FDR to allo-
cate $400 million from PWA funds for a short-term jobs pro-
gram to help the unemployed survive the winter of 1933-1934. On 
November 8, 1933, the White House announced the initiation of this 
new program—which was to be administered by the Civil Works 
Administration (CWA)—with Harry Hopkins as head. Hopkins 
appointed Aubrey Williams, a racially progressive, white southerner, 
to assist in administration.24 
With the goal of establishing useful jobs that provided both dignity 
to the unemployed and income for their survival, Hopkins used the 
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FERA's administrative machinery to establish and oversee work proj-
ects. Labor policies were closely modeled on the PWA, with an identical 
wage scale and the same dual reliance on unions and the USES for hir-
ing. Over its brief course, the CWA spent $934 million, with 80 percent 
of the money spent in wages for 4 million recipients. Its 177,000 proj-
ects included construction or repair of hundreds of libraries, schools, 
and other public buildings, paving of hundreds of miles of streets, and 
cultural projects to employ the growing army of unemployed white-
collar and creative workers. New York City used CWA funds to help 
black artists such as sculptress Augusta Savage, who established the 
Harlem Community Arts Center to train budding artists.25
While data on the participation of African Americans in the 
CWA is scanty, they appear to have been included, at least in pro-
portion to population. There is some evidence of discrimination in 
hiring, but most failures to employ individual blacks were due to 
inefficiency and the rushed pace of hiring. The CWA established a 
grievance system and complaint process, but few complaints of dis-
crimination were reported.26
A quick termination of the CWA was a foregone conclusion, 
given the resistance of FDR to funding long-term government work 
relief jobs. By March 31, 1934, the CWA had shut down most of its 
projects and released most of its employees. In its short life, the CWA 
pumped substantial income into the economy, enhanced the public 
infrastructure, and reduced the stigma of relief by providing employ-
ment at a decent pay. It also provided a precedent for later federal 
programs that served blacks and other victims of the Depression on 
a longer-term basis. As if to underscore the arguments of Hopkins 
and others who wanted to continue the CWA, immediately after its 
shutdown, the relief rolls swelled by 1.3 million. By late 1934, the 
economy exhausted the pump-priming benefit of the CWA and fell 
to its lowest level of the year.27 
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A much longer-lived work-relief program was initiated even 
before the CWA was fully functional. Alarmed by the exceptionally 
high rate of unemployment among young people, FDR proposed the 
idea of putting them to work to preserve natural resources in the 
nation’s public forests. A cabinet group consisting of Harold Ickes, 
Frances Perkins, Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace, and 
Secretary of War George Dern was asked to develop a bill based on 
FDR’s idea. As a result, on March 31, 1933, Congress enacted the 
Emergency Conservation Work Act. It created a program for young 
men (women were not included) aged seventeen to twenty-three to 
do forestry work, flood control, fire fighting, and trail construction 
in national forests and parks. Dubbed the Civilian Conservation 
Corps (CCC), it was jointly administered by the Interior, Labor, 
Agriculture, and War Departments. The corpsmen, who served up to 
eighteen months, were housed in special camps and provided room 
and board and a thirty dollars per month allotment, twenty-five dol-
lars of which went directly to their families. The AFL had opposed 
the bill because it considered the pay inadequate. To mollify orga-
nized labor, FDR appointed Robert Fechner, a vice president of the 
International Association of Machinists, as director. This appoint-
ment would prove to be unfortunate, at least in regard to racial pol-
icy in the CCC.28
Fechner, who was born in Chattanooga, Tennessee, and served 
as director until his death in 1939, oversaw the quartet of agencies 
that operated the CCC. To those who expressed concern over the 
fourfold division of authority, Roosevelt responded, “The Army 
and the Forest Service will really run the show and Fechner will 
‘go along’ and give everybody satisfaction and confidence.” The 
US Army served the vital role of administering and maintaining 
the camps. The USES enrolled men for the camps, Interior super-
vised projects in national parks, and Agriculture oversaw work in 
T O  A DVA N C E  T H E I R  O PP O R T U N I T I E S
54
the national forests. Eventually, over two million young men—two 
hundred thousand of them blacks—served in the CCC. It was one 
of FDR’s most popular programs. However, it was a mixed blessing 
for African Americans, representing for them, both the best and the 
worst of the New Deal.29
After the army enrolled the initial contingent of corpsmen in 
April 1933, the USES took over the job and established recruiting 
quotas for each state based on population. While black participa-
tion was low at first, the number eventually reached the national 
benchmark proportionality level of 10 percent. Nominal parity was 
misleading, however, as black youths were disproportionately repre-
sented in the ranks of the economically disadvantaged.30 
The low black participation rates in the early stages of the program 
were largely a result of discrimination. Georgia, with a 36 percent 
black population, sent no blacks at all to the corps in the early weeks. 
Mississippi included less than 2 percent blacks in its June 1933 con-
tingent, despite a statewide black proportion of 50 percent. In Dallas 
County, Alabama, white enrollees outnumbered blacks 2 to 1 despite 
the fact that the population was 75 percent black. In California, black 
participation was initially low because of a failure to publicize the 
CCC. Most blacks there learned about it through word of mouth.31 
The existence of discrimination in recruitment generated coun-
termeasures, some more effective than others. The CCC’s establish-
ing law decreed that “no person shall be excluded on account of race, 
color, or creed.” To enforce this requirement, Fechner instituted 
mandatory quotas based on proportional enrollment of blacks in 
each state. However, local administrators could get around these 
measures and deny blacks admission, claiming falsely that the state 
had already met the quota. To counter these deceptions, Frances 
Perkins instructed state employment agencies to avoid discrimina-
tion in recruitment. She telegraphed one governor to observe the 
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antidiscrimination clause of the law and to look into allegations that 
it was not being observed.32 
On another occasion, however, Perkins consented to discrimina-
tion at the CCC. In July 1935 Fechner asked USES Director Frank 
Persons to cut off the number of black recruits in Texas at 3,200 for 
the year. He argued that a limited number of projects existed in Texas 
to which black CCC corpsmen could be assigned without provoking 
strong objections from local white populations. Persons drafted a 
letter to Fechner objecting to this request as a violation of the CCC 
law. Secretary Perkins, for reasons unknown, supported Fechner and 
informed Persons, “I prefer that this letter not be sent.” The limita-
tion on Texas enrollments stood.33
The treatment of black recruits in the CCC camps was often 
unsatisfactory. In the South, black corpsmen were assigned to sep-
arate camps. Elsewhere, the races were initially assigned to mixed 
camps. However, the existence of camps with black corpsmen both-
ered nearby communities, particularly in areas of the West where 
few African Americans lived. Because of such community concerns, 
and also in response to allegations of racial strife within the camps, 
Fechner toured the western CCC region in the summer of 1935. He 
presumably saw what he wanted to see since he concluded that race 
relations were a problem and immediately asked the army to segre-
gate the races into separate camps. The army complied and ordered 
complete segregation, except when there were not enough African 
American corpsmen to complete a full CCC company. To deal with 
community complaints about black corpsmen from out of state, the 
order required that blacks be assigned only to camps in their states 
of residence. Thereafter, Jim Crow conditions prevailed throughout 
the CCC. To further assuage the sensitivities of white communi-
ties, Fechner relocated black camps from Gettysburg, Pennsylvania; 
Springfield, Illinois; and the vicinities of various cities in New York 
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and New Jersey to more remote sites. In its zeal to limit contact with 
local whites, the army established isolated black camps deep in fed-
eral lands.34 
Discrimination was also rife in the staffing of the camps. The 
need for a complement of camp officers in the black camps—army 
doctors, teachers, clerical staff, and service workers—seemed like 
an opportunity for blacks, both military and civilian. However, the 
army held a long-standing policy of never putting black officers into 
positions where they might be able to issue orders to, or minister to, 
whites. Fechner supported the army, and black officers were initially 
ruled out in the camps. Walter White of the NAACP and Emmett 
Scott, the black World War I–era War Department official (see chap-
ter 1) now at Howard University, led a movement to force the CCC to 
allow black officers and military doctors to serve. FDR ordered the 
army to permit this suggestion, but only a handful of black officers 
were eventually called to duty at only two all-black camps.35
The CCC provided an extensive education and training program, 
with general educational and vocational classes in a wide range of 
subjects for corpsmen. However, the Interior Department’s Office of 
Education, which administered the educational programs, did not 
oppose the army’s discriminatory racial policies. As a result, blacks 
were initially excluded from staff positions in the training program. 
After Harold Ickes protested vehemently to Army Secretary Dern, 
the army relented and allowed the appointment of black educational 
advisers in most of the all-black camps.36 
Despite the existence of a significant degree of discrimination, a 
substantial number of young black men were allowed to receive the 
benefits of the CCC. The program eliminated a significant amount 
of illiteracy and probably reduced the level of juvenile delinquency in 
the black community. Except for training provided only to blacks in 
so-called Negro occupations, such as cooking and serving, both races 
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received the same training, which focused on high-skill occupations. 
Training did not always translate into appropriate employment for 
blacks, however. Most black alumni in the California CCC found 
jobs as laborers. Blacks were appointed to positions of responsibility 
as officers and educators, although they were limited to service in the 
black camps. At the intangible level, the program buoyed the spirits 
of the young black enrollees and provided them with a measure of 
social and economic security.37 
In the Federal Departments
While the alphabet soup of agencies born of the First New Deal was 
wrestling with issues of racial fairness, the cabinet departments 
began to deal with long-standing fairness issues of their own and 
to involve blacks in policy-making. As he had in the PWA, Harold 
Ickes strove to make the Interior Department a model of nondis-
crimination. Aside from Ickes’s personal interest in racial justice, 
it made historical sense for his department to take the lead on this 
issue. Besides being responsible for Indians on their reservations 
and for other minorities on island territories, Interior had long man-
aged several institutions that specifically served blacks. The insti-
tutions included Howard University, Freedmen’s Hospital, and St. 
Elizabeth’s Hospital for the Indigent, all in Washington, DC. Ickes 
appointed several white racial progressives to top staff positions in 
the department. Notable among them was Louis Glavis, who headed 
the Inspection Division. Glavis was already performing a similar 
duty at the PWA. Nathan Margold, a former US Attorney who had 
done a study for the NAACP on the denial of citizenship rights to 
blacks, was appointed Departmental Solicitor.38
In March 1933 Ickes ordered removal of “Whites Only” and 
“Colored Only” signs at cafeterias, restrooms, and drinking foun-
tains in the Interior Department. He also banned discrimination in 
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hiring practices. When the park system in Washington, DC came 
under his jurisdiction in June 1933, he desegregated all public parks. 
Ickes was, however, forced to bow to public sentiment and did not 
integrate swimming pools or golf courses.39
The Department of Interior rose quickly from role model to pol-
icy leader on racial affairs with the summer of 1933 appointment of a 
“special assistant on the economic status of Negroes.” This appoint-
ment came about after the NAACP pressured FDR to take action on 
behalf of the African American population. Simultaneously, Julius 
Rosenwald, who headed a fund he established in 1919 to aid minor-
ity groups, recommended to Roosevelt that he appoint an adviser 
to the administration to represent blacks in the planning and man-
agement of the program for economic recovery. Roosevelt, however, 
feared that appointing such an adviser would alienate congressional 
Southern Democrats.
Ickes and Rosenwald worked out a way to set up the new posi-
tion.40 Prompted by Rosenwald, as well as by his own racial sympa-
thies, Ickes offered to house the function in his department. FDR 
did not object, but there was a problem with funding this new posi-
tion. Roosevelt had drastically pared back the regular budget to 
find money for the economic recovery program. Ickes had to cut his 
own department’s budget in half while he administered the massive 
PWA. It would have been difficult to obtain funding from Congress 
for the position. Rosenwald solved the dilemma by agreeing to pay 
for the position out of his own pocket.
Rosenwald recommended Clark Foreman, the Rosenwald Fund’s 
research director, for the post. Ickes welcomed the idea and appointed 
Foreman as his “Adviser on Negro Affairs.” Foreman was a young 
white southerner who had worked with the Georgia Commission 
for Interracial Cooperation. Roy Wilkins of the NAACP responded 
negatively when Ickes did not appoint a black to the most important 
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position in the government dealing with race. Ickes defused the 
NAACP’s opposition by creating two additional positions (also paid 
for by Rosenwald) under Foreman, specifically to be filled by blacks. 
One was for an assistant and the other, a secretary. Ickes appointed 
Robert Weaver, a young Harvard economist who went on to a distin-
guished public and academic career, to the assistant position.41
The first concrete accomplishment of Foreman’s group was to 
convince other agencies to appoint black advisers. Among those who 
were then brought into the government were Robert L. Vann, editor 
of the Pittsburgh Courier, in the Justice Department; Eugene Kinckle 
Jones, executive secretary of the National Urban League, at the 
Department of Commerce; and Lawrence A. Oxley, an experienced 
social worker and labor mediator, at the Department of Labor (see 
below). Working with the Interior Department group, these advisers 
pressed for fair consideration of the needs of blacks in the recovery 
program.
With the advisers providing leadership, treatment of black career 
federal employees in many agencies, besides Interior, began to 
improve. More “Colored Only” signs came down, and entire agen-
cies were integrated, some of them demolishing racial dividing 
walls dating back to the Wilson administration. The Civil Service 
Commission ruled that applicants for federal employment no lon-
ger had to submit a photograph with their application. However, the 
CSC retained the “rule of three” whereby employers interviewed 
three qualified job candidates at a time. An employer was free to hire 
any one of them, or reject all three, without explanation or recourse. 
Despite this regressive rule, black employment in FDR’s first two 
terms grew from 50,000 to 150,000. The black percentage of the 
rapidly expanding federal workforce doubled from 5 to 10 percent, 
thereby attaining rough proportionality in relation to the white pop-
ulation. The bulk of these jobs were in Negro occupations—janitors, 
T O  A DVA N C E  T H E I R  O PP O R T U N I T I E S
60
chauffeurs, and elevator operators, for example—but many blacks 
also worked as clerks and secretaries. A number were hired at the 
professional level as architects, engineers, lawyers, and librarians. In 
addition, FDR appointed over one hundred blacks to administrative 
and patronage posts, a number far exceeding that of any previous 
administration.42
Reflecting the unprecedented role of African Americans in 
making national policy in January 1934, Ickes established the 
“Interdepartmental Group Concerned with the Special Problems 
of Negroes,” composed of the growing body of special advisers in 
the various departments. It was led by Clark Foreman and Robert 
Weaver. Previously, the two had suggested the establishment of a 
“National Advisory Board on Negro Welfare.” Ickes had vetoed that 
proposal because he feared that the name would make it a red flag 
to segregationists. He believed an “Interdepartmental Group” would 
sound much less threatening. The purpose of the group was to orga-
nize and rationalize federal policies affecting blacks and to promote 
programs on their behalf. Members began meeting with white repre-
sentatives from numerous departments and New Deal agencies, but 
the innocuous name of the group did not shield it from significant 
resistance to its ideas. Most agencies soon dropped out, and it held 
its fourth and last meeting on June 1, 1934. However, a precedent had 
been set for the eventual emergence of a more influential body—the 
“Black Cabinet” (see below).43
One agency that gave full cooperation to the Interdepartmental 
Group and fully shared its goals was the Labor Department. Secretary 
Perkins desegregated the department’s cafeterias, where white and 
black employees had been kept apart by having one area for man-
ual laborers, who were mostly black, and another for white-collar 
workers, who were mostly white. Perkins canceled a plan by the 
department to fire black elevator operators and replace them with 
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whites. She noted that in the 1920s whites had scorned jobs of this 
nature. She added a total of 129 black employees to the Department 
of Labor’s rolls, many of them not in Negro occupations.
Perkins also attempted to see that the USES treated black job 
applicants fairly. Early on, she ordered that in states with large black 
populations, there should be blacks on the USES staff in local offices. 
Southern members of Congress closely monitored the operations 
of the USES, particularly its offices in their region. From its incep-
tion in 1933, these Congresspersons constantly pressured the USES 
to accept Jim Crow practices in the South. As a result, and despite 
Perkins’s call for equal treatment, the USES bowed to pressure and 
began accepting employer requests that it refer only white candidates 
for a given position. Blacks objected strenuously to this practice, 
which became a bone of contention between civil rights groups and 
the USES until the 1960s.
In an effort to shed light on the situation of black workers in 
America, Perkins had the department undertake and publish a 
number of special studies. One of the first products was an article by 
Robert Weaver, published in the Monthly Labor Review (MLR), the 
journal of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). In his article, Weaver 
contradicted the common notion that relief rolls were overloaded 
with blacks because these workers lacked ability and initiative. 
Throughout the 1930s, the MLR published a series of articles and 
reports on black labor, covering such topics as migration, restrictions 
on black employment, problems of black youth, and blacks in federal 
relief programs.
While the PWA was primarily Harold Ickes’s responsibility, the 
Labor Department had an interest in assuring fair hiring practices 
in that program. Regarding a PWA-sponsored construction project 
for housing in the largely African American south side of Chicago, 
Perkins was made aware that black workers were not obtaining a 
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fair share of employment. To see that the situation was rectified, 
she sent BLS Commissioner Isador Lubin to meet with the Chicago 
building trades unions and contractors association. Lubin presented 
them with a fair hiring plan that Ickes had seen and approved. It was 
based largely on Ickes’s fair hiring policy of 1933 which represented 
a relaxation of straight proportional hiring, and specified black 
employment in the project in relation to black participation in spe-
cific trades. These rates were usually lower than the black percentage 
of the general population in toto. This formula resulted in fewer con-
struction jobs for blacks. Lubin summarized the Labor Department’s 
plan in a March 27, 1935, letter to Ickes:
[The formula] provided for the allocation of jobs for 
Negroes according to the ratio that prevailed between 
white and Negro artisans in the Building Trades in 
Chicago as shown by the census of 1930. That ratio 
showed that 13 percent of the unskilled jobs and 3.5 per-
cent of the skilled jobs should go to Negroes. The Building 
Trades representative undertook to arrange that in the 
event the contact was awarded to a contractor who had 
an agreement with organized labor, the above mentioned 
percentages of the payroll should be paid to Negroes. 
They further agreed that the proportion of the jobs to be 
given to the various crafts should be related to the ratio of 
Negroes to whites in the various skilled crafts. This ratio 
varied from 1.3 percent for electricians to 11 percent for 
plasterers and cement finishers. In those instances where 
there are no Negro employees in a given craft union, an 
arrangement would be made for the granting of working 
permits to a number of Negro workers sufficient to make 
possible the employment of the necessary percentage of 
persons.
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Lubin won agreement from both labor and management to carry out 
a fair hiring plan along these lines, and he also won the support of 
key black leaders who had been involved in the discussions.44
At the request of the black community, Perkins appointed an 
African American to advise the Labor Department on black issues. 
Previously, she had sent a white representative to several black 
labor conferences and had appointed a departmental committee to 
study the health and welfare of blacks. In early 1934 she appointed 
Lawrence A. Oxley to serve as a black issues adviser and gave him the 
official title of Director of the new Division of Negro Labor (DNL). 
Oxley was a former social worker employed at that time as a labor 
mediator with the department’s Conciliation Service. As DNL direc-
tor, he reported to Isador Lubin.
Modeled partly on the World War I Division of Negro Economics, 
but less extensive in scope, the DNL had several tasks. One was to 
serve as liaison with black groups and unions and maintain commu-
nications with the large body of unorganized black workers. Oxley 
advised the BLS, USES, Women’s Bureau, and other departmental 
agencies. His “Weekly Progress Reports” to Lubin indicated frequent 
meetings and contacts throughout the government on civil rights 
issues, as well as numerous speaking engagements at black schools 
and conferences. He also continued to work on special assignments 
for the Conciliation Service, conducting an extensive investigation 
into black participation in organized labor, focused on the construc-
tion trades.45
Like the World War I–era DNE, the Division of Negro Labor 
organized numerous state conferences on black labor problems. The 
goal was to encourage the states both to develop plans for assur-
ing that blacks would receive their fair share of jobs, and to devote 
special attention to the racial attitudes and misunderstandings that 
might interfere with this goal. In a letter inviting the governor of 
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Alabama to participate in a conference, Oxley noted: “These facts [of 
racial friction] must be recognized locally as well as nationally, and 
they must be dealt with in a statesmanlike manner.” An indication of 
the impact of the conferences can be seen in a newspaper report on a 
1939 North Carolina conference of black and white leaders and offi-
cials, and organized by Oxley and the governor. Reporter William 
Howland wrote that, although it was too early to know specifically 
what the conference accomplished, “It is certain that it focussed . . . 
the thought of leaders of both races on an ever-growing problem.”46
The “Second New Deal”
During the off year, Congressional elections were held in the fall of 
1934. Instead of losing seats, as was normal for the incumbent party 
after winning the White House, the Democrats gained ten seats in 
each house. Part of the reason for this gain was a shift in the black 
vote away from the Republican Party. FDR’s dramatic actions and 
engaging manner as president attracted blacks’ interest and support. 
His inaugural address, which asserted that “the only thing we have 
to fear is fear itself,” resonated with African Americans suffering 
from an ongoing wave of lynching and other terrorism. They were 
also encouraged by being included in New Deal programs. For the 
first time, Democratic candidates made a major effort to win black 
votes, and Democratic political machines courted black leaders. As 
a result, Democrats gained a majority of the black vote for the first 
time in history. They even elected the first black Democrat to the 
House of Representatives when Arthur Mitchell defeated the incum-
bent black Republican Oscar DePriest in Chicago. The election gave 
blacks much greater influence in Washington.47 It also weakened the 
hold of the Southern Democrats on the Congress, enhancing both the 
prospects for stronger relief and recovery efforts, and the chances of 
blacks for fairer treatment and greater benefit from federal programs.
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Strengthened by the 1934 election, the Roosevelt administration 
pursued the Second New Deal which, in many ways, turned out to be 
more beneficial for African Americans. This was fortunate because 
the numbers of blacks in need had been augmented by thousands of 
displaced tenant farmers. They were victims of the well-intentioned 
efforts of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA), a New 
Deal program that sought to protect American farms by preventing 
overproduction and by shielding them from ruinously low commod-
ity prices. The subsidies paid by the AAA were intended for farm 
owners and tenant farmers alike, but the unintended consequence 
was that a large number of owners replaced their tenants with hired 
hands so they could retain all the benefits for themselves. Many of 
the former tenants were then forced onto the relief rolls.48
By 1935 New Dealers had decided to take more forceful steps to 
stimulate the economy and provide jobs. Beginning that year, the 
government engaged in a massive and historically unprecedented 
intervention, eventually spending $14 billion to help the needy 
unemployed. Roosevelt’s goal became to “weed . . . out the overprivi-
leged” and “lift . . . up the underprivileged.”49
First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt began paying even closer attention 
to black issues. Through friendships with Mary McLeod Bethune, 
president of the National Council of Negro Women, and Walter 
White of the NAACP, she learned more about their concerns and 
became an advocate for their causes. Bethune and White became 
frequent guests of hers at the White House. She developed a particu-
larly close friendship with Bethune and reportedly “would run down 
the drive to meet her.”50
Eleanor Roosevelt fully utilized her unique status in Washington 
and became an influential friend of black Americans. Through her, 
black leaders made their views known to the president. She allied her-
self with Ickes, Hopkins, and Perkins, and pressured other officials 
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to promote equal rights in their programs. She also won a number of 
federal appointments for prominent blacks, including Bethune, who 
served in the National Youth Administration (see below).51 
The Works Progress Administration
Armed with the mandate of the 1934 elections, FDR proposed to 
institutionalize work-relief spending and fund it on an unprec-
edented scale to overcome the stubborn Depression. In Roosevelt’s 
January 1935 State of the Union address, he proposed a $4.88 billion 
program to help the needy unemployed.52 In April 1935 the over-
whelmingly Democratic Congress gave him the requested amount 
in the Emergency Relief Appropriations Act (ERAA). It was then 
the largest single federal spending bill in history. While most of the 
money went to existing programs, such as the PWA, CCC, and vari-
ous rural-aid agencies, $1.4 billion was allocated to a new agency—
the Works Progress Administration (WPA). Conceived and headed 
by Harry Hopkins and established by Executive Order (E.O.) 7034 in 
May 1935, the WPA was originally intended to oversee and assist in 
the “progress” of the other programs funded by the ERAA, and also 
to develop “small useful projects” of its own.53
Almost an afterthought, the “small useful projects” quickly came 
to dominate the WPA. Under Harry Hopkins the agency (in its first 
five years) spent almost $8 billion on a wide variety of labor-inten-
sive public works, as well as on educational and cultural projects. 
It employed an average of 2.2 million men and women at any one 
time, with peaks as high as 4 million. Ninety percent of those hired 
had to be from relief rolls to assure that benefits went to the neediest 
and also to bring about a shift that the administration was seeking—
from relief to employment programs. Discrimination was banned in 
the WPA, and blacks benefited significantly from its programs, espe-
cially in places like Harlem, where it was one of the main providers 
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of income. Black poet Paul Laurence Dunbar wrote about a song he 
heard in the streets of Harlem in those years: 
“You buy my groceries / and pay my rent. /  
Mr. Roosevelt, you’re my man!” 
The cumulative result of thousands of local WPA projects was a 
massive upgrade of the nation’s public facilities. By June 1940 WPA 
workers had constructed over half a million miles of roads and 
streets; built over 4,000 school buildings, expanded 30,000 more; 
created 132 new hospitals, improved 1,670 others; laid 18,000 miles 
of sewer lines; and built 39 electric power plants.54
A WPA program known as Federal Project Number 1 contrib-
uted to an ongoing cultural and intellectual renaissance in the 
African American community by putting thousands of unem-
ployed musicians, artists, actors, writers, and historians to work. 
Through research, writings, performances, and works of art relating 
to American history and culture, they documented and preserved 
diverse ethnic folkways that were rapidly fading in many regions. 
The WPA also provided a training ground for young artists, per-
formers, and writers.55
The thousands of white-collar and millions of blue-collar work-
ers recruited to the WPA were generally hired without regard to 
race. Each state’s allotment of WPA jobs was proportionate to its 
number of able-bodied workers on relief, and 90 percent of new 
hires had to show financial need. On May 20, 1935, FDR issued 
E.O. 7046 setting rules and standards for the WPA. This executive 
order guaranteed that qualified applicants “shall not be discrimi-
nated against on any grounds whatsoever.” Hopkins elaborated on 
the order in 1936 when he barred discrimination against qualified 
and eligible WPA job candidates “on any grounds whatsoever, such 
as race, religion, or political affiliation.”56 Congress codified the 
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WPA antidiscrimination policy into law in 1939, making violation a 
felony punishable by a $1,000 fine or one year in prison.57 In a num-
ber of projects, the WPA went beyond racial proportionalism and 
hired blacks and whites in equal numbers. The WPA was so ada-
mant about equal treatment that it omitted information on work-
ers’ race, religion, and politics from reports and personnel records. 
While well-meaning in its intent, these omissions made it difficult 
for researchers to accurately gauge the effectiveness of the WPA’s 
nondiscrimination policies.58
Like other New Deal job programs, the WPA prescribed a wage 
schedule and set restrictions on the hours of work and duration of 
employment. In line with the WPA’s dual goal of reducing relief rolls 
without competing with private industry for workers, it developed 
what it called a security wage structure. The average monthly wage 
was set at $50, double the average relief payment but well below the 
wages offered in industry. E.O. 7046 set the maximum hours of work 
at eight hours per day and forty hours per week. In addition, Hopkins 
set a monthly maximum of 140 hours and a maximum term of ser-
vice of 18 months.
E.O. 7046 also established schedules of earnings for four skill 
classes, ranging from unskilled to professional, in each of four 
national regions. There were demographic sub-schedules for each 
region to allow for local rural-urban variations in the cost of living. 
As was the case with the CWA and PWA, the Deep South (Region 
IV) had the lowest wage scales in the program. The greatest pay dis-
parities between the South and other regions existed in the category 
of unskilled jobs in rural areas. This distribution had a dispropor-
tionately negative effect on African Americans. To reduce the wage 
gap, Region IV was abolished in 1936 and merged into the higher-
paying Upper South (Region III), adopting the latter’s higher wage 
scale.59
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The WPA helped African American workers and the black com-
munity both financially and psychologically. Hundreds of thousands 
were taken off welfare rolls every year and given useful, if short-
term, employment at decent wages. The range of projects and ser-
vices that helped blacks was broad and varied. Most of the jobs for 
blacks and whites alike were as laborers in infrastructure improve-
ment. But there were numerous skilled and creative positions as well. 
For example, in addition to upgrading the physical plant in school 
systems, the WPA developed a national adult education system that 
trained tens of thousands of blacks, many of them acquiring literacy 
in the process. Thousands of blacks were employed as teachers. In 
Harlem alone, there were thirty-four WPA education centers. WPA-
run housekeeping services employed single female heads of house-
hold to help the elderly and the incapacitated with their domestic 
chores and provide basic nursing services.60
The Federal Arts Projects of the WPA assisted many African 
Americans involved in cultural activities. In New York City, the 
Federal Music Program—under famed conductor, Nikolai Sokoloff—
hired talented black musicians and sponsored performances of 
works by William Grant Still, Clarence Cameron White, and other 
black composers. Black writer Ralph Ellison, later the Pulitzer Prize-
winning author of The Invisible Man, worked in the Federal Writers’ 
Project researching black history and culture. While the New York 
Writers’ Project never published a book specifically on black life, it 
did include material on this subject in its series of local area guides. 
In addition, the Federal Writers’ Project enabled Ellison and other 
black writers to survive and to develop material they used later in 
their own works. The Federal Arts Project hired thousands nation-
wide and, under pressure from the Harlem Artists’ Guild, set pro-
portional quotas for blacks.
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Participating black artists like Jacob Lawrence, creator of an epic 
series of sixty paintings depicting the Great Migration, produced 
many more works illustrating and celebrating black history and 
identity. Art schools in Harlem and Chicago’s south side trained a 
generation of black artists and sculptors. The Federal Theater Project 
produced eighty-one new plays, fourteen dealing with racial issues. 
The Negro Theater Project in New York produced works by black 
playwrights and an all-black version of Shakespeare’s Macbeth. 
Federal Theater Project pageants depicted figures important in 
black history, such as John Brown, Nat Turner, and Harriet Tubman. 
However, vociferous congressional opposition and allegations of 
Communist influence led to the cancellation of several productions 
and ultimately killed the Federal Theater Project in 1939.61
To help assure fair treatment for African Americans in the WPA, 
Harry Hopkins saw to it that significant numbers of black profes-
sionals were involved in the oversight and administration of the 
effort. He appointed blacks to key WPA positions across the country 
to counteract the tendency of local government officials toward bias 
in the distribution of WPA jobs. Ninety-one blacks were employed in 
the national WPA office, including an administrative assistant and 
several other top staff. To oversee its own national equal-treatment 
effort, the WPA placed black advisers in the field and established a 
network of national, state, and local advisory boards.62
By 1939 approximately one million black workers and dependents 
had received significant income through the WPA.63 Approximately 
14 percent of all workers certified for continued WPA employment 
were black. The WPA was truly seen by many black people as a god-
send. It not only provided economic benefits but empowered blacks 
to feel more included in the mainstream of national life.64 
However, masked by the favorable nationwide data on WPA, 
recruitment of blacks was significant in regional differences. New 
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York City was among the leaders in meeting or exceeding WPA hir-
ing goals for blacks, an expected finding since northern states gen-
erally had the highest black participation rates. In 1943 sociologist 
Richard Sterner’s book The Negro’s Share provided detailed findings 
on black and white employment in the WPA. Sterner found that in 
northern states with large black populations, the percentage of blacks 
in WPA employment was far higher than their percentages either of 
general population, or of all unemployed workers. However, in the 
southern states, black WPA and unemployment percentages were 
fairly close, and the percentage of blacks in WPA jobs was usually far 
below their proportion of total unemployed. Rural blacks were the 
hardest-hit group.65 
Black female heads of household in the rural South were less able 
to obtain WPA jobs than their male counterparts. This discrimina-
tion was partly the result of local Jim Crow laws that allowed black 
and white men to work together but did not allow racial integration 
among women. Also, local whites often opposed offering WPA jobs 
because these might lure black women away from employment as 
domestics.66
Nationally, average wages for blacks in the WPA were lower than 
those of whites, a disparity partly the result of demographics. Blacks 
were concentrated in the South, the area with the lowest wage scale. 
In addition, blacks were disproportionately classified as unskilled 
workers, a group which was always at the bottom of the pay scale.67
Some relief agencies applied different standards of eligibility to 
the races when referring candidates for WPA jobs. They sometimes 
denied jobs to qualified blacks on the spurious grounds that black 
workers were accustomed to a lower standard of living than qualified 
whites. Similarly, blacks who refused low-paid private sector jobs 
were more likely to be denied a WPA job than whites in the same 
circumstances. Under WPA eligibility rules, workers, who refused 
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private employment at local prevailing wages for a given type of 
work, were not supposed to be hired by the WPA for the same work. 
Whites were often excused from this requirement and, when they 
turned down private jobs, were placed in WPA jobs that might oth-
erwise have gone to blacks.68
Local governmental bodies were frequently able to ignore 
Washington’s antidiscrimination policy because the WPA had a 
limited ability to enforce its rules. The WPA was largely focused on 
getting considerable numbers of people into jobs; oversight of relief 
agencies and project sponsors was not a major concern. When the 
WPA did pry into these bodies, the attention was often received with 
hostility. As a result, it tended not to interfere in the business of these 
local governments.69
Throughout its existence, the WPA had to deal with public hostil-
ity, congressional criticism, and constricted budgets. Dubious about 
long-term relief employment and under pressure to balance the fed-
eral budget, FDR authorized a huge cut in the WPA budget in 1936.70 
Fiorello LaGuardia fruitlessly implored FDR to roll back the cuts as 
criticism mounted and thousands of enrollees organized protests. A 
nineteen-year-old black woman named Catherine Brunson shocked 
the nation when she jumped five floors to her death after she learned 
that her husband had lost his WPA job. Some saw the WPA and its 
network of local government agencies as a huge Democratic political 
machine. Civil rights groups criticized discrimination in the WPA 
in the South. Conservatives lampooned nonproductive “leaf-raking” 
jobs and charged that arts projects dwelled excessively on social 
unrest and promoted radical causes. In 1939 Congress reoriented 
the WPA toward large-scale public works projects and cut its budget 
sharply. As was the case with most other New Deal programs, the 
WPA and its mission of recovery and relief became irrelevant during 
the World War II emergency, and it soon went out of existence.71
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Mary McLeod Bethune, the NYA, and the “Black Cabinet”
A companion agency to the WPA, that also incorporated aspects of 
the CCC, was the National Youth Administration (NYA). Created 
on June 26, 1935, under E.O. 7086, its purpose was to serve in-school 
and unemployed youths. The NYA owed its existence, in large part, 
to Eleanor Roosevelt. She wanted to establish a broad program that 
would help all young people, not just males (e.g., the CCC), as they 
sought to complete their education while struggling to survive the 
Depression. Five million youths were out of work in 1935, repre-
senting 25 percent of the out-of-school group. Around three million 
were on relief. Harry Hopkins, Aubrey Williams, Frances Perkins, 
and others were thinking along similar lines as Mrs. Roosevelt and 
presented their ideas to FDR in the spring of 1935. While the exact 
nature of Mrs. Roosevelt’s role is not clear, she certainly was deeply 
involved in the planning for the NYA and played a key role in con-
vincing FDR to approve its establishment.72
FDR appointed Aubrey Williams to head the new agency. The 
NYA took over the FERA program to aid college students, initiated 
assistance to high school students, and provided public works jobs 
for youths who were not in school. The NYA also supported appren-
ticeships, vocational guidance programs, and recreational opportu-
nities for youths. Buttressed by a national advisory committee and 
a national network of fifteen hundred state and local committees, 
the NYA ultimately provided over four million youths with jobs and 
educational assistance.73 
Not only did the NYA serve more young people than the CCC, 
which helped just two million, it was preeminent among all New 
Deal agencies in its effectiveness in serving African American 
youths. Much of its success was attributable to Aubrey Williams 
and Eleanor Roosevelt. Williams worked to assure that black youths 
would be equally compensated and fully included in training that 
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would enable them to move into skilled and nontraditional jobs. He 
directed local administrators in all regions to be scrupulously fair 
to all applicants and installed black administrators in heavily black 
districts.74 Eleanor Roosevelt worked closely with Williams, who 
maintained dual involvement with the WPA until 1938. She made 
a point of knowing as much as possible about the agency and regu-
larly passed information and suggestions along to Williams. In addi-
tion, she worked to defend the NYA from charges of radicalism and 
helped maintain smooth relations between the operating staff and 
the sometimes difficult Williams.75
The primary credit for the NYA’s success on behalf of blacks, how-
ever, goes to Mary McLeod Bethune.76 She was initially appointed to 
the NYA’s advisory committee and then, with the support of Eleanor 
Roosevelt, as director of the Division of Negro Affairs (DNA). Born 
in 1875 in South Carolina and one of seventeen children of two for-
mer slaves, Bethune was the only child in her family to attend col-
lege, earning her way to graduation from the Moody Bible Institute 
in Chicago. Starting out as a teacher in bible schools, she became a 
leading educator and founded Bethune-Cookman College, a black 
teachers and industrial education school in Daytona, Florida. Active 
in the NUL and the NAACP, and the founder of the National Council 
of Negro Women, she was the most famous and highly regarded 
black woman in the country by the time of FDR’s election.
Under Williams’s and Bethune’s leadership, the NYA performed 
its mission by means of two operational divisions. The larger of the 
two was the Student Work Program. It provided part-time jobs for 
students sixteen to twenty-four years of age who needed assistance 
in order to stay enrolled in high school or college. The jobs for col-
lege students were related as closely as possible to their interests 
and coursework. Almost all of the 120 existing black colleges par-
ticipated in the program. Out of 440,000 youths employed, 42,900 
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(9.7 percent) were black. While not applying a quota, the program 
still achieved rough racial proportionality.77
The smaller division of the NYA was the Out-of-School Work 
Program. It provided income and work experience for unemployed 
youths through part-time jobs in a wide range of occupations, from 
construction and production work to clerical, professional, and tech-
nical assistance. Of 312,000 employed in January 1940, 40,200 (12.9 
percent) were black. In addition to providing regular part-time jobs, 
the NYA developed a program of resident work centers, largely in 
the South. A total of 29,000 youths, 13 percent of them blacks, lived 
in these centers, where they also worked and received vocational 
training. In a reflection of Jim Crow practices in the South, black 
participants in the work centers were segregated into separate Negro 
Resident Training Centers. This was one of the few racial blemishes 
in the history of the NYA.78
Over eighty thousand black students and unemployed youths 
benefited from the NYA. Blacks participated at rates equal to or 
exceeding their proportion of the local youth population in most 
locations. Unlike the PWA, the NYA’s wage scales were absolutely 
identical in all parts of the country, and blacks were paid exactly the 
same as whites. Bethune’s goal for the DNA was “the adaptation of 
the program to the needs of Negro people and the interpreting of 
the program to them.” Her staff of seven implemented and reported 
on the program and served as liaisons with local NYA programs. 
Blacks were well represented throughout the DNA. Augmenting the 
division’s work in Washington, supervisors of Negro Affairs oper-
ated in twenty-seven states, blacks served on advisory committees 
in twenty-three states and on numerous local planning boards, and 
there were more than five hundred black project managers.79
The combination of Bethune’s position in the NYA—which 
made her the highest-ranking African American in the Roosevelt 
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administration—and her access to the White house, enabled her 
to be a highly effective advocate for the African American popu-
lation in the New Deal. Bethune saw to it that black workers were 
both beneficiaries and also administrators and policy makers in 
New Deal programs. According to her associate Dorothy Height, 
a black civil rights activist who later headed the National Council 
of Negro Women, Bethune was bold about seeking meetings with 
President Roosevelt. When she wanted to see him, she would simply 
tell Eleanor Roosevelt, “The president really needs to see me,” and 
Bethune would usually get her meeting, if not her way.80
With Bethune’s help, the number of black advisers in the 
Roosevelt administration eventually swelled to over one hundred. 
Bethune began to gather this young professional group at her home 
on Friday evenings to discuss black issues. The press called them 
the Black Cabinet, after similar bodies that had advised presidents 
beginning in the late nineteenth century. The main difference from 
the past was that now there were far more blacks in high appoint-
ive positions than ever before. It was also known as the Black Brain 
Trust, echoing FDR’s Brain Trust of New Deal planners.81
The Black Cabinet brought about greater awareness of black prob-
lems on the part of both the government and the public. Although 
the Black Cabinet initially lacked official status and kept no minutes, 
it provided a valuable forum and breeding grounds for policy ideas. 
Based on its deliberations, members developed ideas for further discus-
sion, presented ideas in their departments, and worked with the press 
to get information out to the public. The black Cabineteers, as they 
were dubbed, vetoed a proposal in the administration to create a fed-
eral Negro Bureau to centralize all initiatives regarding race. They may 
have seen it as a potential rival to their own influence in Washington. 
In 1936 they were officially recognized as the Federal Council on Negro 
Affairs, but Black Cabinet remained the unofficial name.82 
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The council (i.e., the Black Cabinet) served as a liaison between 
the administration, civil rights organizations—such as the NAACP 
and NUL—and labor leaders like A. Philip Randolph, founder of 
the all-black Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (BSCP). Besides 
helping the White House keep in touch with the black community, 
the council also transmitted a detailed picture of operations in the 
White House to the black leadership. The Cabineteers worked closely 
with colleagues outside of government and joined with them when 
needed to protest particular policies and bring pressure against the 
appropriate officials.83 
With support from the Black Cabinet and the NYA, Mary 
McLeod Bethune organized two government conferences on black 
welfare and black youth. A precursor to these efforts came in 1935 
when the Joint Committee on National Recovery organized a confer-
ence at Harvard University on the economic status of black people 
that presented dramatic testimony from black and white workers to 
five hundred scholars and students. This conference publicized the 
plight of African Americans during the New Deal and helped set 
the stage for the later federal conferences. Held in 1937 and 1939, the 
Conferences on the Problems of the Negro and Negro Youth covered 
employment and training problems and issues, relations with labor 
unions, black education, and federal employment opportunities. 
The conferences made numerous recommendations to benefit black 
workers. For example, the 1937 conference called for establishing a 
thirty-hour workweek to increase employment of blacks; eliminat-
ing discrimination in labor unions; barring federal contracts which 
involved discrimination; eliminating abuses interfering with fair 
employment of blacks by the federal government; hiring black super-
visors and managers in every federal department and every region; 
and appointing blacks to federal and state committees on apprentice 
training.84
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Second New Deal Legislation, the Courts, and Blacks
Among the more significant accomplishments of the Second New 
Deal in relation to working blacks were several important laws that, 
while not aimed at them, nonetheless provided direct or indirect 
benefits. The 1935 National Labor Relations Act, also known as the 
Wagner Act, guaranteed all workers the right to form unions and 
bargain with their employers. At the time, it was doubtful that the 
law would be of any help to blacks. It specifically excluded agricul-
tural and household workers, representing 65 percent of black work-
ers, and a provision to prohibit unions from discriminating against 
or excluding blacks had been defeated. However, the Wagner Act 
empowered the new Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), 
established in 1935 as the Committee on Industrial Organization, 
to aggressively organize whole industries into single unions, rather 
than following the model of the AFL and organizing each craft into 
its own union. The CIO concentrated on the automotive, steel, meat-
packing, and other relatively nonunionized industries. In most of 
these industries, blacks had become a significant part of the work-
force. Generally speaking, they were welcomed into and treated 
fairly by the new CIO unions.
To compete with the CIO, the AFL urged its affiliates to also orga-
nize blacks and accept them as equals. Even before the Wagner Act, 
in early 1935 the AFL had admitted the all-black BSCP as an affili-
ate. The result of the competition between the AFL and the CIO to 
organize workers was that, especially in cases where union represen-
tation was determined by elections, thousands of new black union 
members benefited from good union wage scales, improved benefits, 
and better working conditions.85
A landmark law for all Americans, but especially important for 
those with limited means, was the Social Security Act of 1935. By 
providing old-age pensions, unemployment insurance, and other 
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benefits, it established a safety net that served the large mass of 
blacks who had limited resources to carry them through economic 
hardship and old age. The law was crafted and administered in a 
generally fair manner, but Social Security had its limitations. Before 
enactment, Senator Harry Byrd and other Southern Democrats had 
objected to Title I, which provided for federal oversight of the states 
as they determined who would receive Social Security payments and 
how much they would be paid. Byrd and his colleagues saw this lan-
guage as a threat to state control and feared that it would lead to fed-
eral interference with discriminatory southern racial policies. They 
feared that Washington would be able to deny Social Security funds 
to any state program that it believed was discriminating against 
blacks. As a result, the clause in Title I that governed federal con-
trol over states was watered down.86 In addition, the law excluded 
most farmworkers, a disproportionately large number of whom were 
black. Mary McLeod Bethune and others succeeded in broaden-
ing the coverage of the law in other areas. Bethune also objected to 
the small percentage of blacks employed within the Social Security 
Administration and worked to improve black hiring.87
Like the Social Security Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 
(FLSA) was a broad law that benefited many blacks. The FLSA set an 
initial minimum wage of twenty-five cents per hour, required pay-
ment of time and a half for time worked beyond eight hours in a 
day and forty hours in a week, and eliminated abusive child labor. 
Restricted to workers engaged in interstate commerce, the law ini-
tially excluded farmworkers, domestic help, certain transportation 
workers, and many others. Some white employers protested having 
to pay blacks a minimum wage and indicated they preferred to hire 
only white workers for minimum wage jobs. Initially, the law cov-
ered about a million blacks, with several million others among the 
excluded groups. Over the years, Congress steadily broadened the 
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FLSA to cover most of the lowest-paid wage groups, and it became a 
wage floor for black workers.88
A major shift in the Supreme Court in favor of a greater role for 
the federal government and in support of the rights of individuals, 
particularly benefited black Americans. Federal courts had blocked 
earlier attempts to establish labor standards, and the subject was a 
campaign issue in the 1936 election. When FDR won reelection, he 
tried to pack the anti-New Deal Supreme Court by appointing extra 
justices. FDR failed, but the court subsequently provided several 
important victories for the New Deal and working blacks. The New 
Negro Alliance (NNA)—a black activist group formed in 1933 by a 
group of young college graduates aided by the distinguished lawyer 
William C. Hastie—had initiated a campaign to picket employers in 
Washington, DC, who refused to hire blacks. When a federal court 
issued an injunction against the NNA, in a dispute with the Sanitary 
Grocery Company over black employment, they appealed the case to 
the Supreme Court. Among the range of arguments the NNA made 
was that the proportion of minorities working for a given employer 
should be close to the proportion of minorities in the local workforce. 
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of their actions on the grounds that 
such picketing against employers was protected under the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, which banned the use of federal-court restraining 
orders in labor disputes. In 1936 Thurgood Marshall—a lawyer with 
the NAACP and later the first African American appointed to the 
US Supreme Court—devised a strategy of attacking segregated pub-
lic schools. He sued to force school districts to provide equivalent 
salaries to both black and white teachers. The NAACP won several 
cases in lower federal courts, including a favorable decision elimi-
nating serious underpayment of black teachers in Norfolk, Virginia. 
The Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal, and these decisions 
became settled law.89
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Paralleling the court’s racial progressivism, in 1939 Attorney 
General Frank Murphy established a Civil Rights Section in the 
Department of Justice. Murphy vowed to initiate “a program of vigi-
lant action in the prosecution of the infringement of [legal] rights.” 
The Civil Rights Section focused initially on protecting black voting 
rights in the South, for the first time directing the power of the federal 
government toward eliminating legal sanctions of discrimination.90
When Nazi Germany invaded Poland in September 1939, 
Washington’s attention turned to Europe and war. The New Deal 
effectively came to an end, concluding a period in which the federal 
government provided significant economic aid to blacks. The agen-
cies charged to provide jobs and relief from Depression–era poverty 
had made an unprecedented effort to do so in a way that was fair to 
all. Because most of these agencies were discontinued due to the war, 
the jobs and benefits they provided ended when the agencies did. 
The coming war, however, created conditions that spawned a historic 
shift to a permanent government effort to promote equal opportuni-
ties for blacks and all minority workers.

The second part deals primarily with the emergence of long-term executive action through presidential executive orders 
rather than ad hoc action by individual administrators. Chapter 3, 
“World War II and the Fair Employment Practice Committee,” takes 
as its main subject the FEPC. This body was created by an execu-
tive order under threat from African American leaders to mount a 
massive march of blacks on Washington. The FEPC enforced equal 
opportunity in federal employment and defense contract work. 
Due to congressional opposition, it died after the war. However, 
as discussed in chapter 4, “Truman Administration, 1945-1952,” 
new executive orders reestablished fair treatment policies in the 
two areas covered by the FEPC and also included the armed forces. 
Harry S. Truman was the first president to speak out clearly for civil 
rights, and he took numerous actions to promote equal opportu-
nity. Chapter 5, “Eisenhower Administration, 1953-1960,” shows 
how executive action continued in a form modified to fit the policy 
approaches of an administration that favored limited government. 
Secretary of Labor James Mitchell was an eloquent spokesman on 
civil rights throughout these years.
Part II
Institutionalization of Executive Action,  
1940–1960

When Germany initiated World War II in 1939, the Roosevelt administration had already begun develop-
ing war production capacities to support Great Britain and other 
nations threatened by the dominant European power. Even before 
the United States entered the war against the Axis Powers (Germany, 
Italy, and Japan) in 1941, the stimulative effect of defense produc-
tion was creating millions of jobs and setting the stage for the end 
of the Depression. On the threshold of war, a huge reserve of unem-
ployed African Americans (6.5 million by 1940) was available in the 
nation’s industrial centers to help fill the vast numbers of new jobs 
being created.
Good defense jobs were not quickly, nor easily, realized for hope-
ful blacks. Several factors constricted their share of new jobs. Unlike 
the situation at the beginning of World War I, in 1939 there was a 
massive reserve of unemployed whites. In addition, there were forty-
four million potential workers not in the labor force, many of them 
women. Because they had seniority, many whites returned to previ-
ous jobs when their employers began rehiring; these white workers 
were rehired before less senior blacks. Women started entering the 
workforce in droves, competing with blacks for defense jobs. 
Racial discrimination inevitably reared its ugly head and made 
it even more difficult for blacks to participate fully in the explosion 
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in hiring. Many employers sincerely feared that white unionists 
would strike if they began hiring blacks, but other employers used 
this diversion as a smoke screen to mask their own prejudices. Some 
employers went to such extremes to avoid hiring African American 
workers that production bottlenecks were created when they lured 
white workers away from other defense plants. The Standard Steel 
Corporation of Kansas City announced, “We have not had a black 
worker in twenty-five years and do not plan to start now.” The presi-
dent of North American Aviation stated flatly that blacks “will be 
considered only as janitors” and laborers. “Under no circumstances,” 
he said, would they be hired for aircraft manufacture, even if they 
were fully trained. At one point, seventy-five thousand experienced 
black construction workers remained unemployed as a result of dis-
crimination in the construction industry.
African Americans fared almost as poorly in the military. The 
Selective Service Act of 1940 allowed the drafting of blacks into the 
army and required that the numbers of draftees meet the test of racial 
proportionality. However, all the services remained strictly segre-
gated, and opportunities for blacks to serve as commissioned officers 
were limited. The perception of unfairness in the military stimulated 
black activists to seek redress. Even before the war, Pittsburgh Courier 
editor Robert L. Vann, a member of the Black Brain Trust, called on 
Roosevelt to appoint blacks to West Point on a regular basis. A group 
of black officers formed a committee to promote the participation 
of blacks in the military. In 1940 the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car 
Porters (BSCP) joined the mounting call to eliminate discrimination 
in the military. A major victory in these efforts was the promotion 
of Army Colonel Benjamin O. Davis in October 1940 to become the 
first African American general officer in history.1
That same year the NAACP began a campaign against exclu-
sion of blacks from the aircraft industry, publishing a photo of an 
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aircraft plant and the title “For Whites Only” on the cover of the 
July issue of its journal The Crisis. Mary McLeod Bethune provided 
Eleanor Roosevelt with detailed documentation of discrimination in 
the defense industry. Black organizations published lists of indus-
try and governmental officials accused of discrimination, and the 
white press began to report on the issue. The Saturday Evening Post 
published an article titled “It’s Our Country, Too” by Walter White 
of the NAACP. White leaders joined blacks in a November 1940 
conference at Hampton, Virginia, on “Participation of the Negro in 
National Defense.”2
FDR, who was running for an unprecedented third term in 1940 
and was aggressively courting black votes, appointed a number of 
additional black government advisers and sought in various ways to 
reduce discrimination in the federal government. For example, he 
appointed black federal judge William H. Hastie as a special civilian 
aide to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson.3 Hastie’s job was to inves-
tigate complaints of discrimination in both the military and among 
civilian employees of and contractors to the War Department. At 
FDR’s behest, the US Office of Education (USOE) required non-
discrimination in federally funded training programs for defense 
workers, a policy backed up by a nondiscrimination clause Congress 
placed in defense training legislation.4
Roosevelt established the National Defense Advisory Commission 
(NDAC) in May 1940 to coordinate industrial and manpower 
resources. The NDAC included a Labor Division headed by CIO 
unionist and New Deal proponent Sidney Hillman, who was deter-
mined to supply a sufficient flow of workers to produce everything 
needed to win the war. To accomplish this task, Hillman sought to 
tap all sources of labor, including African Americans. Accordingly, 
on September 1, 1940, Hillman issued a policy statement warning 
against discrimination based on race, age, or sex in hiring in the 
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defense industry. Robert Weaver, a former Black Cabineteer, was 
appointed to spearhead the Labor Division’s efforts to mobilize the 
black labor force.5
In December 1940 after winning reelection, FDR replaced the 
NDAC with the Office of Production Management (OPM) but con-
tinued the Labor Division. Sidney Hillman, who now jointly headed 
OPM with William Knudsen, established a Negro Employment and 
Training Branch (NETB) and put Weaver in charge. There was also 
a Minority Groups Service, supervised by white southerner Will 
Alexander, which dealt with discrimination against other groups. 
While this antidiscrimination machinery was being established, 
pressure mounted on Knudsen and Hillman to take stronger action at 
OPM against discrimination. On April 11, 1941, they issued a formal 
letter calling on defense contractors to cease discriminating against 
blacks who applied for work. However, the letter was never published 
in the Federal Register, limiting its impact. Weaver’s NETB, lacking 
investigative or enforcement powers, sought to persuade and negoti-
ate with employers to hire more blacks and reduce the burden on the 
relief system. Weaver focused on defense construction and was able 
to achieve modest gains in black employment in that sector.6
Roosevelt had won reelection with the help of strong support 
from black voters. The National Negro Congress wished to cash in 
on that support and proposed that Roosevelt go beyond OPM’s lim-
ited antidiscrimination efforts and issue an executive order prohibit-
ing employment discrimination within the federal government. A 
“Fight for Freedom Committee,” organized by racially progressive 
whites, telegraphed OPM demanding enforcement of fair employ-
ment for blacks. In May 1941 Mary McLeod Bethune, Walter White 
of the NAACP, and others met with Hillman to call for an executive 
order banning discrimination, not just in the federal government, 
but in the entire defense-military establishment.7 
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Meanwhile, black labor leader A. Philip Randolph, the founder 
and president of the BSCP, was preparing to take more direct action. 
At a meeting with FDR in September 1940, Randolph asked for imme-
diate and full integration of the entire national defense effort, both 
civilian and military. Roosevelt rejected this proposal, and Randolph 
decided to mount a march of ten thousand blacks on Washington to 
demand equality in the defense effort. The NAACP and the Urban 
League endorsed the idea, plans for a march in the summer of 1941 
firmed up, and to the administration’s alarm, the projected number 
of marchers swelled to one hundred thousand.8
The White House was concerned that a march could touch off 
racial violence in the nation’s capital, which was already nerve-
wracked from a sensationalized crime wave. They were also worried 
that such a march would confuse and distract an American public 
poised to support the White House’s call to aid the United Kingdom, 
then under attack from Hitler’s Germany. In an effort to meet 
Randolph’s demands, FDR sent a memo to Hillman and Knudsen, 
officially placing the weight of his office behind their April 11, 1941, 
letter. FDR specifically directed OPM to see that the nation’s work-
force was used productively and without discrimination. He also 
arranged a meeting in New York City on June 7 at which Eleanor 
Roosevelt, Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia (a friend of Randolph), and 
Aubrey Williams, head of the NYA, tried unsuccessfully to persuade 
Randolph and White to abandon their plans for a march.
Roosevelt met personally with Randolph and White on June 18, 
joined by LaGuardia and others. FDR, who was open to the idea of 
change, asked, “What do you want me to do?” Randolph gave the 
president a memo from the March-on-Washington Committee 
(MOWC) he headed, outlining a number of necessary actions. 
The memo demanded issuance of executive orders that would bar 
awarding government contracts to firms known to discriminate; end 
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segregation in the military; ban discrimination in federal defense-
work training programs (that FDR had already done, but not by 
executive order); order the USES to refer workers to jobs regardless 
of their race; and abolish discrimination within the federal gov-
ernment. The MOWC memo also called on Roosevelt to seek leg-
islation denying the benefits of the Wagner Act to any unions that 
discriminate.
FDR balked at accepting the entire package, and the discussion 
ground to a temporary halt. LaGuardia broke the ice. He noted that 
“it is clear that Mr. Randolph is not going to call off the march” and 
suggested that “we all begin to seek a formula.” Roosevelt agreed and 
appointed a committee, chaired by LaGuardia, to draw up a response 
to the MOWC demands. The LaGuardia committee quickly recom-
mended that FDR issue an executive order banning discrimination 
in defense contracting. The committee made that recommendation 
despite objections from the War Department that contractors in the 
South might refuse to bid for contracts and that the order would be 
unenforceable anyway. Roosevelt accepted the idea and began nego-
tiations with Randolph and the MOWC. He balked at their call to 
include desegregation of the military in the order but agreed to their 
demand to include federal employees. When a final agreement was 
reached on June 24, Randolph called off the march.9
Executive Order 8802 and the FEPC
The next day, June 25, 1941, President Roosevelt issued Executive 
Order (E.O.) 8802 establishing the president’s Fair Employment 
Practice Committee (FEPC). The black press hailed the order as 
a second emancipation proclamation, but segregationists imme-
diately objected to the agency it created. As a result, the FEPC 
became the most controversial World War II agency of the federal 
government.10 E.O. 8802 marked a significant expansion of federal 
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antidiscrimination policy. For the first time there was a federal body 
specifically responsible for administering equal employment oppor-
tunity requirements. While the FEPC’s powers were few, its budget 
small, and its life span limited to the World War II period, it marked 
the beginning of a quarter century of almost continuous executive 
action promoting fairness in employment funded by the federal 
government.
The overall goal stated in E.O. 8802 was “to encourage participa-
tion in the national defense program by all citizens . . . regardless 
of race, creed, color, or national origin.” It required an end to dis-
crimination by the federal government and by defense contractors. 
It also called upon unions and all other private employers to make a 
voluntary effort to eliminate discrimination.
The order established two main requirements. First, federal train-
ing programs for defense production were to be administered free of 
all discrimination. Second, and more importantly, all federal defense 
contracts were to include a nondiscrimination provision. The order 
placed the FEPC under OPM. The committee could investigate any 
complaints of discrimination it received, though it was not empow-
ered to initiate specific investigations on its own. It would then “take 
appropriate steps” to remedy discriminatory situations and make 
specific recommendations to federal agencies and the president on 
how best to implement the order. However, the FEPC did not enforce 
any laws, and it lacked the power to subpoena witnesses or sue viola-
tors in court. It did have the right to call for cancellation of contracts 
as a remedy, but it could not require this action.11 
Initially, the committee was to have five members. Shortly after 
the order was issued, Randolph and White met with Sydney Hillman 
to discuss the committee’s membership. Randolph and White agreed 
with Hillman that the AFL and the CIO should each have a repre-
sentative, but they wanted the committee enlarged to seven members 
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to assure that organized labor, whom the black leaders did not trust, 
would not dominate it. A compromise was reached at six members, 
and E.O. 8802 was amended to reflect the change.12 
In July 1941 Roosevelt appointed Mark Ethridge, a white liberal 
and publisher of the Louisville Courier-Journal, as chair of the com-
mittee. Two black members were appointed: Milton Webster, vice 
president of the BSCP, and Earl Dickerson, a Chicago alderman. 
Other members included William Green, president of the AFL; 
William Murray, president of the CIO; and, representing the busi-
ness community, David Sarnoff, president of the Radio Corporation 
of America.13 
The committee formally organized in August 1941. One of its 
first actions was to appoint Lawrence Cramer, the white former gov-
ernor of the largely black US Virgin Islands, as executive secretary, 
and George M. Johnson, the black dean of the Howard University 
Law School, as Cramer’s assistant. The subordination of Johnson, a 
distinguished legal scholar, did not please the black community. Due 
to budget limitations, the FEPC hired very few employees initially 
and was forced to rely on OPM staff for additional support. From the 
outset, the members were concerned that federal government work-
ers, while technically covered under E.O. 8802, were mentioned only 
in passing. By contrast, several provisions were devoted to antidis-
crimination enforcement in defense contract work. To alleviate the 
committee’s concerns, Roosevelt specifically directed the heads of all 
federal departments to treat their employees with fairness.14 
Another early problem was the public’s lack of knowledge about 
the committee. Therefore, it initiated a publicity and educational 
campaign and distributed seventy-five thousand posters on E.O. 
8802 to federal agencies and contractors. The members decided to 
hold a series of four public hearings on fair employment, one in each 
region of the country, in order to publicize the order and investigate 
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discrimination. The first hearing was held in Los Angeles in October 
1941. Subsequent hearings occurred in 1942 in Chicago, New York, 
and Birmingham, Alabama. The hearings focused on the employ-
ment policies of local defense industries and the associated unions. 
Evidence turned up proving that, from New York to Los Angeles, 
discrimination was a serious barrier to minorities in war work. 
Venturing beyond E.O. 8802’s mandate to investigate specific com-
plaints only, the committee made general recommendations to the 
private sector on abating discrimination. These early actions were 
largely ignored by the mainstream press, but black newspapers such 
as the Chicago Defender praised it for “[giving] hope to millions of 
black workers.”15 
The FEPC had to find a new home when OPM was disbanded in 
late 1941 due to a reorganization of the government’s war production 
effort. The FEPC was transferred to the new War Production Board 
(WPB) in January 1942. Shortly after that, Ethridge—partly due to 
frustration with the extremely limited staff and budget allowed to 
the committee—resigned as chair, although he remained a mem-
ber. Malcolm McLean, president of Hampton Institute, took over 
as chair. With organizational matters settled for the time being, the 
committee completed its hearings. The White House praised the 
work of chair McLean. As the FEPC celebrated its first anniversary 
on June 25, 1942, it was slated to receive a substantial budget increase 
and was planning to set up regional offices in twelve cities.16 
Unfortunately for the committee, these plans had to be put on 
hold just one month later. The committee’s troubles began with the 
last of its four hearings. This final hearing was held in Birmingham 
in June 1942 and highlighted revelations of extensive discrimination 
in defense work in the South. Many southerners now came to see the 
committee as a threat to the Jim Crow system, and southern politi-
cians pressured FDR to restrain the FEPC. The Democratic Party 
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badly needed southern votes in the fall elections. On July 30, 1942, 
FDR gave in to political pressure and transferred the committee to 
the War Manpower Commission (WMC). This body had been cre-
ated in April 1942 to deal with labor shortages that were beginning 
to interfere with war production. The FEPC, whose members con-
sidered WMC head Paul McNutt to be unsympathetic to the mis-
sion, had hoped to be transferred to the White House’s Office of 
Emergency Management. The move to the WMC, besides placing it 
under an unfriendly administrator, meant that the FEPC would now 
be funded through regular congressional budgetary procedures that 
gave Congress direct control over its budget.
Confirming the worst fears of the committee’s supporters, the 
FEPC quietly languished in its new home. McNutt delayed for three 
months, after the transfer, before approving a procedure for merging 
the two agencies. He cut the committee’s budget, denied it access to 
WMC offices in the field, and refused to appoint needed staff mem-
bers. Furthermore, he placed the FEPC under his direct supervision, 
depriving it of the relative autonomy under which it had been oper-
ating. In one bright spot, in October 1942 Robert Weaver’s NETB 
and Will Alexander’s Minority Group Branch were consolidated into 
the FEPC, significantly strengthening its staff.17 
The last straw for the supporters of the committee came in January 
1943 when McNutt, responding to pressure from critics of the FEPC, 
indefinitely postponed scheduled hearings on discrimination in 
railroad employment in the South. Black groups, sympathetic labor 
unions, civic and church leaders, and others petitioned the president 
to order that the hearings be held. At the same time—because of the 
weakening of the commission under the WMC—McLean, Ethridge, 
David Sarnoff, and Executive Director Cramer resigned with numer-
ous staff members.18
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The “Second FEPC”
The Roosevelt administration, concerned about growing labor short-
ages on the one hand and the difficult status of the committee on the 
other, had already begun exploring ways to better accomplish the 
mission of E.O. 8802 and mobilize a larger portion of the African 
American workforce for the war effort. In February 1943 at Roo-
sevelt’s request, McNutt and Attorney General Francis Biddle met 
with twenty-four leaders of the pro–FEPC community. The black 
supporters demanded that the committee be removed from the 
WMC and report directly to the president, but the administration 
made no commitments at this time. In fact, FDR made no decision 
at all for several months. During this time, the FEPC, White House, 
Bureau of the Budget, and Department of Justice considered a wide 
variety of options. These options ranged from the extreme of abol-
ishing the committee to strengthening it and removing it from the 
control of the WMC.19
In this period of limbo, the committee aggressively resumed 
its antidiscrimination work, partly in the hopes of pressuring the 
administration into a favorable decision on its fate. Without McNutt’s 
approval, the committee announced a new series of hearings on dis-
crimination in the defense industry, beginning in Detroit on May 
24; it also rescheduled the postponed hearings on the southern rail-
roads. These steps probably had some impact on the White House. 
More important was Attorney General Biddle’s support for the FEPC 
and his recommendation that it be reestablished and strengthened.20 
Heeding Biddle’s advice, on May 27, 1943, Roosevelt issued E.O. 
9346, replacing the old FEPC with what became known as the Second 
FEPC. It was located, as FEPC members had originally sought a year 
earlier, within the Office of Emergency Management and reported 
directly to the president. Monsignor Francis Haas, a social scientist 
at Catholic University in Washington, DC, was appointed chair, and 
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vacancies on the committee were filled. Then, in October 1943 Haas 
suddenly resigned when he was appointed Bishop of the Diocese of 
Grand Rapids, Michigan. However, in his short tenure he brought 
greater racial and religious diversity to a staff that was 90 percent 
black when he took over. This diversity reflected his goal of seeing 
that the FEPC met its mission to serve all minority groups, not just 
the predominantly black population. He was replaced by Malcolm 
Ross, the former public affairs officer at the NLRB. Under Haas and 
Ross, the committee received better support and was able, at last, to 
establish the twelve regional offices it had long wanted, plus three 
additional subregional offices.21
E.O. 9346 did not dramatically reorganize the committee, but it 
did enlarge the scope. Now the FEPC’s jurisdiction extended to work 
that was not performed under federal contract, provided it was con-
sidered essential to the war effort. The antidiscrimination clause that 
E.O. 8802 required in defense contracts was extended to all federal 
contracts. Since E.O. 9346 did not drastically alter the FEPC, reac-
tions from most interested parties (whether critics or supporters) 
was mild, and the mainstream press gave it little attention.22 
There was, however, a quiet transformation in policy. Although 
the committee finally held the delayed railroad industry hearings, 
its primary emphasis shifted from investigating whole industrial 
sectors to focusing on resolving individual discrimination com-
plaints.23 Under FEPC rules—in order for a case of alleged discrimi-
nation in hiring, placement, or training to merit investigation—an 
affected individual had to submit a signed complaint against a spe-
cific employer, government agency, or union. By adhering to this 
approach, the committee avoided charges of going on “fishing expe-
ditions” in various workplaces and industries. However, it inter-
preted E.O. 9346 broadly enough to allow it to accept complaints 
from anyone who had evidence of possible discrimination, not just 
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complaints from aggrieved persons themselves. It also investigated 
discriminatory job advertisements, job placement orders, and appli-
cation forms.
Investigation of a complaint typically began in the region where 
the alleged discrimination took place. If the FEPC’s Fair Practice 
examiner assigned to the case determined it to be legitimate, he 
or she first sought to negotiate an informal settlement between the 
employer or the union and the aggrieved party. Settlements took 
many forms: an employer might promise in writing to “cease and 
desist” discriminatory practices; a complainant who was denied a 
job might be hired; an employer might agree to drop racial require-
ments for job openings; or the employer might eliminate questions 
about race from application forms. Most cases were resolved in this 
manner with only 15 percent handled above the regional level. If the 
regional examiner did not resolve the case, he or she referred it to 
the FEPC's Office of Field Operations in Washington. In rare cases 
when the ensuing visit from a national office examiner did not clear 
up the matter, it went to the Legal Division for further investigation. 
In some cases a public hearing was held.24 
For cases that remained unresolved after these steps had been 
exhausted, there was not a great deal the committee could do. It 
lacked the authority to enforce directives in the courts or to collect 
fines for willful violations. It could recommend cancellation of the 
contract in question, but in fact, no contract was ever cancelled due 
to discrimination. The administration discouraged cancellation of 
contracts, fearing that such a drastic action would interfere unduly 
with the war effort.
Given its limited enforcement powers, the FEPC was heavily 
dependent on employers, unions, and community groups to volun-
tarily improve the racial climate and reduce, or eliminate, discrimi-
nation. Accordingly, it emphasized education, cooperation, and 
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non-adversarial relations. The field staff was trained to be friendly, 
evenhanded, and tactful. The director of Field Operations advised 
staff to avoid cold, formal phrases such as “It is hereby requested” in 
favor of the more conciliatory “Will you be good enough to . . .” types 
of requests. Examiners were expected to thoroughly review and ver-
ify evidence of complaints and look for mitigating factors in appar-
ent acts of discrimination. Complaints were kept confidential to 
avoid embarrassing, or alienating, employers or unions. Examiners 
were also expected to avoid questioning the good faith of an accused 
party. Rather, they were to make sure the party understood that 
FEPC staff wanted only to help resolve problems. While support-
ers of the committee lamented the lack of strong enforcement tools, 
there is evidence that the voluntary approach had an impact.25 For 
example, in Detroit the local FEPC officials were credited, particu-
larly, with fostering racial harmony in industry at large and, gener-
ally, throughout the city after extensive race riots in 1943.26
The FEPC also emphasized cooperation with federal agencies. 
The committee worked closely with the WMC, which had an exten-
sive network of offices around the country. Under a special oper-
ating agreement, the WMC provided staff and other assistance for 
complaint cases that the committee was investigating. The WMC 
handled all complaints that it received that was of significant help to 
the committee because the WMC received 20 percent of all discrimi-
nation complaints.27 
The FEPC worked with a number of other agencies under both 
E.O. 8802 and E.O. 9346 with varying success. The Navy and War 
Departments made a substantial effort to implement the order, but 
their effectiveness was impeded by the overriding goal of promoting 
production and winning the war. When employees of contractors 
resisted efforts to hire or promote blacks, the contracting agency often 
tolerated discrimination rather than risk a strike or lose production. 
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The Maritime Commission successfully promoted minority rights 
in shipyards in the Northeast and on the West Coast, but they met 
resistance in the South. The War Shipping Administration (WSA) 
followed equal treatment policies in referrals for maritime jobs, but 
it did not have much cooperation from the Seafarers International 
Union. Often, by the time it came to the attention of the WSA that 
a ship’s crew had been hired in violation of E.O. 8802, the ship had 
already sailed. The NLRB fought discrimination in unions by refus-
ing to certify representation elections from which minorities had 
been excluded. The War Labor Board promoted equal pay by prohib-
iting separate wage scales based on race.28 
The FEPC particularly needed the cooperation of the USES that 
worked with the WMC to refer millions of workers to defense plants. 
In the early stages of the war, before US entry, the USES was doing 
a very poor job of placing blacks in skilled manufacturing jobs. In 
early 1941 it placed 8,769 workers in key aircraft production jobs, but 
only a paltry thirteen of them were black. Local employment ser-
vice offices in the Gulf Coast region excluded blacks from shipyard 
employment. One cause of this discrimination was that employment 
offices in the state-federal system had grown accustomed to accom-
modating discriminatory hiring in the Jim Crow South. They feared 
that if they enforced fair hiring practices, employers would simply 
bypass the USES and hire directly, or through, private employment 
agencies.29
In 1942 the USES established a Minority Groups Consultant 
position to promote fair treatment and ordered its placement officers 
to inform employers that federal policy prohibited discriminatory 
job specifications. At the same time, unfortunately, the 1942 USES 
operating manual allowed employment offices to accept biased job 
orders (except in states that banned discrimination by law). However, 
the office first had to attempt to persuade the employer to drop any 
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racialized requirements. When the WMC assumed control of hiring 
in areas of labor shortage in 1943, affected employers could only hire 
through the USES, which gave the government potential leverage in 
enforcing fair employment practices. When the USES persisted in 
accepting discriminatory job orders, the WMC attempted to stop the 
practice once and for all. On September 3, 1943, the WMC directed 
the USES to refuse to accept such requests. It also ruled that USES 
staff would be subject to disciplinary action if they disobeyed. In 
1944 the WMC took the further step of issuing a revised internal 
USES training handbook titled The USES and the Negro Applicant. 
(This appears be the first federal training material on fair treatment 
of black job applicants.) Over the course of the war, the USES, at the 
national level, improved its effort to promote equal employment. It 
was another story in the local offices, many of which continued to 
honor whites-only job orders. This problem remained a continuing 
sore point for civil rights groups for years and was never corrected 
until the 1960s (see chapter 9).30
In addition to enforcing fair treatment in hiring and on the job, 
the FEPC was also authorized to require fairness in government-
sponsored vocational and training programs for defense work. 
Training was largely funded by the National Defense Training Act 
and was supervised by the Office of Education (USOE). Beginning 
with the hearings it held in Los Angeles in October 1941, the commit-
tee discovered that many blacks were denied training opportunities, 
particularly in the South. While espousing an official policy of equal 
opportunity, the USOE did not enforce this policy when local train-
ing programs excluded African Americans. When the FEPC found 
considerable discrimination in these programs in Alabama, Georgia, 
and Tennessee in 1942, it charged that the USOE was not comply-
ing with E.O. 8802. The FEPC thereupon issued a series of directives 
to the USOE, requiring it to stop approving defense training plans 
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if they did not prohibit discrimination; withhold funds, if neces-
sary, from the noncompliant programs discovered in defense plants 
in Alabama, Georgia, and Tennessee; and reinspect those defense 
plants to make sure that they did not resume discriminatory train-
ing programs. The USOE improved its fair treatment performance 
and made significant progress in the South. The total number of 
black trainees in twelve southern states swelled from 3,768 in June 
1942 to 4,702 in November, a 25 percent increase in just five months. 
While defense industry training remained segregated in the South, 
the USOE was able to see that the proportion of training courses 
open to blacks grew from only 4 percent in early 1942 to 18 percent 
by the end of the year.31 
The agency with the primary responsibility for promoting equal 
treatment in federal employment was the Civil Service Commission 
(CSC). Guided by equalitarian racial policies stemming from the 
New Deal, the commission had banned racial discrimination in fed-
eral hiring even before the creation of the FEPC in 1941. In addition, 
as ordered under the Ramspeck Act of 1940, the CSC had ceased 
to attach photos of job seekers to their applications. At the com-
mittee’s request, the CSC resolved most discrimination complaints 
internally, while keeping the FEPC informed about the disposition 
of cases. The committee reserved the right to advise the CSC on 
particular cases and to take over unresolved ones. As a result of the 
joint effort, black employment in government underwent a remark-
able transformation. For example, in 1938 blacks constituted only 8.4 
percent of all federal employees in Washington, DC, but by March 
1944 that proportion had swelled to 19.2 percent. In addition, the 
proportion of black federal employees who held noncustodial jobs 
grew from 10 percent to 60 percent in the same period.32
While the FEPC encountered resistance from many federal 
agencies to fully enforcing E.O.s 8802 and 9346, it also operated 
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in the face of growing criticism and opposition in the Congress. 
In the eyes of many in Congress, it had a couple of strikes against 
it. First of all, the FEPC was seen as a bureaucratic “orphan” laid 
at the doorsteps of a Congress expected to nurture and support it. 
Worse, Southern Democrats saw the reorganized “Second FEPC” 
as a particularly serious threat to the discriminatory racial prac-
tices they supported. Beginning in December 1943, Representative 
Howard Smith (Democrat–Virginia) held a series of investigative 
hearings on the FEPC. Its opponents charged that it was illegal and 
communist-influenced.33
With the testimony from the Smith hearings as a basis, south-
ern members of Congress and their allies plotted in early 1944 to 
eliminate the committee. In order to do that, Congress first had to 
gain control of the FEPC’s budget, which at that time was provided 
through the White House. When Congress passed a multiagency 
funding law in June 1944, Senator Richard Russell (Democrat–
Georgia) inserted an amendment prohibiting the executive branch 
from funding any federal agency for more than twelve months with-
out a specific appropriation from Congress. Designed to eliminate 
the FEPC forever, the Russell Amendment was permanent legisla-
tion that constricted federal fair employment efforts for decades. 
Supporters of the committee thwarted the intent of the Russell 
Amendment for the time being by passing an appropriations bill in 
1944 enabling the FEPC to maintain its normal level of activity until 
July 1, 1945. Encouraged by this success, the pro–FEPC forces sought 
unsuccessfully to make the agency permanent. The battle over fair 
employment and the FEPC continued into the Truman administra-
tion (see chapter 4).34 
Over the course of World War II, the FEPC received some four-
teen thousand complaints, 80 percent of them filed by blacks. Two-
thirds of the claims filed were dismissed as invalid, but almost all 
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of the valid ones—about five thousand—were successfully resolved. 
During the period of peak activity, from July 1943 to December 
1944, the committee resolved an average of one hundred cases and 
dismissed one hundred fifty each month. A few controversial cases 
involving uncooperative employers received wide publicity, but the 
preponderance of claims were resolved quietly.35
According to the FEPC, the black portion of the defense work-
force grew from 2.5 percent in March 1942 to 8.3 percent in 
November 1944. Laboring and service jobs accounted for the bulk of 
the increase. However, the number of blacks in skilled, semiskilled, 
or foreman jobs doubled from half a million to one million.36 
Mounting labor shortages increased the pressure on employers 
to hire black workers at all levels of defense-related work. The FEPC 
took advantage of that pressure to maximize minority opportuni-
ties. In cities with labor shortages, such as Detroit and Cleveland, the 
FEPC brought about satisfactory settlements in almost 40 percent 
of all complaints. In cities where labor supply and demand were in 
relative balance, such as New York and Detroit, the results were less 
satisfactory.37 Despite the best efforts of the FEPC and other federal 
manpower agencies, racial tensions had reached the boiling point in 
those cities by the summer of 1943. In Detroit, thirty-four died and 
six hundred were injured in a race riot, and in Harlem a riot was 
barely averted.38 
While the FEPC revealed and eliminated many violations of the 
obvious type—racially marked job applications, relegation of minor-
ities to unskilled jobs, and discriminatory want ads—its educational 
and public relations efforts also had a significant impact. In an exam-
ple of successful public relations, Dwight R. G. Palmer, president of 
General Cable, ordered an end to discrimination by his company. 
He asserted that it was wrong to fight for democracy abroad while 
slighting it at home.39 
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The results of all efforts, public and private, to employ black work-
ers in war industries and treat them fairly were mixed. According 
to the official US Army history of industrial employment in World 
War II, the black proportion of all those employed in defense work 
doubled during the war. It grew from 4.2 percent in 1942 to 8.6 by 
1945.40 Yet the same study concluded that:
Practically every industry in the North or South that 
made an effort to solve its manpower problem by hir-
ing greater numbers of Negro workers encountered new 
problems that were in many instances as great a threat to 
production as the manpower shortage.41
The impact of the FEPC on this ambiguous picture is impossi-
ble to measure. It seems clear, however, that the committee—while 
carrying a heavy baggage of opposition and controversy—played a 
significant role in the enormous growth in black employment cited 
above. It also helped moderate racial tensions during a stressful 
period. Historian John Hope Franklin concluded that, because the 
FEPC encouraged employers and unions to voluntarily adopt fair 
employment practices, its “existence had a salutary effect.”42
 
As African American veterans and defense workers demobi-lized after World War II ended in August 1945, they took 
great pride in their role in the defeat of fascism. Black veterans 
hoped for fair treatment and better opportunities at home, and black 
defense workers hoped to retain their wartime economic and occu-
pational advances. President Harry Truman, who as vice president 
succeeded President Roosevelt upon his death in April 1945, was 
sympathetic to the postwar hopes of African Americans.
One of Truman’s very first domestic priorities was a law to make 
the FEPC permanent. However, continuing congressional opposi-
tion to the FEPC doomed the effort. The committee managed to sur-
vive into the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1945, but its appropriations 
were drastically cut. Worse still, the appropriations bill included an 
amendment specifying that funds were to be used only for the pur-
pose of terminating the committee’s functions by June 30, 1946.1 
On December 18, 1945, Truman issued E.O. 9664 to focus the 
lame-duck FEPC on demobilization issues. The order forbade gov-
ernment agencies—which were busy cutting their staffs and retool-
ing for peacetime roles—from discriminating on the basis of race 
or creed as they laid workers off, transferred employees, or rehired 
veterans. It also directed the committee to focus on investigating 
discrimination, both in industries that were producing military 
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supplies and in munitions industries that were reverting to peace-
time production. While giving the FEPC important new fair employ-
ment goals, Truman did not provide any new enforcement teeth. To 
the dismay of its proponents, the committee, in effect, was largely 
relegated to a fact-finding role in its last days.2
Just before it went out of existence in June 1946, the commit-
tee issued a final report in which it made three main recommenda-
tions. First, it warned that black wartime employment gains were 
threatened by the industries, in which those gains were strongest, 
were exactly those targeted for the most severe postwar contrac-
tion. Second, it emphasized that discrimination should be resolved 
through negotiation rather than enforcement. Finally, it called for 
permanent fair employment legislation. While failing to enact such 
legislation during the Truman administration, Congress relented 
enough to slightly loosen the strictures of the Russell Amendment. 
This moderate concession made it possible for the executive branch 
to provide modest, but regular funding, to interdepartmental com-
mittees for the next twenty years without specific authorization from 
Congress.3
Federal fair employment legislation remained stalled, but state 
governments were free to move ahead. In 1941 the same year the 
FEPC was born, New York State established a similar committee. 
In 1945 it passed the Ives-Quinn Act that banned employment dis-
crimination and created a Commission on Human Rights. Like 
the FEPC, the state commission was not allowed to initiate inves-
tigations, and it depended on workers to file complaints. Unlike the 
FEPC, however, the commission was allowed to issue mandatory 
cease and desist orders, enforceable in the courts, when it proved the 
existence of discrimination. A number of states followed the lead of 
New York, and by the time Truman left office in January 1953, eight 
had laws against employment discrimination on the books. State fair 
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employment laws were not particularly effective in terms of advanc-
ing large numbers of black workers into jobs thus far unavailable to 
them. However, they helped raise hopes in the black community that 
discrimination on the job could be defeated. Equally important, they 
raised expectations that the government, at both the state and fed-
eral levels, was a committed ally in the struggle for fair employment.4
While stymied in his efforts to enact a fair employment law, 
Truman promoted national programs and policies that, while not 
targeted at blacks, had the potential to benefit them. In his January 
1946 State of the Union message, he called for a number of gen-
eral social welfare measures, including raising the minimum wage, 
increasing unemployment insurance benefits, and promoting a 
national program of full employment. Congress ignored most of 
Truman’s proposals but, with unemployment a national concern at 
that time, readily took up the full employment proposal that had 
considerable public support. The result was the Employment Act 
of 1946. The concept of literally “full” employment levels, with 
the implication of potentially massive government programs, was 
removed from the final bill. Retained, however, was the inclusive 
goal of seeing that everyone “able, willing, and seeking to work” 
would find it—provided that free enterprise and the general welfare 
were not compromised. The law committed the federal government, 
for the first time, to maintain a high level of employment for all. 
Black leaders hailed the law as an important step in helping African 
Americans climb up the economic ladder.5
Measures such as the Employment Act of 1946 and the establish-
ment of state fair employment practices commissions, while useful 
to African American workers, did little to reduce racial tensions that 
had begun building during the war. As had happened after World 
War I, racial violence broke out in many parts of the country, as rising 
black aspirations collided with resistance from a large segment of the 
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white population. Race riots occurred in most southern states, hate 
organizations spread racial propaganda throughout the country, and 
individual racial attacks drew national attention. In February 1946 
Isaak Woodward, a black war veteran, was attacked and blinded by 
the chief of police of Batesburgh, South Carolina. That same month 
in Columbia, Tennessee, the Ku Klux Klan terrorized the black pop-
ulation and killed two. In July 1946 a mob near Monroe, Georgia, 
shot and killed two black couples because one of the men, a veteran, 
had stabbed a white man whom he accused of making advances on 
his wife.6 
In response to the violence, news media attention, and protests 
by civil rights groups, Truman revived a wartime proposal for a 
federal race relations committee. On December 5, 1946, he issued 
E.O. 9808 establishing the President’s Committee on Civil Rights 
(PCCR). Its mission was to investigate the situation and recommend 
law-enforcement and governmental mechanisms that would serve 
“to safeguard the civil rights of the people.”7 
After conducting a thorough investigation into the state of rela-
tions between the races, the PCCR submitted its report titled To 
Secure These Rights on October 29, 1947. Truman urged all Americans 
to read what he termed an American charter of human freedom in 
our time. The committee’s recommendations dealt with personal 
safety, voting rights, and equality of opportunity. The report called 
specifically for:
The enactment of a Federal Fair Employment Practice 
Act prohibiting all forms of discrimination in private 
employment based on race, color, creed, or national 
origin. The enactment by the states of similar laws, the 
issuance by the president of a mandate against discrimi-
nation in government employment, and the creation of 
adequate machinery to enforce this mandate.
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The Truman administration delayed acting on these ideas for 
a time. However, by mid-1948 two factors combined to drive the 
administration to take decisive executive action. The first was the 
growing Cold War that had broken out with the Soviet Union, the 
former World War II ally. This struggle was, to a large extent, a pro-
paganda battle pitting the ideologies of Communism and Western 
democracy against each other. Each side sought to convince the 
undecided nations of the world that they alone offered the best road 
to a just and prosperous future. The struggles and maltreatment of 
African Americans received wide publicity around the world and 
condemnation from the Soviet bloc. Truman saw himself as the 
leader of the noncommunist world and realized that the United 
States’ civil rights problems detracted from its credibility as a moral 
leader.
The second factor was the election of 1948. Truman was engaged 
in a difficult struggle for reelection. Many Southern Democrats had 
deserted their party at the Democratic convention in July 1948 to 
protest Truman’s stand on civil rights. To offset that loss, Truman 
badly needed to secure strong support from the black community.8
In response to these pressures and to the Civil Rights Committee, 
on July 26, 1948, Truman issued a historic, dual set of executive 
orders: E.O. 9980, banning discrimination in the federal govern-
ment; and E.O. 9981, ordering the desegregation of the armed ser-
vices. Combined, their scope was broader than E.O. 8802 and the 
FEPC in one way, and narrower in another. Government contractors 
were not subject to antidiscrimination requirements, but the mili-
tary—for the first time—was required to eliminate all discrimina-
tion. While the full implementation of E.O. 9981 took several years, 
by the early 1950s the military was almost completely integrated. It 
became a model of equal opportunity for both government and the 
private sector.
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E.O. 9980 established an official policy of fair employment 
throughout the federal government without regard to race, religion, 
or country of origin. The order required every department to set up 
an equal treatment program for its own employees, run by a Fair 
Employment Officer (FEO). To review cases from the departments 
and provide periodic reports to the president, the order set up a Fair 
Employment Board housed by the Civil Service Commission. By the 
end of 1948, eighteen departments and agencies had established fair 
employment programs.9 
Promulgated with equal parts of moral principle and political 
expediency, the twin executive orders were warmly welcomed by 
the black community. This support translated into black votes for 
Truman in the presidential election of 1948. Locked in a race he was 
not expected to win against Republican Thomas Dewey, Truman 
eked out a close victory. Contributing greatly to the upset win, black 
voters gave Truman 69 percent of their vote.
In gratitude, Truman initiated a number of new civil rights 
steps right after the election. He immediately met with civil rights 
advocates and groups. Among them was the National Committee 
on Segregation in the Nation’s Capital, which complained about the 
pervasive discrimination that existed in Washington at that time. 
One example the committee cited was a segregated restaurant at the 
federally controlled Washington National Airport. Truman imme-
diately ended all discrimination at the airport, effective December 
27, 1948. At his inauguration on January 20, 1949, Truman broke 
precedent and integrated all inaugural events. As a result, there 
were four blacks in the audience at the Truman-Barkley Club dinner 
on January 18, when Truman gave his first speech of Inauguration 
Week. While the army’s marching platoons at the inaugural parade 
were not individually integrated, they included both black and white 
units. The army tank crews and coast guard units were thoroughly 
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mixed. Black dignitaries sat in the reviewing stand and attended 
the inaugural ball. A number of nominally segregated Washington 
hotels and restaurants accepted black guests and patrons. The 
Chicago Defender noted hopefully that “it was obvious to everyone 
that the lily-white era of Washington’s official social life had come to 
an abrupt end.”10 
Fair Employment and the Bureaucracy under Truman
Well before the Truman White House issued E.O. 9980 and E.O. 9981, 
the Department of Labor and other federal agencies were developing 
their own internal and external programs for fair employment. There 
had been a change of leadership at the department at the beginning 
of the Truman administration. Frances Perkins resigned in June 
1945 after twelve years as secretary of labor.11 She was replaced by 
former Senator Lewis Schwellenbach, an ardent New Dealer and a 
strong supporter of rights for African Americans. Despite the new 
leadership, many local employment offices of the USES continued 
to accept and honor discriminatory job orders, in violation of offi-
cial policy. In a poignant letter to the secretary of labor in July 1945, 
an anonymous writer noted a dearth of black workers in shipyards 
in Portland, Oregon, and accused the USES of consciously denying 
blacks employment in this industry. The writer posed the question: 
“Is slavery returning to the United States of America?”12 
This lone citizen was joined by the United Automobile Workers 
(UAW) union in calling for fairer treatment of blacks by the USES. 
In the fall of 1945 the UAW’s Fair Practices Committee accused 
the USES of practicing discrimination. Director Robert Goodwin 
strongly denied this accusation but agreed to reevaluate USES poli-
cies and practices.13 
In late 1946 Congress permitted state governments to take over 
administration of USES activities within their borders effective 
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January 1, 1947. African Americans feared that this devolution 
would make it more difficult to eliminate discriminatory job orders. 
Addressing the National Council of Negro Women in November 
1946, Secretary of Labor Schwellenbach tried to allay their fears. He 
argued that when the USES devolved its local operations to the states, 
it would be “promoting employment opportunity for all applicants” 
and working hard to see that employers’ “hiring specifications be 
based exclusively on job performance factors.” The USES sought to 
ease concerns by creating a special office devoted to the problems of 
minority groups. In addition, the District of Columbia Employment 
Service, which continued to be operated by the federal government, 
discontinued racial segregation in its offices.14 
The USES, among several other federal labor and veterans’ agen-
cies, came under strong pressure in 1946 from the American Council 
on Race Relations (ACRR) to improve assistance to black veterans. 
A group of eminent civil rights leaders had formed the ACRR in 
1944 to promote the equal participation of minorities in all aspects 
of American society. Its leadership included Charles Houston, 
Will Alexander, Mary McLeod Bethune, and Lloyd K. Garrison. 
Concerned about neglect of minority veterans’ rights under the GI 
Bill, the council convened an “Emergency National Conference” 
(ENC) on April 5, 1946, in Chicago, with Houston presiding. At 
the ENC it was charged that the USES and other agencies not only 
provided inadequate service to black veterans but also engaged in 
discrimination and segregation. The ENC resolved that the ACRR 
should meet with the heads of the relevant federal agencies. It also 
joined other civil rights voices pleading for a fair employment prac-
tices bill and urged unions to provide full membership rights to all 
qualifying veterans without regard to race. The conference agreed 
to convene again in a few months to tally gains and plan further 
activities.15 
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Although the ENC focused on the Veterans Administration, it 
also addressed three Department of Labor agencies: the USES; the 
Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training (BAT)16; and the Retraining 
and Reemployment Administration (RRA), a temporary agency for 
placing returning veterans and displaced defense workers. The con-
ference also contacted the sub-Cabinet Department of Education 
and the National Housing Agency. Representatives of the ACRR 
met with the head of each agency and presented them with specific 
charges of discrimination, along with proposed remedies.
The USES was the agency of greatest concern to the ACRR, 
partly because of its planned transfer to the states. The council 
called for a variety of measures such as placing black advisers and 
consultants in local USES offices and establishing advisory com-
mittees on race relations around the country. They also called for 
the collection of detailed statistics on placements by race so that 
the Minority Placement Division in the USES Washington office 
would have a clearer picture of the agency’s performance in relation 
to blacks. Further, the committee stressed that Secretary of Labor 
Schwellenbach should implement effective antidiscrimination pro-
cedures before the USES’s devolution. In a friendly follow-up letter 
to USES Director Robert Goodwin, in which he used the saluta-
tion “Dear Bob," A. A. Liveright of the ACRR expressed apprecia-
tion for “your interest and your desire to deal with” all the problems 
discussed.17 
ACRR representatives met with BAT Director William F. 
Patterson and called for the appointment of a black field worker to 
advise BAT staff and employers on equal opportunity issues. They 
also called for the collection of statistics on the degree of inclu-
sion of blacks in apprenticeship programs. The committee sought 
to obtain a “positive, aggressive policy statement” from the Federal 
Committee on Apprenticeship that would promote inclusion of all 
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groups. The ACRR considered apprenticeship a key element in inte-
grating minorities into the skilled craft occupations. To further that 
goal, the ACRR recommended that the BAT deny federal approval 
to apprenticeship programs that were known to practice discrimina-
tion (see chapter 9).18 
At the meeting with the ACRR committee, Patterson expressed 
strong interest in the problem of discrimination in apprenticeship. 
He promised to meet as many of the ACRR’s requests as possible. 
The BAT had begun studying the potential contribution of a minor-
ity adviser and whether this contribution would justify the salary 
involved. While Patterson noted that the government could not 
force employers to indicate the race of participants in their appren-
ticeship programs, the BAT was looking into ways of obtaining that 
kind of data through other means. He assured the ACRR that he 
would bring up their call for a strong policy against discrimination 
at the next meeting of the Federal Committee on Apprenticeship. 
He promised to “take proper steps” to deal with federally approved 
apprenticeship programs that practiced discrimination. But at the 
same time, he undercut that promise by stressing that both employ-
ers and unions have the right to include or exclude whomever they 
wish.19 
When the ACRR met with General Graves Erskine, head of the 
RRA, the representatives were both encouraged about the program 
and impressed with Erskine’s support of fair employment. They noted 
that the RRA’s information centers in the South treated whites and 
blacks equally, in contrast to the often segregated USES offices. The 
ACRR representatives suggested that the RRA’s policy be publicized 
in the region and recommended that blacks be involved in the opera-
tion of the RRA’s various programs, both in Washington and in the 
field. The representatives particularly sought to assure full inclusion 
of minority veterans in the RRA’s job placement program; they told 
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Erskine that they expected him to report the RRA’s positive steps to 
reduce discrimination at the follow-up to the April conference.20 
After meeting with agency heads, the ACRR reported the results 
to local civil rights and veterans agencies in an effort to establish 
a benchmark for the performance of local government offices. The 
ACRR’s Information Service provided articles on minority veterans’ 
problems to the black press. The ACRR also followed through with 
its promise to hold a second conference with federal agencies. On 
July 12, 1946, representatives of the USES, the BAT, and the RRA, 
along with the other federal agencies, met in New York City and 
reported to the ACRR on their progress.21 
As a result of pressure from the ACRR, in September 1946 the 
USES, among other agencies, adopted a new antidiscrimination 
policy. Disappointingly for the ACRR, the policy did not totally 
ban discriminatory job orders. Rather, it merely required USES staff 
to encourage employers to remove "nonperformance" (discrimi-
natory) criteria from their orders. Edward Cushman, an aide to 
Schwellenbach, admitted that the policy was “not a thoroughly satis-
factory one.” Indicating that the proposal had been reviewed by the 
NAACP and the NUL, he stressed that it should serve as a middle-
of-the-road precedent, and he defended the policy as “the most prac-
tical one in the light of existing conditions.”22 
In the arena of federal employment, the Department of Labor 
exhibited a progressive racial approach well before the issuance of 
E.O. 9980. The USES had created the position of Minority Groups 
Consultant (MGC) during World War II to assure equal opportunity 
to job applicants. Schwellenbach maintained the position, appoint-
ing Thomasina Johnson as MGC. Johnson, an African American 
and a former social worker and teacher, had become active in the 
Democratic Party in Massachusetts and as a lobbyist in Washington, 
DC, in order to pursue racial justice.23
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This activist African American woman sparked an effort to extend 
equal employment principles to the department’s internal personnel 
policies. In 1947 she urged Schwellenbach to issue a general order 
requiring that all personnel actions be based “strictly on qualifica-
tions and ability.” This order, she argued, would both allay criticism 
from those who charged that the department lacked a strong policy 
against discrimination and also leave no doubt about the matter in 
the minds of departmental managers and personnel officers. While 
she won Robert Goodwin’s support, other officials were less inter-
ested. Ultimately, Schwellenbach rejected the idea, insisting that 
Johnson’s proposal merely restated orders and procedures already in 
effect. Schwellenbach’s resistance may have resulted, at least in part, 
from his awareness that Truman planned to issue an antidiscrimina-
tion policy “sometime in the near future.”24 
Later in 1947 at the request of Under Secretary David Morse, 
Johnson investigated and reported to him on equal opportunity 
efforts at the department. She examined and evaluated not only inter-
nal personnel practices but also the external services the department 
provided to the public. Johnson relied heavily on the report of the 
Committee on Civil Rights, and she quoted extensively from both 
the CCR report and the United Nations Charter on Human Rights. 
Noting that the American race relations picture was “not a pretty 
one,” she stressed that it was time for the department to reevaluate 
its performance and see “what it can do ‘To Secure These Rights.’”
Johnson noted that a number of other government agencies had 
poor civil rights records, but she also found the Department of Labor 
to be far from perfect. Relying largely on comments from civil rights 
leaders, the press, organized labor, ordinary citizens, and employers, 
Johnson uncovered problems in each Department of Labor agency 
that dealt with minorities. These included the USES, the Wage and 
Hour and Public Contracts Division, the BAT, the Division of Labor 
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Standards, and the Veterans’ Employment Service. Only the Veterans 
Reemployment Rights Division received high marks, largely because 
of its success in helping returning black veterans receive adequate 
training for high-skill jobs. She, like most investigators, found that 
disproportionate numbers of minorities held low-paying, menial 
jobs, and far too few were in professional positions. She did not make 
any specific recommendations, calling instead for a detailed com-
parison of each agency’s services, both to whites and to nonwhites. 
She believed this comparison could then serve as a basis for better 
and more racially equitable services. 25
Around the same time, Local 10 of the United Public Workers 
of America (representing employees of the Department of Labor)
complained to Schwellenbach about alleged violations of the depart-
ment’s antidiscrimination policies. Local 10 Chairman Roy Patterson 
charged in a December 16, 1947, letter to Schwellenbach that “to an 
alarming degree black employees and prospective employees are sub-
jected to discriminatory and hostile acts.” Patterson presented several 
discrimination grievances and called first for a full “recognition by 
the secretary of labor and the department that racial discrimination 
does exist.” To deal with this problem, he called on Schwellenbach to 
follow three recommendations: (1) immediately discipline supervi-
sors guilty of discrimination; (2) guarantee fairness in promotions 
throughout the department; and (3) issue a department-wide memo-
randum that strongly reaffirmed a policy of nondiscrimination.26 
Schwellenbach responded immediately and met with Patterson. 
He promised “very friendly consideration” of Local 10’s requests. 
Charles Beckett of the Washington Urban League thanked the sec-
retary for responding to the union’s concerns and urged him to 
“continue to lead the way” in fair employment policies. Speaking for 
Schwellenbach at a Department of Labor staff conference on Janu-
ary 6, 1948, Under Secretary David Morse “made it clear that any 
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evidence of discrimination would . . . not be countenanced and that 
investigation would be made of alleged instances of discrimination.”27 
Shortly after Truman issued E.O. 9980 in July 1948, the 
Department of Labor began implementation. On August 12 Acting 
Secretary of Labor John Gibson28 issued General Order (G.O.) 40 
that stated the department’s fair employment goals and created the 
position of departmental Fair Employment Officer, as required by 
the order. The first Labor Department FEO was Thacher Winslow, 
a white who had worked in the NYA and the Wage and Hour and 
Public Contracts Division. At the time, Winslow was serving as an 
assistant to David Morse. Winslow’s main duties as FEO were to 
resolve cases of discrimination within the department and assure 
fairness in personnel policies. Cases that were not resolved were to 
be appealed to the Fair Employment Board (FEB) created by E.O. 
9980. Gibson explained at a press conference that Winslow’s duties 
went beyond internal personnel matters to include the depart-
ment’s services to the public. This broader approach is exactly what 
Thomasina Johnson had urged in 1947. William Oliver, the UAW’s 
Fair Employment Practices Officer, endorsed G.O. 40 and the idea 
of an FEO. The day G.O. 40 was issued, Ms. Ruth Steele, a private 
citizen from Asheville, North Carolina, wrote to John Gibson and 
praised his action as “a grand example of democracy.”29
After Truman was reelected president in 1948, fair employment 
legislation was again blocked in Congress by Southern Democrats, 
whose party had retaken control of both houses. Secretary 
Schwellenbach had died in office in June 1948, but fortunately his suc-
cessor—former Massachusetts governor Maurice Tobin—was also a 
powerful public advocate for civil rights. Tobin addressed the 1949 
convention of the National Council of Negro Women shortly before 
its founder, Mary McLeod Bethune, retired from her leadership post. 
He praised her as “one of the great women of America” and “a gallant 
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soldier in the war for human advancement.” He noted that students 
at the all-white Washington University in St. Louis, in “another sign 
of increasing social consciousness” among young people, had voted 
by a two-to-one margin to support admitting blacks as undergradu-
ates. He expressed great satisfaction that twelve blacks had recently 
broken the color barrier as graduate students at the University of 
Kentucky. Addressing the twenty-fifth anniversary conference of the 
Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters in 1950, Tobin congratulated 
them for being the first black union to win affiliation with the AFL.30
Shortly after Truman’s inauguration in January 1949, Tobin had 
an important opportunity to assist the NAACP. They were orga-
nizing a National Emergency Civil Rights Mobilization to meet in 
Washington to promote equal rights legislation. After the organizers 
ran into difficulties in obtaining a large meeting hall for the racially 
mixed group, Roy Wilkins telegraphed Tobin for help. Tobin imme-
diately made available to them the departmental auditorium next 
to the Department of Labor headquarters. On January 15, 1950, as 
a result, 4,218 NAACP members and representatives from church 
groups, labor organizations, civic associations, and other bodies 
convened at the auditorium for a two-day mobilization and lobbying 
campaign. The attendance far exceeded the one thousand persons 
that had been expected.31
To strengthen the department’s antidiscrimination efforts, Tobin 
appointed William L. Batt as a special assistant. Batt had played a 
key role in Truman’s 1948 reelection campaign by helping to win 
black votes. Under Tobin’s and Batt’s leadership, the department 
took a number of steps to advance opportunities for blacks and other 
minorities. In 1950 the Bureau of Labor Standards held a conference 
of administrators of state fair employment laws to promote better 
implementation and enforcement. One result of that meeting was 
the development of enforcement guidelines that could be applied 
TO ADVANCE THEIR OPPORTUNITIES
120
in any state. The USES, which returned permanently to the depart-
ment in 1949 after a brief postwar relocation to the Federal Security 
Agency, developed a Minority Group Program, building on the role 
of the Minority Groups Consultant. Under the supervision of MGC 
Thomasina Norford (formerly Thomasina Johnson), the program 
worked to meet the special needs of blacks and other minorities. 
The USES stubbornly continued its ambivalent policy of accepting 
discriminatory work requests while refusing to honor them. At the 
same time, it helped employers, unions, and other bodies deal with 
discrimination in the workplace. The department also conducted a 
study of the effects of unemployment on minority groups.32
The Department of Labor continued to implement fair employ-
ment and E.O. 9980. In December 1949 Clarence Mitchell, NAACP 
labor secretary, asked Tobin to appoint a special committee to seek 
qualified black applicants to fill openings that had come up in the 
Wage and Hour and Public Contracts Division and in the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. Mitchell stressed, however, that in the process, the 
Department must not, under any circumstances, “unjustly deprive 
qualified white persons of chances for employment.” Mitchell 
believed that the government needed to go beyond E.O. 9980’s reli-
ance on specific complaints to fight discrimination and “meet the 
increasing need for positive action.” Tobin, however, defended the 
department’s efforts to implement E.O. 9980 and declined to estab-
lish a “positive action” committee.33
Thomasina Norford was not satisfied with that response. She 
immediately launched an informal investigation of minority hiring 
in the Wage and Hour and Public Contracts Division and the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics. The disappointing finding that she reported to 
John Gibson was that less than 1 percent of their staffs were black and 
that many of these black workers complained of discrimination.34
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Thacher Winslow, who had to spend much of his time on other 
duties, resigned as FEO in February 1950 to work for the International 
Labor Organization. Before departing he sent Tobin several sugges-
tions for improving the fair employment program. Echoing Walter 
White’s call for “positive action,” Winslow suggested that the depart-
ment require supervisors to report all hiring decisions to the FEO. 
They would have to list the candidates considered and provide their 
reasons for selecting the one hired. Winslow also called for pub-
lic posting of vacancies to assure that all departmental employees 
would have an opportunity to apply. He noted that in the past the 
department “took a very firm stand against this,” but he pointed out 
that it had worked well for the NYA during the New Deal. He argued 
that “No one can ever complain that they were not given notice and 
were not considered for the job openings under such a system.” None 
of these suggestions were adopted at the time, however.35 
Filling the FEO post vacated by Winslow was difficult. Tobin 
wanted to appoint Charles Donohue, a white attorney in the Solicitor’s 
Office. John Gibson objected to moving the function outside the sec-
retary’s office. Gibson also feared that “the Negroes will regard this 
as a slough off.” He pointed out that when Frances Perkins was secre-
tary of labor, she had had a black employee, Lawrence Oxley, on her 
staff to handle race issues (see chapter 2). Thomasina Norford also 
objected to Donohue as FEO. Nevertheless, the appointment went 
forward, but Tobin specified that whenever Donohue acted in his 
capacity as FEO, he “shall be directly responsible to the Secretary of 
Labor.”36
Government-wide, primary enforcement of E.O. 9980 fell to the 
individual departments and agencies, with the Fair Employment 
Board (FEB) serving as the final court of appeals.37 In some cases, 
the simple fact of the existence of the order served as a spur to fight 
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discrimination. In July 1949 the Government Printing Office volun-
tarily abolished the last segregated federal employee dining rooms. 
This move eliminated an indignity that had been instituted under 
Woodrow Wilson.
Wielding the stick of E.O. 9980, civil rights groups achieved 
notable fair employment success at the State Department. For years, 
they had sought the advancement of blacks into professional posi-
tions there, especially Foreign Service posts. The onset of the Cold 
War, which made it incumbent upon the United States to present a 
positive face to the noncommunist world, placed additional pressure 
on the State Department to open opportunities to minorities. By the 
early 1950s, sixty African Americans were serving in the Foreign 
Service, seventeen of them in posts previously held by whites.
A number of federal bodies still resisted fair employment prac-
tices, however. The District of Columbia, under congressionally 
appointed supervisors and the oversight of the FEB, virtually ignored 
E.O. 9980. The Department of Agriculture did not make much of an 
effort to reverse its past record of discrimination. The Department of 
the Interior, which pioneered in the fight against discrimination dur-
ing the New Deal, backslid a bit by allowing field offices in Alaska to 
deny jobs to blacks unless there were no other candidates available.
The Bureau of Engraving and Printing in the Treasury Department 
had long resisted hiring blacks for skilled jobs. It came under great 
pressure from the civil rights community, the FEB, and the White 
House to open up opportunities to minorities. The bureau was 
about to provide in-service training for minorities when Congress 
proposed legislation that would have effectively preserved the white 
monopoly on skilled engraving and printing work. This change froze 
the bureau into inaction.
After the legislation failed, the White House ordered the bureau 
to hire black candidates who performed well in the bureau’s 
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competitive examination. As a result, fourteen were placed in the 
apprenticeship program in January 1951. Unfortunately, a few years 
later the bureau eliminated the program entirely before any of the 
fourteen could finish it.38 
In addition to resistance from a number of agencies, the FEB 
faced other problems in enforcing E.O. 9980. It lacked adequate 
data on discrimination in federal employment. The order did not 
cover segregation in the workplace, so the board was powerless to 
deal with this abuse. The FEB’s limited budget, which was carved 
out of the Civil Service Commission’s (CSC) appropriation, limited 
the time it could spend on the cases that came before it. In addition, 
the CSC continued to apply the long-standing “rule-of-three” in civil 
service hiring. Typically, the CSC certified three applicants at a time 
for a particular opening, and the hiring agency would interview 
those three. If none of these applicants were acceptable, the CSC 
would certify another batch of three. The potential employer did not 
have to give any reasons for rejecting any candidate. This policy gave 
employers the effective power to reject minority candidates. Despite 
the best efforts of the FEB to see that blacks were included on certifi-
cation lists, it was virtually powerless against prejudiced supervisors.
A serious obstacle to E.O. 9980 was presented by another execu-
tive order—E.O. 9835 of March 1947—which instituted an employee 
loyalty program. Born of the postwar anticommunist hysteria, 
this measure required the CSC to certify the loyalty of employees 
of the federal government and investigate any employees with pos-
sible communist ties. E.O. 9835 inhibited blacks from raising dis-
crimination complaints for fear of appearing disloyal. Black leaders 
feared that civil rights would suffer when discriminatory supervisors 
invoked spurious charges of communist affiliation against minori-
ties. In one prominent case, several federal employees who simply 
possessed recordings by Paul Robeson, an inspirational black singer 
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and actor with known communist sympathies, were charged by their 
employers with being of questionable loyalty.
Despite the loyalty program, the FEB made a significant contribu-
tion. By 1950 the number of black federal employees had tripled over 
the 1940 level and accounted for 8 percent of the federal workforce. 
As of 1952 one-third of all federal agencies had broken the color bar-
rier and appointed at least one black person to either a supervisory 
or professional position. By December 1951 a total of 488 complaints 
in 27 agencies had been filed with the FEB. Most of these complaints 
were found to be without merit or else were resolved by the agencies. 
The board heard sixty-two appeals, finding in thirteen of them that 
discrimination had occurred. The board continued operations well 
into the Eisenhower administration, which eventually put a new sys-
tem into place (see chapter 5).39
Korean War Period
In June 1950 troops from Communist North Korea suddenly poured 
across the border into US ally South Korea, almost driving US and 
United Nations forces into the Sea of Japan. As the mostly Ameri-
can forces rallied to defend South Korea, Truman quickly took steps 
to gear up defense production and mobilize labor to deal with an-
other protracted military conflict. Civil rights advocates once again 
pressed for strong antidiscrimination efforts in the defense industry. 
Clarence Mitchell urged Tobin to order the BAT, which was working 
feverishly to increase the supply of skilled labor, to also assure that 
blacks would be allowed full participation in apprenticeship pro-
grams across the country. Tobin directed BAT Director Patterson to 
follow through on this decision.40
At the request of Walter White, Tobin appointed several blacks 
to advisory committees on defense labor mobilization. White reit-
erated the black community’s long-standing request that the USES 
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cease designating race on workers’ application cards and stop 
accepting discriminatory work orders from employers, whether they 
were defense contractors or not. For reasons that are not clear, Tobin 
failed to respond directly to this request and told White only that the 
matter was under review.41
Randolph, White, and others were now pressing the administra-
tion for new executive actions on discrimination. In August 1950 
they proposed a revival of the FEPC and urged Secretary Tobin and 
White House adviser Stuart Symington to develop an executive 
order based on such a committee. The Labor Department endorsed 
the idea and developed a draft order, which was shown to a group of 
black leaders in November. This group criticized the failure to pro-
vide either effective enforcement or a mechanism for central admin-
istration. The department corrected these flaws and in December 
1950 sent Truman a new draft with beefed-up enforcement powers. 
Like the FEPC, the new committee would require that all govern-
ment contracts include a clause in which the contractor promised 
not to discriminate. Aggrieved individuals would have the right to 
file a civil suit if the committee could not obtain compliance. In pre-
senting the draft to the White House, Tobin cited both moral and 
practical reasons for making full use of minorities in defense work. 
He argued that it would be unthinkable if the federal government did 
not enforce strong antidiscrimination standards.42
While not rejecting the proposed order, Truman decided to take a 
different approach at this time, in light of the Korean emergency. Like 
previous wartime presidents, he needed support for the war effort 
from those in Congress who opposed antidiscrimination efforts. As 
part of the National Manpower Mobilization Policy, in January 1951 
he included a program to help private industry maximize its use of 
minorities and other groups. He followed the establishment of this 
program with a series of executive orders that eventually applied to 
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ten federal agencies. Contracts under their control were required to 
include nondiscrimination clauses. Unlike the fair employment pro-
gram of World War II, however, Truman’s policy did not provide for 
enforcement, or establish a committee to oversee the effort. Truman, 
however, confided privately in May 1951 that he planned to take 
more substantial action as soon as practicable.43 
Finally, on December 3 Truman issued E.O. 10308. The order 
required the head of each contracting department, or agency,  to 
stipulate that contractors comply with the standard nondiscrimina-
tion clause already in effect. At that point the Korean War was going 
well for the UN forces, and Congress was not in session—having 
adjourned for the year. The order set standards for evaluating con-
tractors’ fair employment efforts. It also established the President’s 
Committee on Government Contract Compliance (PCGCC) to over-
see and assist the agencies and advise them on enforcement. Truman 
had deliberately chosen a name that would not remind anti-FEPC 
members of Congress of that controversial agency. The committee 
had the power to hold hearings and publicize cases of discrimina-
tion through press releases, but it was even weaker than its World 
War II counterpart.44 Truman’s approach succeeded in insulating 
the PCGCC from the kind of vicious attacks that opponents had 
unleashed on the FEPC.
Truman appointed Dwight R. G. Palmer, the racially progressive 
chairman of the board of General Cable Corporation (see chapter 3), 
as chair. Under Palmer, the PCGCC provided central guidance and 
promoted uniformity in equal opportunity programs throughout 
the government. However, the responsibility for enforcement still 
resided with the individual agencies and was heavily dependent upon 
the degree of commitment each administrator held to fighting dis-
crimination. The committee lacked the power to subpoena witnesses 
to hearings or issue legal orders against violators. Like the FEPC, it 
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had to rely heavily on voluntary compliance. Unlike the FEPC that 
ultimately boasted a staff of over one hundred, the PCGCC had to 
make do with only ten employees on its payroll.
The committee started very slowly and held its first meeting more 
than two months after issuance of E.O. 10308. Palmer was not an 
aggressive leader. As he stated at one meeting: “Our directive from 
the President had [sic] no teeth attached to it. It is probably better 
that it has not.” He agreed with the decentralized approach of the 
order and argued that “the best work can be done by the people who 
are in the front-line trenches.”45 It was late 1952 when the commit-
tee finally adopted procedures for contracting agencies to follow in 
enforcing the nondiscrimination clause in contracts.
The committee relied heavily on publicity and educational cam-
paigns by the agencies. The PCGCC guidelines for inspectors at work 
sites stressed the nonpunitive and educational nature of their role. 
The inspectors were to record known instances of discrimination. 
However, rather than immediately issue orders for amelioration, 
they were to discuss the situations with the employer and seek vol-
untary remedies. If the employer did not cooperate, then the agency 
could send the inspector back and conduct a more thorough investi-
gation as a basis for possible sanctions or penalties.46 
Although relatively toothless, the PCGCC did succeed in expos-
ing the laxity in fair employment efforts that prevailed in most con-
tracting agencies. Three agencies had not even bothered to include 
nondiscrimination clauses in contracts they issued. Fortunately, this 
glaring lapse was soon remedied. The committee studied conditions 
nationwide, heard over three hundred complaints, and unearthed 
widespread discrimination by government contractors. As with 
similar bodies in the past, the mere presence of the PCGCC exerted 
significant pressure on firms, and it regularly exercised its powers of 
moral suasion.
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African Americans did make significant gains in employment 
and promotions during the tenure of the PCGCC. However, the 
committee deserved only partial credit for these advances. Broader 
economic conditions led to increased hiring and, therefore, low 
unemployment levels. Perhaps the greatest contribution of Truman’s 
PCGCC was to establish, once and for all, fair employment policy as 
a permanent and continuous effort of the federal government.47
In March 1952 Truman announced he would not seek another 
term as president. America’s black community was dismayed. He had 
contributed greatly toward a climate in which African Americans 
had a better chance to improve their employment and living stan-
dards. He had actively applied the prestige and moral force of the 
White House to that end and had spoken out in support of civil 
rights more strongly than any previous president. He had also taken 
more decisive actions against discrimination and appointed more 
blacks to executive positions in the government than any previous 
president. Through executive action, Truman virtually eliminated 
segregation in the armed forces and significantly reduced racial dis-
crimination in federally funded employment.
In November 1952 Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower, retired commander of the victorious allied forces in Europe in World 
War II and a national hero, was elected president in a landslide elec-
tion. Eisenhower strongly supported equal rights in principle, and 
he followed in Truman’s footsteps by dealing with employment dis-
crimination primarily through executive orders establishing spe-
cial bodies to deal with federally funded employment. However, 
Eisenhower's belief in limited government was equally strong. As a 
result, he was not as outspoken nor ardent an activist as Truman. 
Furthermore, having won only 27 percent of the black vote, he had 
little political incentive to emphasize civil rights.1 
However, Eisenhower (like FDR) made key appointments that 
guaranteed civil rights would continue to be an important element 
of government policy. In September 1953 his first secretary of labor, 
Martin Durkin, resigned in a policy dispute. Eisenhower named 
James P. Mitchell, a former retailing executive from New York City, 
as Durkin’s replacement. Mitchell was an assistant secretary of the 
army, where he had promoted the elimination of segregation on all 
army bases and built a reputation as a progressive on racial issues. In 
his second key appointment, Eisenhower filled the vacant position 
of chief justice of the Supreme Court in 1953, naming the moder-
ate Republican governor of California, Earl Warren. Under Warren’s 
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leadership, the court unexpectedly overturned the Jim Crow princi-
ple of “separate but equal” treatment of blacks in the historic Brown 
vs. Board of Education decision of May 17, 1954, outlawing segrega-
tion in public schools. James Mitchell hailed the Brown decision and 
became the most enthusiastic supporter of civil rights of any mem-
ber of Eisenhower’s cabinet. Mitchell served until January 1961 and 
was dubbed the social conscience of the Eisenhower administration.2
Important changes in the 1950s exerted strong pressures on the 
administration to protect the rights of black citizens. An increas-
ingly vigorous civil rights movement was marked by direct action 
and mass demonstrations. The movement first achieved national 
prominence with a boycott of the Montgomery, Alabama, bus system 
that resulted in the elimination of segregated seating. The boycott 
was led by a young black minister named Martin Luther King Jr. and 
kicked off on December 1, 1955, with the arrest of NAACP official 
Rosa Parks who refused to sit in the “Blacks Only” section of a bus. 
In 1957 the third anniversary of the Brown decision was marked by a 
“Pilgrimage of Prayer,” led by King and A. Philip Randolph. A crowd 
estimated at thirty thousand gathered at the Lincoln Memorial to air 
their grievances. In the fall of 1958, Randolph organized a march of 
a thousand students from New York City to Washington in a “Youth 
March for Integrated Schools.” He repeated the march in 1959, and 
King addressed the rally in Washington in support of voting rights 
for blacks.3 
The black migration accelerated in the 1950s as 1.5 million more 
African Americans left their homes in the South and crowded into 
northern ghettoes. At the same time, large numbers of the indus-
trial jobs they sought were shifting out of the cities into the sub-
urbs as factories expanded onto cheaper land. Many of the nation’s 
labor unions opened their doors wider to blacks. Randolph and 
Willard Townsend, black president of the United Transportation 
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Service Workers, were elected vice presidents of the AFL-CIO in 
1955.4 However, discrimination within unions remained a problem, 
prompting Randolph to protest so vehemently at the 1959 AFL-CIO 
convention that president George Meany shouted, “Who the hell 
appointed you the guardian of all the Negroes in America?” 
In addition to resistance among segments of organized labor, 
there was also a strong reaction in parts of the white community 
against equal rights for blacks in voting, housing, and employment. 
Nonviolent White Citizens Councils and the terrorist Ku Klux Klan 
in the South actively resisted school integration and the civil rights 
movement in general.5
The Eisenhower administration’s civil rights effort concentrated 
on public persuasion and the elimination of legal sanctions allow-
ing discrimination. Eisenhower relied on his appointees, espe-
cially Mitchell, to speak for the administration on civil rights. The 
Eisenhower administration continued Truman’s policy of supporting 
equal rights as part of a worldwide competition with the Communist 
bloc, and this support intensified with the Soviet Union’s launching 
of the Sputnik satellite in 1957. Mitchell asserted in October 1954, 
“Human equality in America is a weapon against Communism.”6 
The White House made a strong effort to include blacks in pol-
icy positions. Just after Eisenhower took office, he followed up on a 
campaign promise and had Chief of Staff Sherman Adams develop a 
list of qualified black candidates for appointive positions. By August 
1956 he had appointed over three hundred, compared to only ninety-
four during the entire Truman administration. The most promi-
nent appointees were Special Assistant to the President E. Frederick 
Morrow and Assistant Secretary of Labor for International Affairs J. 
Ernest Wilkins (brother of NAACP president Roy Wilkins). Ernest 
Wilkins was the first African American ever to attend a cabinet 
meeting and only the second to serve at the assistant secretary level. 
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While Morrow held a high position, he was (unfortunately) largely 
ignored by the administration. The principal White House adviser 
on racial matters was Maxwell Rabb, a white man.7 
In his first State of the Union address, Eisenhower boldly prom-
ised, despite his usual public reticence on civil rights, to end all seg-
regation in Washington, DC. While he did not quite accomplish this 
goal, by the end of 1953 the White House had succeeded in pres-
suring the District of Columbia government into integrating its 
hotels, restaurants, and theaters. Integration of the public schools 
after the Brown decision—to which the DC Board of Education was 
a party—came more slowly but was largely complete by 1960. The 
administration supported enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1957, 
the first civil rights law in eighty-two years. It was a limited measure 
primarily protecting the right to vote. It also created the President’s 
Commission on Civil Rights and elevated the Justice Department’s 
Civil Rights Section, created in 1939, to the Division level. In June 
1958 Eisenhower hosted Martin Luther King Jr. and other civil rights 
leaders in a historic meeting at which the president endorsed further 
legislation on voting rights. In 1960 Congress strengthened fran-
chise rights and outlawed the defacing of black churches and other 
houses of worship.8 
Court decisions and executive branch policy resulted in a number 
of gains for blacks in the 1950s. By 1956 all branches of the military 
were desegregated. However, implementation of the Brown decision 
met substantial resistance in some areas, and in 1957 Eisenhower 
had to send troops to enforce admission of black students at Central 
High School in Little Rock, Arkansas. Building on a 1950 Supreme 
Court decision banning segregation on railroad dining cars, in 1955 
the Interstate Commerce Commission ordered an end to all segre-
gation on interstate rail and bus travel. That same year, to improve 
housing opportunities for blacks, the Federal Housing and Home 
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Finance Agency urged lenders to provide more home mortgage loans 
for qualified minority members.9 
To promote equal opportunity in the workplace, the admin-
istration relied on executive orders—the patient spadework of the 
permanent federal agencies—and moral suasion, as provided by 
Labor Secretary Mitchell and other spokespersons. While endorsing 
the administration’s policy of limited government, Mitchell spoke 
more frequently on civil rights than any previous labor secretary. In 
speeches and appearances from 1953 to 1960, he regularly presented 
his views on the problem of discrimination in society and the work-
place, the efforts of the federal government to deal with it, and the 
responsibilities of business, organized labor, and the nation at large. 
In a characteristic speech in 1954, the year of the Brown decision, 
Mitchell addressed the New England Governor’s Conference:
We all know that despite our professed beliefs in the 
equality of man, certain groups among us are discrimi-
nated against because of their race, color, religion or 
national origin. When this discrimination affects a per-
son’s opportunities for employment, it is particularly 
pernicious. The freedom to earn a living without being 
discriminated against is as important to the individual 
as the better known civil rights and freedoms guaran-
teed by the Constitution. Freedom of speech, assembly, 
and religious worship may seem to be empty phrases to 
a person who is deprived of his chance to make a living 
because of the color of his skin, or the way he worships 
God, or because his ancestors were members of a par-
ticular national group. 10 
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The President’s Committee on Government Contracts
An important preexisting program for equality on the job was 
the President’s Committee on Government Contract Compliance 
(PCGCC), created late in the Truman administration by E.O. 10308. 
The committee had gotten off to a slow start, and by the time it 
was fully staffed, Truman’s term in office was over. The members 
appointed originally began resigning as the Eisenhower administra-
tion was getting organized, and the PCGCC was largely ignored. In 
the meantime, committee staff kept busy, producing a detailed study 
of the history of fair employment clauses in federal contracts since 
World War II.11
The press, however, did not forget about the committee, and 
reporters began asking administration officials about it at press 
conferences. Clarence Mitchell of the NAACP met with Attorney-
General Herbert Brownell and called for the establishment of a new 
government contract compliance committee to replace the PCGCC. 
As a result of this interest, Sherman Adams, Maxwell Rabb, and 
other White House staff began to address the issue. The Bureau of 
the Budget recommended the extreme position of disbanding the 
PCGCC and abandoning its mission. Adams and others agreed that 
the old body should be eliminated, but they supported Clarence 
Mitchell’s call for a replacement. Eisenhower agreed, and Rabb was 
given the task of developing a new program for fair employment in 
government contracts.12 
Jacob Seidenberg, staff director of the PCGCC, came to Rabb’s 
aid and drafted a proposal. The White House adapted it to serve as 
the basis of a new executive order. On August 13, 1953, Eisenhower 
issued E.O. 10479. The “Whereas” clauses defined the rationale and 
nature of the order: (1) it is in the national interest to “promote the 
fullest utilization of all available manpower”; (2) promotion of equal 
employment opportunity has been established policy on government 
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contract work; (3) government agencies are responsible for ensur-
ing equal treatment by employers with whom they hold contracts; 
(4) such contracts are required to contain a clause forbidding dis-
crimination in employment; and, most importantly, (5) “review and 
analysis” demonstrates that the existing system of compliance with 
federal policy “must be revised and strengthened to eliminate dis-
crimination in all aspects of employment.”
To reform the system, E.O. 10479 established a “Government 
Contract Committee,” which quickly became known as the 
President’s Committee on Government Contracts (PCGC). The 
word Compliance was dropped from the Truman committee’s name 
to emphasize the more voluntaristic approach of the new body. The 
PCGC consisted of fourteen members, one each from six designated 
federal agencies and eight appointed by the president, including the 
chair and vice chair. Lacking strong legal tools and relying largely on 
persuasion, the PCGC was given a three-part mission: (1) to develop 
stronger antidiscrimination clauses for government contracts; (2) to 
accept complaints directly from contract workers alleging discrimi-
nation and refer these to the contracting agencies; and, (3) to encour-
age employer, labor, civic, and other groups to develop educational 
programs to eliminate “the basic causes and costs of discrimination 
in employment.” The last clause expanded the potential scope of the 
order, at least in terms of educational programs, from contractors 
to the national economy as a whole. While not drawing much com-
ment or making any significant public relations impact when issued, 
E.O. 10479 helped set a precedent for broader national action against 
discrimination in the workplace.
It authorized the PCGC to develop “cooperative relationships” 
with local governmental and nongovernmental organizations and 
to set up its own procedures. It was also to report annually to the 
president. But in compliance with the Russell amendment, the 
TO ADVANCE THEIR OPPORTUNITIES
136
PCGC received no direct appropriation, instead receiving funds and 
support from the six agencies represented in its membership. The 
Department of Labor provided office space and logistical support, 
and the Justice Department supplied legal services, but the executive 
branch was barred from providing direct funding.
E.O. 10479 defined the working relationships between the PCGC 
and the contracting agencies. The head of each agency was assigned 
primary responsibility for requiring that contractors comply with 
nondiscrimination clauses. He or she was authorized to take “appro-
priate measures” to ensure compliance. These measures included the 
possibility of disbarment and other legal action. The agencies were 
to cooperate fully with the committee and provide information as 
needed. They were also to report any actions taken on complaints of 
discrimination, whether referred by the PCGC or received directly 
from contract employees. Based on these reports, the committee 
maintained oversight of the agencies, but it did not have the author-
ity to serve as a court of appeals to resolve complaints or review 
agency decisions.
The organizational core of the PCGC consisted of the represen-
tatives of the six federal agencies: the Atomic Energy Commission; 
the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Justice, and Labor; and the 
General Services Administration. However, the other eight appoin-
tees brought visibility and power to the body. They included such 
prominent figures as Walter Reuther, president of the United Auto 
Workers union; George Meany, president of the AFL and later of 
the AFL-CIO; Congressman James Roosevelt, the son of FDR; and 
Fred Lazarus, a leading retailing executive. Jacob Seidenberg was 
appointed executive director.
Recognizing that a program based mainly on persuasion required 
a highly visible leader, Eisenhower appointed Vice President Richard 
Nixon as chair. Nixon took an active interest in the PCGC, and the 
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press soon began to refer to it as the Nixon Committee. J. Ernest 
Wilkins, representing the Labor Department, was initially named 
vice chair. When James Mitchell was appointed secretary of labor, he 
supplanted Wilkins. Working with Nixon, Secretary Mitchell played 
an active role in the committee. In fact, the PCGC occupied offices 
in the Labor Department for its entire existence.13 
Most of the committee’s positions were filled quickly, and the first 
meeting was held within days after issuance of E.O. 10479. In a letter 
to Nixon on that occasion, Eisenhower laid out the basis for the com-
mittee’s mission in terms of both the Cold War and human rights:
[T]here are those in the world who doubt our fidelity to 
the ideal of human brotherhood. Both as answer to that 
doubt, and proof of our own faith, we are called to prac-
tice the principles of equality that we preach . . . On no 
level of our national existence can inequality be justified. 
Within the Federal Government itself, however, toler-
ance of inequality would be odious. What we cherish as 
an ideal for our nation as a whole must today be honestly 
exemplified by the Federal establishment.14 
It was clear that the PCGC’s mission had important implica-
tions on both the national and international stages. However, when 
Eisenhower met with the committee shortly after its creation, he 
stressed the need for substantive accomplishments without a great 
deal of publicity. This approach was carried out so rigorously that, in 
the view of some White House staff, the administration lost a num-
ber of opportunities to take deserved credit for civil rights accom-
plishments. However, the low-key approach served to reassure the 
business community and the South, both of which were concerned 
that the PCGC would become a new version of the FEPC. Also reas-
suring to those favoring a voluntaristic approach was the fact that 
the word compliance did not appear in the name of the committee.15
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Vice Chair Mitchell consistently emphasized the PCGC’s volun-
tary approach to compliance. He told a business audience at a 1955 
PCGC conference that, “As you all know, the [PCGC] is an educa-
tional and promotional outfit. It has no enforcement power.” Rather, 
Mitchell interpreted E.O. 10479 to mean that the PCGC had “an 
obligation to work with interested and responsible groups to develop 
and use the processes of education and persuasion” in dealing with 
discrimination in employment. The PCGC fostered the idea that its 
main function was to serve as an educational forum on equal oppor-
tunity and to show federal support for fair employment. The organi-
zational structure further reinforced this notion by including special 
subcommittees on liaison with outside groups, education, and public 
relations.16
Contract compliance, however, remained an important part of 
the mission. The agencies were responsible for the bulk of the com-
pliance work, contract by contract. The PCGC staff, never number-
ing more than twenty-five, paled beside the resources the contracting 
agencies brought to bear. Approximately five thousand contract offi-
cers were available to investigate complaints, review compliance by 
contractors, and develop educational programs mandated by the 
committee. Generally, the agencies avoided the tools of litigation 
and disbarment, seeking instead to engage contractors informally in 
voluntary compliance.
In 1955 contracting agencies began inspecting selected contrac-
tors for compliance, conducting two thousand inspections in the 
first year. At Nixon’s request, the agencies provided regular compli-
ance reports to the committee. To assist the agencies in detecting the 
existence of discrimination, the PCGC prepared a guidance manual 
for inspectors. Agency inspectors were advised not to accept the 
existence of token or limited employment of minorities as de facto 
proof of compliance and nondiscrimination. However, the manual 
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did not specify a minimum acceptable percentage or quota of minor-
ity employment. The compliance determination was left to the dis-
cretion of the individual investigators.17
The committee assisted the agencies in numerous ways. It helped 
them to develop more efficient systems for processing complaints 
and improve their compliance methods. One of the committee’s first 
accomplishments was to persuade the government of the District of 
Columbia, a federal body, to include an antidiscrimination clause in 
its contracts for goods and services. Mitchell persuaded the Defense 
Department, the leading contracting agency, to strengthen contract-
ing regulations. The committee provided guidance to the agencies’ 
contracting representatives on checking contractors for compliance 
and investigating complaints. The committee also set up mecha-
nisms within the contracting agencies to make sure employers were 
aware of their antidiscrimination responsibilities.18 
E.O. 10479 also required the committee to recommend improve-
ments in contractual nondiscrimination clauses. Up to that time, 
there was no uniform wording. The only existing (and very skimpy)
guidance was provided in Truman’s E.O. 10210, which was largely 
devoted to regulating defense contracts under the War Powers Act of 
1941. Buried in it was a brief requirement banning discrimination by 
contractors and ordering that all contracts contain a provision (not 
specified) against discrimination.
To remedy this leniency, the PGCG—in consultation with con-
tracting agencies—called for a standard antidiscrimination provi-
sion to be used in all government contracts. It turned to Deputy 
Attorney General William P. Rogers, one of the administration’s 
leading advocates for civil rights, to develop a proposal. Rogers 
drafted a nondiscrimination clause, the PCGC accepted it; and on 
September 3, 1954, Eisenhower promulgated it as E.O. 10557.19 
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The order stipulated that the contracting employer “agrees not 
to discriminate . . . because of race, religion color, or national ori-
gin.” The new clause elaborated on the vague wording in E.O. 10479, 
which referenced the rights of “persons employed or seeking employ-
ment” with government contractors to “fair and equitable treatment 
in all aspects of employment.” E.O. 10557 provided a comprehensive 
statement that covered all aspects of employment, requiring that a 
contractor’s equal employment effort
shall include, but not be limited to, the following: 
employment, upgrading, demotion or transfer; recruit-
ment or recruitment advertising; layoff or termination; 
rates of pay or other forms of compensation; and selec-
tion for training, including apprenticeship.
The contractor was required to post a summary of the clause con-
spicuously in the workplace, and the committee provided a poster-
sized notice. Under the title “Equal Economic Opportunity,” in very 
large letters, the poster stated the basic provisions of the clause and 
displayed the seal of the PCGC next to its address. The committee 
also trained agency officials on how to enforce the clause. While E.O. 
10557 applied to almost all contracts executed ninety days after its 
issuance, there were exceptions for contracts that did not involve 
recruitment of workers within the United States. The PCGC was also 
empowered to exempt contracts in special or emergency situations.20 
While compliance work occupied a great deal of its time and 
resources, the PCGC consistently placed its primary reliance on 
education, persuasion, and conciliation. The members felt their main 
purpose was to serve as an educational forum on equal opportunity 
and to demonstrate federal support for fair employment. The educa-
tional program consisted of promoting cooperation among involved 
groups and convincing the public of the need for national action. To 
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develop public support, the PCGC relied on a wide range of publica-
tions, films, television spots, and public appearances by its members. 
One of its most useful products was the 1954 pamphlet Equal Job 
Opportunity Is Good Business which it sent to all major government 
contractors.21 
The committee worked most extensively with the business com-
munity, frequently appealing to employers for voluntary action. 
Addressing the 1955 PCGC Conference for business leaders, 
Mitchell sought to cajole and flatter them into greater efforts against 
discrimination, noting that, “undoubtedly there is in this room suf-
ficient imagination and experience, determination and expertness, 
to develop a workable solution to any businessman’s problem.” The 
committee made frequent contacts with the business community in 
order to bring the administration’s equal opportunity program to 
their attention. It sought to convince employers that, as Mitchell put 
it, “the program is not only morally right but economically sound.”22 
In his January 1956 speech to a meeting of the Cleveland Urban 
League, Mitchell laid out the committee’s philosophy on industry’s 
role in solving the problem of discrimination. He explained that the 
PCGC did not wish to depend entirely on resolving discrimination 
complaints to achieve the goals of E.O. 10479: “This would be like 
trying to dip up the ocean with a teaspoon.” He did not consider 
legislation a solution either, noting that “even where there are excel-
lent state programs based on legislation, principal reliance has had 
to be on education and persuasion.” He asserted that the committee’s 
main task was “to get industry to do several things that only industry 
can do.” These things included instituting thorough, company-wide 
antidiscrimination policies, making sure that each company main-
tained open recruitment and training channels for all groups, and 
assuring minorities equal chances for advancement within the firm. 
He pointed out that “it is no triumph for equality to obtain jobs for 
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blacks as janitors . . . It is a goal of the committee to open some of 
the doors that go upward in industry through the normal promotion 
channels.”23 
Such meetings played an important role in promoting voluntary 
compliance. The PCGC met frequently with business, labor, civil 
rights, and religious groups, beginning with a November 1953 meeting 
with the NAACP, the Urban League, and several social service groups. 
In December 1954 it met with several trade associations, in March 
1955 with top union officials, and in October 1955 with a group of 
business leaders. At the October 1955 conference, Mitchell addressed 
sixty-five chief executive officers and board chairs on ways to 
pool our knowledge and experience in this area with a 
view to determining how we can best achieve throughout 
the Nation the equality of employment opportunity in 
which all of us here believe . . . We meet here as friends, 
in private session, in order that we may be as frank and 
helpful to each other as possible.24 
The PCGC’s Youth Training Incentives Conference of 1957 
resulted in the establishment of programs promoting youth employ-
ment in six cities. After religious leaders met with the committee in 
1959, they established a Religious Advisory Council to work with 
local communities to open up job opportunities for minorities.25
During the course of its history, the committee’s funding and 
staffing tripled, albeit starting from a relatively low level. With an 
initial staff of nine and annual funding of $125,000, it was impos-
sible for the committee to be fully functional. As civil rights issues 
became more prominent after 1956, the staff grew and an executive 
vice chairman was added to relieve the administrative burdens on 
Mitchell and Seidenberg. The PCGC established four regional offices 
and conducted a general survey of industry compliance. By January 
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1961, the end of the Eisenhower administration, funding had tripled 
to $375,000 and the staff had grown to twenty-five.26
As with the FEPC before it, the PCGC’s contribution to open-
ing up new opportunities for blacks is difficult to determine. Within 
the strictures of limited resources and the limited mandate of E.O. 
10479, it made a significant effort. As time passed, the committee 
became more aggressive in response to civil rights events of the 
period and pressure from civil rights groups. While its compliance 
manual was silent on acceptable minority hiring levels, in practice, 
the PCGC edged toward a goal of proportional hiring. For example, 
in 1960 it encouraged government contractors in Washington, DC, 
to engage in limited preferential hiring of African Americans in 
cases where white and black applicants were equally qualified. Partly 
due to the committee’s evolving support of preferences and racial 
proportionality, the civil rights community became more accepting 
of the Eisenhower administration’s equal employment efforts.27 
Over the course of its existence, the PCGC and the enforcing agen-
cies mitigated discriminatory hiring patterns in a number of indus-
tries, including meatpacking, electronics, chemicals, and utilities, 
although progress was limited in others. The committee played a role 
in the elimination of discrimination by the Capital Transit System 
in Washington, DC, and also required over one hundred thousand 
contractors nationwide to display equal opportunity posters. When 
discrimination complaints began to pour in (largely instigated by 
the NAACP) the PCGC arranged favorable settlements for a number 
of employees. Racially separate lines of promotion at Atlantic Steel 
were eliminated. The tobacco industry partially relaxed its segrega-
tion policies. At the Lockheed aircraft plant in Marietta, Georgia, 
segregated black and white locals of the International Association of 
Machinists (IAM) were required to merge.28 
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However, except for the case of the IAM, the committee did not 
stress action against discrimination by unions. For one thing, its abil-
ity to intervene was limited by the fact that unions were not parties 
to procurement contracts between the government and employers. 
Basically, the PCGC depended on the NLRB to bring about progress 
in this area by enforcing the Wagner Act’s requirement that unions 
provide “fair representation” to all members. The NLRB, however, 
took little action on this requirement. While the PCGC did not gen-
erally investigate complaints against unions, committee members 
from the labor movement did look into problems in specific unions 
when requested. In 1958 the committee’s compliance guide called for 
federal agencies reporting violations to identify whether discrimina-
tory union practices were involved.29
The business community was always the central focus of the 
PCGC’s compliance effort. However, as with unions, the com-
mittee’s ability to intervene in cases of discrimination by employ-
ers was limited. Contract revocation and other legal sanctions for 
overt discrimination were solely at the discretion of the contract-
ing agencies and beyond the committee’s control. To detect failure 
to deal with “institutional discrimination”—employment policies 
that limited the chances of minority members to be considered for 
employment—PCGC inspectors could consider the extent to which 
minorities were present in a given workplace. But the committee did 
not specify minimum acceptable percentages that would indicate de 
facto compliance, nor did it require employers who were found not 
in compliance to take compensatory actions. Instead, it emphasized 
voluntary action. In its final report, “Pattern for Progress,” the com-
mittee implied that employers should make a special effort to deal 
with institutional discrimination:
Overt discrimination, in the sense that an employer 
actually refuses to hire solely because of race, religion, 
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color, or national origin, is not as prevalent as is generally 
believed. To a greater degree, the indifference of employ-
ers to establishing a positive policy of nondiscrimination 
hinders qualified applicants and employees from being 
hired and promoted on the basis of equality.30 [emphasis 
added]
Federal Agencies: Employment and Policies
Truman’s Fair Employment Board (FEB) continued its task of pro-
moting equal employment opportunity for federal workers into the 
Eisenhower administration. In 1954 the FEB was looking into a com-
plaint against the Bureau of Engraving and Printing that had earlier 
resisted efforts to eliminate discriminatory practices (see chapter 4). 
Treasury Secretary George Humphrey, to whom the bureau reported, 
opposed the investigation. Then, perhaps influenced by the recent 
Brown decision, the press started asking questions about the inves-
tigation at presidential press conferences. To avert an embarrassing 
crisis, Maxwell Rabb recommended in September 1954 that the FEB 
be abolished and replaced with a new body with the same portfolio. 
Eisenhower agreed and issued E.O. 10590 on January 18, 1955, estab-
lishing the President’s Committee on Government Employment 
Policy (PCGEP). The NAACP, which had been critical of the FEB, 
supported the new committee.31
The PCGEP’s mission was to advise the president on ways to 
improve opportunities for minorities in federal employment and 
to evaluate government performance. Unlike the FEB, the PCGEP 
reported to the president and, therefore, had greater stature within the 
government. It served largely in an advisory capacity to departments 
and agencies. Each agency head was made responsible for ensuring 
equal treatment within their jurisdiction, as well as for hearing and 
ruling on complaints filed by their employees. Complainants had the 
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right to request an advisory opinion from the committee, although 
this opinion was not binding on the agency head. The agencies were 
required to file enforcement regulations with the committee and 
report on the disposition of each complaint. Every federal agency 
was to appoint an Employment Policy Officer (EPO). (This posi-
tion replaced the Truman–era position of Fair Employment Officer.) 
The EPO was responsible for processing complaints, recommend-
ing remedies, and assuring that personnel offices implemented E.O. 
10590 properly. 
To avoid any conflicts of interest with the agencies, EPOs in each 
agency were independent of the personnel office. There were seven 
members on the PCGEP. They included J. Ernest Wilkins, Civil 
Service Commissioner W. Arthur McCoy, two Defense Department 
representatives, and two public members. Archibald Carey, a black 
minister and attorney from Chicago, was chair. President Eisenhower 
did not make a public statement when he issued E.O. 10590. However, 
he asserted later that the PCGEP exemplified the administration’s 
policy “that equal opportunity be afforded all qualified persons” 
seeking employment within the federal government.
By issuing guidelines for government supervisors, pamphlets 
for federal workers, and checklists on equal rights procedures for 
human resources officers, the PCGEP educated bureaucrats on the 
administration’s antidiscrimination policies and helped make the 
federal work culture more tolerant. However, its own procedures 
ultimately limited its effectiveness. Complaints were handled within 
the accused agencies, and this proximity gave agency supervisors an 
opportunity to dismiss, or resolve, disputes in the agencies’ favor. 
The committee was also hampered because, unlike the FEB, it could 
not utilize the Civil Service Commission to investigate complaints, 
relying instead on its own miniscule staff. The committee’s efforts to 
discover and evaluate discrimination were hampered for some time 
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because the government stopped collecting data on the race of its 
employees.
Nevertheless, the Eisenhower administration praised the PCGEP’s 
performance. Vice President Nixon asserted in 1958, “Americans are 
now assured that Government service . . . is open to one and all, on 
the basis of ability . . . [T]he Government not only sets an example 
for other employers but directly protects the rights of more than two 
million workers to equal opportunity.” The PCGEP’s 1958 annual 
report assured that segregation within federal government had 
been eliminated and noted that, of over one thousand complaints 
received, only thirty-three required corrective action. The commit-
tee collected data on race in federal employment in Washington, DC, 
and four other cities. 
The report analyzed black employment in career, nonpolitical 
positions in all of the Civil Service System’s General Schedule (GS) 
levels. These levels ranged from GS-1, for the lowest paid, non-skilled 
workers, to GS-18, for the most senior career officials. The report 
found that from 1956 to 1960, black employment in GS grades 5 to 15 
had grown from 3.7 percent of all employees to 5.9 percent. However, 
independent studies in major southern cities revealed a pattern of 
poor employment opportunities for blacks and a tendency to relegate 
them to janitorial or other low-skill jobs. One bright spot for black 
employment in the South was the US Post Office Department, which 
placed large numbers of blacks in skilled, well-paying jobs. But, 
despite the government’s best efforts, by 1961 blacks still made up 
only 1 percent of all federal employees at the GS-12 level or above.32
During the Eisenhower administration, the Department of Labor 
continued to wrestle with the ongoing problems of discriminatory 
job orders and other unfair treatment in the local offices of the USES. 
To help deal with these problems, Mitchell revived the Truman–era 
Minority Groups Program (MGP). It was located within the new 
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Bureau of Employment Security (BES) that now supervised the 
USES. Mitchell intended the MGP to be the means through which 
the department “promotes the principle of hiring workers on the 
basis of merit.” The MGP was of such prominence in the adminis-
tration that Mitchell, speaking at Fisk University in 1955, cited it as 
one of the two principal federal equal opportunity programs (the 
PCGC was the other). Mitchell also revived the position of Minority 
Groups Counselor (MGC) to oversee the MGP. To fill it, he appointed 
Roberta Church, an African American human relations worker from 
Memphis, Tennessee, and a Republican Party operative.33
The Minority Groups Program, according to Robert Goodwin, 
now BES director, dealt with “problems involved in promoting 
employment of workers belonging to minority groups.” Roberta 
Church, the sole human relations professional in the program, had as 
one of her main goals the elimination of segregation in all offices of 
the USES. While some progress was made, many offices in the South 
resisted integration. Church worked with the National Urban League 
and other welfare organizations to promote job opportunities in 
local communities. She focused particularly on persuading employ-
ers to drop discriminatory requirements from job orders. Church 
also persuaded the state branches of the USES to appoint Minority 
Groups Representatives (MGRs) to serve as her counterparts.34
Impressed with Church’s activism, Secretary Mitchell appointed 
her as an adviser to the assistant secretary for Manpower and Em-
ployment. Now her portfolio included not only the USES and BES, 
but other departmental programs, such as the BAT and the inde-
pendent PCGC. Many officials now looked to her for advice on fair 
employment matters. In 1957, at her request, Mitchell made official 
her broadening role and designated her as departmental Minority 
Groups Consultant.35 Church saw her expanded role as providing all 
DOL agencies
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with a departmental source of current information about 
minority groups, the activities of organizations estab-
lished to work with minority groups, legislation affecting 
these groups, and other pertinent data.36 
To assist the growing federal-state minority groups effort, in 1955 
and 1956 the department called together conferences on the national 
Minority Groups Program. The 1955 MGP Conference afforded the 
sharing of news on fair employment efforts in the labor market and 
the opportunity to review the MGP at all levels. The focus of the 
larger 1956 MGP Conference was the preparation of minority youths 
to enter the labor market and the growing need for skilled labor in 
the US economy. At the 1956 conference, Church spoke optimisti-
cally of social and economic changes for blacks in American soci-
ety. She noted that, due to recent events, “it appears we can view the 
future with some degree of optimism, although there is much to be 
done.”37
In order for the BES and USES to be effective and credible advo-
cates of equal treatment, they had to put their own house in order. 
Mitchell fully shared Church’s goal of the elimination of segregation 
in the USES in every state. Arkansas, which would soon be a battle 
ground in the civil rights movement, was a case in point.38 In March 
1956 Robert Goodwin met with Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus 
to discuss segregation in the state’s USES branch. Faubus was sur-
prisingly conciliatory and promised Goodwin that he and Arkansas 
USES head, James Bland, would take care of the problem. Goodwin 
thus reported to Rocco Siciliano, the White House’s liaison with the 
Labor Department:
They are not giving publicity to the decision, and they 
have developed their program in such a way as to avoid 
conflict to the maximum extent possible. For instance, 
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although separate offices and separate entrances will be 
eliminated in connection with moves to new quarters, 
there will for a time be scheduling of white and colored 
unemployment insurance claimants at different hours 
of the day. It is planned to drop the separate scheduling 
after it is clear that there will be no difficulty from the 
other changes.39
In April 1956 Bland reported to Goodwin that separate entrances 
for whites and blacks had been eliminated at the Little Rock ES office. 
He attached newspaper clippings and went on:
This problem was approached with some caution, and 
there have been no serious repercussions. However, 
elements who are opposed to the plan of paying unem-
ployment insurance benefits in any form, and perhaps 
antagonistic toward Governor Faubus, have been suc-
cessful in obtaining publication of critical articles . . . I 
am not alarmed . . . I hope you will find opportunity to 
inform Secretary Mitchell of this development. It was not 
an easy job.40 
Mitchell wanted to send a note to Bland, commending his efforts, 
but first there was a skirmish among aides over its wording. Deputy 
Under Secretary Millard Cass wanted Mitchell to tell Bland:
Your actions have demonstrated how progress can be 
made when people of goodwill try to solve their prob-
lems with imagination, courage, and patience.
Under Secretary John J. Gilhooley scribbled a caution on Cass’s note: 
“No, goes to [sic] far.” Cass’s phrase was dropped, and the letter was 
sent.41 Despite this example of progress in Arkansas, as of 1959 seg-
regation persisted in USES offices in 110 southern cities. In seventy 
of those cities, the offices had racially separate service areas; in an 
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additional twenty-five cities, the offices had one entrance for whites 
and another for blacks; and in fifteen cities the local ES went to the 
extreme of maintaining completely separate offices for the races.42
One of the important elements of the Cold War, as it developed 
during the Eisenhower administration, was the competition with 
the Soviet bloc in technological advancement. The administration 
was concerned that the American workforce did not have the nec-
essary skills and professional expertise, and it sought to improve 
the nation’s educational and training resources. Secretary Mitchell 
spoke often about the increasing need for skilled workers and the 
lack of adequate skills in the workforce, particularly among African 
Americans. He pointed out that black workers were often barred 
from training programs and apprenticeships. He considered equal-
ity of training opportunities to be an important element in fight-
ing job discrimination. E.O. 10557 required that equal opportunity 
clauses in government contracts encompass training and apprentice-
ships. In 1956 the department developed a “Skills of the Work Force” 
program to promote the training of the skilled workers needed for 
both economic growth and national defense. While this program 
did not specifically target blacks, one of its main goals—according 
to E. R. Chapell, who coordinated the program—was “the full uti-
lization of all our people without regard to race, creed, age, sex or 
physical handicap.”43
One of Roberta Church’s main goals was to use the regulatory 
authority of the BAT to open up more apprenticeship opportunities 
for black youths. This bureau, because it provided certification of ap-
prenticeship programs, had some potential for influence in this area. 
However, it depended largely on voluntary help from the private sec-
tor to maintain and upgrade the quality of apprenticeship programs. 
It lacked statutory authority to directly enforce equal treatment in 
apprentice programs. The only “stick” the BAT had was the power 
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to exclude violators from its registry of federally certified programs. 
Unfortunately, it never used that sanction during the Eisenhower ad-
ministration (but it did so later—see chapter 6); however, the BAT 
did require that programs associated with government contractors 
have the imprimatur of registration with the BAT. In conjunction 
with this requirement and with E.O. 10557, the bureau also sought 
“to stimulate those [contractors] responsible for such training to 
provide equal opportunities for all qualified individuals to acquire 
skills without regard to race, creed, sex, age or physical handicaps.”44 
In 1960 the NAACP released a report titled “The Black Wage 
Earner and Apprenticeship Training Programs,” in which it charged 
that blacks were excluded from most apprenticeship programs. In 
the NAACP’s view, the BAT bore part of the responsibility for this 
state of affairs. In order to provide the maximum apprenticeship 
opportunities to blacks, the NAACP called on all parties involved, 
especially the BAT, both to eliminate racial barriers and to signifi-
cantly increase apprenticeship programs. Reflecting its close ties to 
the providers of apprentice programs, the BAT leadership thought 
the report was useful but off the mark. In a memo to Under Secre-
tary O’Connell, Newell Brown, assistant secretary of labor for the 
Wage-Hour Administration, praised the “well written and cleverly 
handled” booklet. He had asked BAT for their comments on it and 
found that
They are of the opinion that so long as their effective-
ness depends heavily upon the goodwill of employers 
and workers, they cannot attempt to assert pressure for 
integration to any noticeable extent. They do agree that 
perhaps they could do a little more "soft selling."
I am inclined to agree with their comments. Where the 
report in its recommendations goes beyond proposals 
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for expanding and improving Apprenticeship generally, 
it calls for Federal action which we would have to oppose 
if we are to retain employer and employee goodwill.45
By the end of the Eisenhower administration in January 1961, the 
federal government had, for two decades, issued executive orders and 
operated highly visible presidential committees intended to alleviate 
discrimination in federally funded jobs. These bodies, supplemented 
by the Department of Labor and other executive branch agencies, 
applied limited resources to the difficult task of turning around 
long-established practices and prejudices that limited opportunities 
for black workers.
The results of this twenty-year effort were modest and incom-
plete. Black wages and employment opportunities did improve, but 
African Americans still lagged well behind the rest of the workforce. 
In 1960, 45 percent of minority men, mostly black, held laborer jobs. 
Only 13 percent of white men were relegated to such work. The black 
unemployment rate was twice the white rate, and the average black 
family earned 55 percent of the average earnings of white families.46 
The hopeful side of this picture was that twenty years of executive 
branch efforts had succeeded in institutionalizing the concept, if not 
the reality, of equal employment opportunity. Thus was provided a 
policy base for further federal efforts to attain this elusive goal.

With the election of John Kennedy as president in 1960, action by the executive branch, driven by the exploding 
civil rights movement, reached a new, more intense level. In 1961 
Executive Order 10925 established the President’s Committee on 
Equal Employment Opportunity (PCEEO). As discussed in chap-
ter 6 (“Birth of the President’s Committee on Equal Employment 
Opportunity”), chapter 7 (“The Committee Gets Underway”), and 
chapter 8 (“The Kheel Report and Beyond”), the PCEEO adminis-
tered a unified program that focused on equal opportunity compli-
ance both in federal contract work and also in federal employment. 
Added to the dual mission of the PCEEO was “Plans for Progress,” 
a controversial voluntary effort which included the nonfederally 
funded private sector. With broad-based support for the commit-
tee, Congress increased funding significantly over the levels for pre-
vious equal employment opportunity programs. Chapter 9, “The 
Department of Labor in the Kennedy–Johnson Era,” covers the 
continued process of instilling equal opportunity policies in the US 
Employment Service and details the issuance of a historic affirma-
tive action regulation governing apprenticeship programs. The chro-
nology concludes at the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
which largely superceded existing executive action and moved equal 
employment opportunity enforcement into the new realm of legis-
lated, mandatory enforcement.
Part III
Culmination of Executive Action,  
1960–1964

On February 1, 1960, four black student activists from the North Carolina Agricultural and Technical College 
entered a Woolworth’s department store in Greensboro, North 
Carolina. They made a few purchases and then sat down at the 
whites-only lunch counter. The students were never served, but they 
remained quietly on their stools until the store closed. They came 
back on each of the following six days, attracting ever-larger crowds 
and extensive television news coverage. This historic “sit-in” sparked 
similar actions throughout the South, spreading to fifty-four cities in 
nine states within three months.1
The immediate effect was to boost the Civil Rights Movement to 
a higher level and give African Americans unprecedented political 
influence. As a result, candidates seeking the presidential nomina-
tions of both major political parties worked harder than ever to gain 
black support. Vice President Richard Nixon, virtually unopposed 
for the Republican nomination, worked to reverse the long-term ero-
sion in black support for his party. Senator John F. Kennedy (JFK), 
the leading contender for the Democratic nomination, met with 
Martin Luther King Jr. in June and endorsed the sit-in movement 
before the party convention took place. Kennedy won the nomina-
tion on the first ballot. He persuaded his chief rival, Senate Majority 
Leader Lyndon Baines Johnson (LBJ), to be his running mate as vice 
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president. The convention adopted a strong civil rights plank that 
called for federal action to end discrimination in housing and edu-
cation, and for enactment of a fair employment practices law. The 
Republican convention—which, as expected, chose Nixon as its 
nominee—adopted the strongest civil rights plank in the party’s his-
tory, urging the total eradication of racial discrimination.2
In the fall, Kennedy campaigned vigorously for the votes of 
African Americans. Kennedy promised to establish, through an 
executive order, equality in federally funded housing with the stroke 
of a pen. Shortly before the election, he telephoned Coretta Scott 
King—her husband, Martin Luther King Jr. had been sentenced to 
four months hard labor by a Georgia judge in retribution for civil 
rights activities there. Pressure from JFK, and his brother and close 
adviser Robert F. Kennedy, quickly led to an order releasing King 
from jail. This episode contributed to an election-day shift of black 
support to the Democratic camp. In one of the closer elections in 
American history, Kennedy carried 70 percent of the black vote. He 
won the election by a total of 115,000 popular votes nationwide and 
by 84 votes in the electoral college, 303 to 219.
The Kennedy administration came into office with an ambitious 
domestic agenda. Black hopes for significant civil rights actions in 
Washington were high. However, as had been the case under past 
Democratic presidents like Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt, power in Congress continued to rest largely with segrega-
tionist Southern Democrats. Kennedy needed their support in order 
to achieve his highest domestic priority: recovery from the stubborn 
grip of a recession that began in 1959. To this end, the administra-
tion decided early on to avoid conflict with Congress over civil rights 
and to rely instead on executive action.
Inauguration Day, January 20, 1961, marked the initiation of 
what was soon labeled the New Frontier. Black participation in JFK’s 
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inaugural festivities was more extensive than it had ever been before.3 
Many black dignitaries were invited, and President Kennedy made a 
point of dancing with their wives at the balls. Kennedy’s inaugural 
address, however, dealt largely with the Cold War. His only allusion 
to civil rights was when he spoke of “those human rights . . . to which 
we are committed today at home and around the world.”4 Civil rights 
leaders were encouraged both by the fact that the president chose to 
mention civil rights, and also by the tone of governmental activism 
that he projected.
Despite giving minimal attention to black concerns in the speech, 
the Kennedy administration soon focused on a number of civil rights 
issues. Kennedy himself said relatively little in public on the subject. 
However, his brother Robert, whom he appointed Attorney General; 
Vice President Johnson; Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg and 
successor W. Willard Wirtz; and others spoke eloquently and regu-
larly on equal rights. The administration tied this issue closely to 
the Cold War and competition with the Soviet Union, as had the 
Truman and Eisenhower administrations. Kennedy made himself 
more accessible to civil rights leaders than any previous president. 
He met with Martin Luther King Jr., A. Philip Randolph, and Roy 
Wilkins, among others.
After assuming office, Kennedy appointed African Americans to 
high political posts at a rapid pace, giving them more power and 
responsibility than in previous administrations. His most prominent 
appointment was that of Robert C. Weaver, who had served in FDR’s 
Black Cabinet, to head the Housing and Home Finance Agency.5 In 
his first two months in office, JFK appointed forty blacks to high 
positions in a wide range of policy areas. However, he appointed 
Harris Wofford, a white—albeit also a racial liberal—as the senior 
White House civil rights adviser and liaison. Nevertheless, Kennedy 
put great pressure on agency heads to appoint blacks to high advisory 
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positions. In September 1961 he appointed Thurgood Marshall, the 
principal attorney in the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision, 
to the US Court of Appeals in Washington, DC, making him the first 
black jurist ever to serve at that level.6 While neither of Kennedy’s 
appointees for secretary of labor was black, both Arthur Goldberg, a 
labor lawyer and an architect of the merger of the AFL and the CIO 
in 1955, and Willard Wirtz, a law professor with extensive experience 
in government, were strong supporters of civil rights. Earlier, Wirtz 
had advised Democratic presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson on 
civil rights issues during his 1956 campaign.7
The administration quickly began implementing an equal oppor-
tunity agenda through executive action. Executive orders were 
issued to promote fair housing, desegregate public transportation, 
and promote equality in the workplace. Despite the fact that the 
executive branch was acting more vigorously than ever before to 
promote equal employment opportunity, African Americans were 
critical of the administration’s slow pace and limited scope in civil 
rights activities.
In the early 1960s, the Civil Rights Movement rapidly became 
a civil rights crisis. Activists mounted Freedom Rides, at consider-
able risk to themselves, in an attempt to desegregate southern pub-
lic transportation. Large numbers of blacks began to exercise their 
right to register and vote. Perhaps most crucially, the Reverend 
Martin Luther King Jr., leader of the 1955 Montgomery Bus Boycott, 
emerged as a powerful and charismatic leader. In May 1963 King led 
a series of marches and demonstrations in Birmingham, Alabama. 
The marchers were assaulted by Police Commissioner Bull Connor’s 
police dogs and water cannons in full view of a national television 
audience.
In June 1963 in response to the mounting crisis, Kennedy stopped 
stalling and called for a strong civil rights law. Congress soon took 
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up bills on the issue. Adding pressure for enactment was the historic 
“March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom,” staged on August 28, 
1963, and led by A. Philip Randolph, father of the 1941 March on 
Washington Movement. At the march, where King gave his immor-
tal “I have a dream” speech, a quarter of a million people demon-
strated peacefully in support of a new civil rights act. A further, if 
tragic, impetus came in November 1963 when President Kennedy 
was assassinated in Dallas. When Vice President Johnson succeeded 
Kennedy, LBJ took advantage of the national period of mourning to 
call for enactment of the Civil Rights Act in Kennedy’s memory.
Segregationists stoutly resisted the legislation. President Johnson 
then shifted gears and mounted a separate initiative, dubbed the 
Great Society, to improve the social and physical quality of life in the 
United States, including race relations. An allied LBJ program, the 
War on Poverty, focused on reducing severe economic disparities, 
regardless of race. Institutionalization of both programs began with 
the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964.
After a tremendous battle in Congress, LBJ won passage of the 
Civil Rights Act and signed it into law on July 2, 1964. Title VII 
specifically banned discrimination based on race, religion, or gen-
der in the workplace, created an Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission to investigate and assist in enforcement, and required 
affirmative action to eliminate discrimination. The following year, 
Johnson issued E.O. 11246, establishing a permanent Office of 
Federal Contract Compliance to enforce equal employment oppor-
tunity in government contracts.
Enactment of the Civil Rights Act and the initiation of the Great 
Society and War on Poverty ushered in an era of legislative remedies 
for discrimination and its economic and social effects. The Civil 
Rights Act marked an end to the period of reliance on executive 
action to provide equal employment opportunity. The law developed 
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while action by the executive branch was at its apogee. This effort 
helped lay the groundwork for the transition to legislative remedies.
Issuance of Executive Order 10925
During the 1960 presidential campaign, Kennedy had charged that 
the President’s Committee on Government Contracts (PCGC), es-
tablished by President Eisenhower, was ineffective. Calling for large-
scale executive action to promote civil rights, Kennedy promised 
to reorganize and strengthen the committee. After the election he 
designated LBJ, who had championed the 1957 Civil Rights Act, 
to organize the drafting of a presidential order to establish a new 
committee.
Beginning before the inauguration, Johnson led a collective effort 
involving the Justice Department, Secretary of Labor-designate 
Goldberg, LBJ adviser and journalist Bill Moyers, and Abe Fortas 
and Hobart Taylor, two lawyers and longtime Johnson associates. 
Johnson also consulted widely outside government. The drafters 
used the PCGC and the legacy of twenty years of executive orders as 
a starting point.
On March 6, 1961, JFK issued E.O. 10925 abolishing both the 
PCGC and Eisenhower’s PCGEP on federal employment (see chap-
ter 5). In their place, E.O. 10925 created the President’s Committee 
on Equal Employment Opportunity (PCEEO), which covered both 
contract and federal employment, thus eliminating the traditional 
bureaucratic separation of these areas. The order incorporated a 
number of features intended to make the PCEEO more effective than 
its predecessors. The secretary of labor was designated vice chair, 
reporting to the vice president, who served as chair. The secretary 
was responsible for seeing that the committee fulfilled its duties. The 
order also included a beefed-up antidiscrimination clause for gov-
ernment contracts, allowed contract debarment as a sanction, and 
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required detailed surveys of minority employment in federal agen-
cies. Kennedy announced E.O. 10925 and the PCEEO with great 
fanfare at a press conference on March 7, 1961, and promised vigor-
ous administration and enforcement.
E.O. 10925 was longer, more detailed, and more sweeping than 
any previous order of its kind. The Whereas clauses at the begin-
ning laid out the basis for the order in law, policy, national interest, 
and administrative functioning. As a matter of law, discrimination 
was found to be clearly against the Constitution, and it was the duty 
of the federal government to promote equal employment opportu-
nity for all in the workplaces of both the government and federal 
contractors. It was also found that efficient use of the entire labor 
force was necessary for a sound economy and for national security. 
The concluding clause asserted that existing government orders and 
procedures were not adequate to the task of eliminating workplace 
discrimination and that the government’s efforts to meet its anti-
discrimination responsibilities should be coordinated in a single 
agency.
The heart of federal contracts enforcement was a new, far-reach-
ing, and mandatory nondiscrimination clause which was to be 
included in most government contracts. Contractors were to post the 
clause conspicuously in the workplace, include a promise of equal 
employment opportunity in any job announcements, and inform 
unions about employers’ duties under the order. In addition, subcon-
tracts also were to include a nondiscrimination clause. The contrac-
tor was primarily responsible for enforcement, under the direction 
of the agency. The committee could, at its discretion, allow agencies 
to omit the clause from specific contracts, and to exempt small con-
tracts or contracts for work not involving US residents.
The most innovative feature of E.O. 10925 was the inclusion of 
the phrase “affirmative action.” Section 301, specifying the wording 
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of the antidiscrimination clause for government contracts, required 
that contractors take 
affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, 
and that employees are treated during employment, with-
out regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin.
The order also called on the PCEEO, in Section 201, to suggest “affir-
mative steps” for agencies to take for promoting nondiscrimination 
for their own employees.
Affirmative Action was not defined, but it was a recognizable 
phrase with a history. It had first been used by the federal govern-
ment in the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. In that context, 
it referred, not to racial discrimination, but to providing redress to 
employees victimized by unfair labor practices. A few years later, 
during discussions among policy makers leading to the formation 
of the Second FEPC, the concept was discussed in reference to equal 
employment. Budget Bureau head Harold Smith objected to a pro-
posal (not adopted) to allow the FEPC to require, as a remedy for 
discrimination, “affirmative action such as employment, reinstate-
ment, and payment of back pay.” State FEPCs, however, often had 
the authority to order affirmative action by employers. In the 1950s 
the PCGC applied the notion in settling several discrimination 
complaints. By 1960 “affirmative,” “affirmative action,” and similar 
phrases were in common use by those, including President Kennedy, 
calling for more aggressive governmental efforts to deal with a num-
ber of issues. As Willard Wirtz later noted, in 1961 affirmative action 
had little specific meaning beyond that of expressing a need for “tak-
ing an initiative instead of just sitting back and waiting for things to 
happen.” It was a kind of shibboleth expressing the activist spirit of 
the new administration.8
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Under E.O. 10925, contractors were to provide the PCEEO with 
periodic compliance reports on their practices and policies, along 
with fair employment statistics. Contractors were also to open their 
records to the contracting agencies to allow independent evaluation 
of their efforts. The order also specified that contract bidders, who 
had previously come under its purview, would have to submit a past 
compliance report.
E.O. 10925 broke new ground by applying its requirements to 
organized labor, which had been excluded from past executive orders. 
Because the Civil Rights Movement in the late 1950s had publicized 
long-standing discrimination within unions, the Kennedy adminis-
tration, while strongly supportive of organized labor, felt obliged to 
take this step. 
All contracting employers’ compliance reports were to describe, 
to the extent known, any practices and policies of the relevant unions 
related to fair employment. Any firm seeking government contracts 
would have to obtain a statement from unions representing their 
employees, certifying that the unions were free of discrimination 
and would comply with the order. Furthermore, the committee was 
charged to use its best efforts to seek compliance and cooperation 
from the relevant unions. 
The committee was also empowered to hold hearings on any 
labor organization’s fair employment practices and to report their 
findings to the White House. When it encountered discriminatory 
practices or lack of cooperation by a particular union, the committee 
could recommend, though not require, remedial action and notify 
the government agencies involved.
E.O. 10925 designated the contracting federal agencies as the pri-
mary enforcers of its provisions. The agencies were to comply with 
the order and the committee’s rules and provide any assistance or 
information the committee might ask. Each agency was to designate 
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one of their employees as the compliance officer. These officers were 
to avoid confrontation and conflict and seek compliance through, as 
the order put it, “conference, conciliation, mediation, or persuasion” 
whenever possible.
The committee was responsible for a wide range of contract com-
pliance functions. To ease the burdens on its limited resources, it 
was authorized to delegate functions to the agencies. For example, 
the committee was free to investigate any contractor’s employment 
practices for possible violations, or it could ask that the contracting 
agency or the Labor Department do so. Employees could file dis-
crimination complaints with the committee, which would initiate 
an investigation resulting in recommendations for remedial action. 
The committee had a broad mandate to hold hearings around the 
country on any facet of employment discrimination. The commit-
tee also had a mandate to support educational efforts by employers, 
unions, and other concerned groups to eliminate discrimination in 
employment. In theory, E.O. 10925 included educational work in all 
workplaces, not only federally funded ones. While this mandate had 
little practical effect, nevertheless, it did constitute a widening of the 
federal role. As such, it foreshadowed the sweeping changes insti-
tuted in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
The sanctions and penalties available to the PCEEO under E.O. 
10925 were stronger than those available to any previous federal fair 
employment body. Before taking any formal action, the committee 
and contracting agencies were allowed to publish the names of con-
tractors and unions who were not in compliance with the order. For 
employers whose policies and practices met the requirements of E.O. 
10925, the committee could publish their names and award an offi-
cial Certificate of Merit.
If the public “dishonor roll” of violators failed to bring about 
compliance, stronger measures were available. When any person or 
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organization, whether an employer or a union, was found to be in 
actual or potential violation of the mandatory antidiscrimination 
clause, the committee could ask the Department of Justice to bring 
legal action against them. This action could even include criminal 
proceedings if the violator had furnished false information. When 
the committee ruled that a contractor had violated the clause, it 
could either terminate their contract forthwith or allow continua-
tion, provided the contractor developed a satisfactory program to 
bring about compliance. Agencies could also debar noncomplying 
contractors from further government work until they had remedied 
all violations.
In reality, legal action, cancellation, and debarment were rarely 
invoked. Before pursuing such remedies, the PCEEO and the con-
tracting agencies were required, under the order, to follow the 
long-established principle of voluntary compliance by instituting 
conferences, conciliation, and other voluntary measures. However, 
Vice Chair Goldberg stressed in a television interview that while the 
compliance policy of the PCEEO would be at heart voluntaristic, the 
committee would seek to apply it as rigorously as possible:
We will use reason, we will use persuasion, we will use 
common sense. We will, however, use firmness. There is 
no justification . . . for anyone to be denied fair opportu-
nities for government employment . . . [or] employment 
opportunities on government contracts. 9
E.O. 10925, unlike its predecessors, combined the portfolio of 
the federal workforce with contract work. The order adopted the 
abolished PCGEP’s goal of prohibiting discrimination against fed-
eral employees or job applicants based on race, color, religion, or 
national origin. There were no formal penalties for violations of gov-
ernment employees’ rights. Sanctions were not really necessary since 
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all federal agencies are directly accountable to the president. As with 
federal contractors, the order made federal agencies, rather than the 
committee, directly responsible for meeting nondiscrimination stan-
dards. E.O. 10925 required that the committee immediately study 
employment practices in all agencies of the federal government and 
recommend steps to promote equal employment opportunities. To 
assist the committee, agencies were instructed to survey their inter-
nal employment conduct and policies in detail and, as soon as pos-
sible, send the committee a full report, including recommendations 
for improvement. The committee would then report the results of the 
federal survey and the recommendations to the president. Shortly 
after issuing E.O. 10925, Kennedy broadened its scope to include 
recreational associations that federal agencies provided for their 
employees. These associations were barred from using federal facili-
ties, or even the name of the agency with which they were associated, 
if they practiced discrimination.10
Regarding both federal employment and contractors, the commit-
tee was authorized to adopt procedures to implement the order and 
consider reports from government agencies on progress made. The 
chair could appoint subcommittees as needed to conduct studies on 
specific issues, and members could bring up specific concerns for con-
sideration. The committee was to report to the president at least annu-
ally on the antidiscrimination performance of each federal agency.11
Start-up of the PCEEO
Shortly after President Kennedy announced the creation of the 
PCEEO on March 7, 1961, his staff began selecting and appoint-
ing the members of the new committee. Prescribed for member-
ship under the order by reason of their positions were the vice 
president (Lyndon Johnson), chair; the secretary of labor (Arthur 
Goldberg), vice chair; the secretary of defense (Robert McNamara) 
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and the heads of the four military branches; the secretary of com-
merce (Luther Hodges); the attorney general (Robert Kennedy); the 
Atomic Energy Commission chair (Glenn T. Seborg); the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration director (James Webb); the 
Civil Service Commission chair (John W. Macy); and the General 
Services Administration director (John L. Moore). The order also 
gave the president a free hand to make additional appointments. 
Kennedy used the opportunity to bring in a wide-ranging group of 
luminaries. These additions included Abraham Ribicoff, secretary 
of Health, Education and Welfare; retailing mogul Fred Lazarus; 
philanthropist Mary Lasker; black businessman John H. Wheeler; 
and three prominent religious leaders: Monsignor George Higgins, 
Washington National Cathedral Dean Francis Sayre, and Rabbi 
Jacob Weinstein. Because of the importance of organized labor to 
the success of the order, Kennedy named AFL-CIO President George 
Meany and Vice President Walter Reuther as members.12 In addition 
to Lazarus, Kennedy appointed six more business representatives, 
three from the South and three from the North. In total, he appointed 
twenty-eight members, fourteen each from government and the pri-
vate sector. Assistant Secretary of Labor (and Johnson friend) Jerry 
Holleman was appointed executive vice chair, an ex officio position 
with wide-ranging responsibilities for carrying out the functions of 
the committee. Holleman was only available part-time, however, as 
he continued to serve in his Labor Department post.
The committee leadership began work well before the official 
kick-off meeting scheduled for April 11. Members for the committee 
were still being selected, but Johnson was anxious for the committee 
to get off to the fastest possible start. He asked each agency head to 
immediately designate a compliance officer to serve as a contact with 
the committee on all matters and, using a form to be supplied by 
the committee, conduct a quick survey of employment of minorities 
TO ADVANCE THEIR OPPORTUNITIES
170
by contractors and by the agency. The agencies were then to report 
to the committee on their compliance plans. Agency heads notified 
personnel directors that they were to fully implement E.O. 10925.
As of April 3 the committee had failed to develop a survey form 
for the agencies. To help assure that the survey would meet Johnson’s 
reporting deadline of May 5, Goldberg provided the agencies with 
a form the Labor Department had already devised for its own use.13 
The Labor Department and its agencies facilitated the PCEEO’s start-
up in other ways. The Bureau of Apprenticeship (BAT) and the Wage 
and Hour and Public Contracts Divisions (WHD) were especially 
useful. Vice President Johnson wanted to include the controversial 
issue of equal opportunity in the nation’s apprenticeship programs 
on the agenda of the committee’s first meeting. To facilitate this pre-
sentation, Secretary Goldberg ordered a background study on the 
extent of the problem, which the BAT quickly provided.
The WHD became a key component in administering the order. 
A joint body created in the 1930s to enforce the Fair Labor Standards 
and Public Contracts Acts, the WHD maintained a staff of 650 
inspectors in all fifty states. It was often called upon to enforce regu-
lations related to other labor laws. WHD Administrator Clarence 
Lundquist reported that, while a small amount of additional funding 
would be necessary, the divisions were “ready, willing, and able” to 
enforce E.O. 10925. Their expertise made an invaluable contribution 
to the work of the PCEEO.14
Like other federal employers, the Department of Labor was 
required to put its own house in order under E.O. 10925. Goldberg 
was determined to see that the department was a leader and role 
model among federal employers. On March 7, 1961, the day President 
Kennedy announced the order, Goldberg sent out an all-employee 
departmental memo on the White House initiative, which he termed 
“a vigorous, positive program to ensure that all Americans . . . will 
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have equal access to employment opportunities.”15 Goldberg high-
lighted Kennedy’s requirement that all government agencies were to 
“take immediate action” to open more opportunities for minorities. 
Reinforcing that theme, Goldberg issued a call for affirmative action 
in federal employment:
IT IS MY INTENTION THAT THERE SHALL BE NO 
RACIAL OR RELIGIOUS BARRIERS TO EMPLOY-
MENT AT ANY LEVEL IN THIS DEPARTMENT 
. . . WE ARE TAKING AFFIRMATIVE STEPS TO 
ACQUAINT MEMBERS OF MINORITY GROUPS 
WITH THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR EMPLOYMENT 
THAT EXIST IN THIS DEPARTMENT AND IN THE 
GOVERNMENT GENERALLY. 16 [original emphasis]
In the same memo, Goldberg announced that letters had gone 
out to the presidents of every black college in the country, informing 
them of job opportunities for their graduates at the Department of 
Labor. To follow up, Goldberg sent his personnel director, Edward 
McVeigh, on a four-week recruiting trip to seventeen black col-
leges. Goldberg was careful, at the same time, to make sure that 
affirmative action would not deprive qualified white students of job 
opportunities:
We will expect, of course, that members of minority 
groups meet the same qualification standards, follow the 
same staffing procedures, and qualify in the same exami-
nations or evaluations as others seeking employment or 
promotion. To do otherwise would in itself be a form of 
discrimination.17 [emphasis added]
By March 9, 1961, Goldberg had named three blacks to high posi-
tions in the department. George L. P. Weaver was named assistant 
secretary for International Affairs and US Representative to the 
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International Labor Organization (ILO). He and Robert C. Weaver 
(no relation) were the two highest-ranking African Americans in the 
administration. While Goldberg sought (as a matter of principle) to 
appoint African Americans to high positions, George Weaver was 
seen as a particularly appropriate choice, by virtue of his color, to 
speak for the United States in the racially diverse ILO. Goldberg 
appointed Arthur Chapin, a labor, civil rights, and Democratic 
Party activist from New Jersey, as Minority Groups consultant in 
the Bureau of Employment Security, and Dolly Robinson, an African 
American, as a special assistant to Women’s Bureau director Mary 
Dublin Keyserling. Goldberg ordered a careful study of the depart-
ment’s personnel practices to determine the extent to which dis-
crimination was, or had been, present. He rushed a hand-carried 
memo on these activities to the vice president. Johnson immedi-
ately thanked Goldberg: “I’m glad you acted with your characteristic 
speed and dispatch.”18
Edward McVeigh’s recruiting trip was revealing. He discovered 
firsthand that few black students at the campuses he visited had 
taken the civil service examinations required for eligibility for fed-
eral white-collar jobs. McVeigh reported that they either did not 
know about the tests or did not believe they had a real chance for a 
federal job. By the time he reported to the secretary, the Civil Service 
Commission (CSC) had completed its regular schedule of examina-
tions for the year. Goldberg asked CSC head Macy, a member of the 
PCEEO, to provide an additional examination day. Macy consented, 
and the CSC held a special exam session on May 13, 1961.19
With the help of the Labor Department and other agencies, 
the committee was able to be ready for its inaugural meeting on 
April 11, 1961, as scheduled. At this high-profile event, held in the 
Cabinet Room at the White House, Johnson swore in the members. 
President Kennedy spoke, stressing that E.O. 10925 was “both an 
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announcement of our determination to end job discrimination once 
and for all, and an effective instrument to realize that objective. . . . I 
don’t think there’s any more important domestic effort in which we 
can be engaged.” In a reference to the continuing international and 
Cold War significance of US race relations, Kennedy also noted that 
Johnson had just returned from a trip to Senegal that reflected “the 
importance of our establishing our image in accordance with our 
Constitutional promise.” Kennedy pointed out that the committee 
was not an honorary body but had important enforcement powers 
that he expected to be firmly applied. At the same time, he sought to 
calm fears that the committee would be heavy-handed and intrusive 
in the nation’s workplaces. He stressed that its responsibilities were 
to be discharged “with fairness, with understanding, with an open 
mind, and a generous spirit of cooperation.” He noted, “There is no 
intention to make this a harsh or unreasonable mandate for those sin-
cerely and honestly seeking compliance.” He concluded his remarks 
by saying that “this is the best way I know how to do it . . . [W]hen 
[the committee’s] powers and responsibilities are put together, it will 
be moving along a very important, useful, and national road.”20
Echoing Kennedy’s sentiments, Johnson expressed strong deter-
mination to eliminate discrimination in the workplace. Using a 
phrase that became an unofficial motto of the committee, he asserted, 
“we mean business.”21 To facilitate the PCEEO’s work, he organized 
it into subcommittees on: skill improvement, training and appren-
ticeship, vocational education, promotion and upgrading, franchise 
industries, and religious cooperation.
Johnson described the PCEEO’s role as national in scope. Its man-
date was to bring about “voluntary compliance throughout the gov-
ernment, throughout industry and throughout the labor movement.” 
While recognizing that eliminating discrimination from govern-
ment-funded employment areas could not be accomplished quickly, 
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he emphasized that “it is long overdue; and it must be accomplished 
with all reasonable speed.” He noted that the new committee differed 
from its predecessors in that it was to be devoted largely to matters 
of policy, with members “carrying the gospel of the Executive Order 
to every corner of this land.” Freeing up the PCEEO’s members to 
pursue this purpose, the vice chair, executive vice chair, and forty 
full-time staff members were to carry out the day-to-day operations. 
Johnson concluded:
The President’s Executive Order is framed not merely 
in the negative terms of avoiding discrimination, but in 
the positive direction of taking steps to make sure that 
all persons . . . have a full opportunity to participate in 
[government-funded] employment . . . It is your obliga-
tion . . . to see that this positive and affirmative program 
is fulfilled, in spirit as well as in letter.22
After Johnson’s remarks, the committee members who repre-
sented government agencies initialed a prepared statement commit-
ting their agencies to the elimination of discrimination in federally 
funded employment. Specifically, they pledged to complete the 
surveys already begun and initiate any follow-up actions that were 
needed. Johnson announced that the committee would meet soon 
in Washington with the major government contractors, followed by 
a separate meeting with union leaders. After that meeting, commit-
tee members would travel around the country to convene with more 
contractors and unions. He emphasized that “the ultimate solution 
to this problem must be found among the people themselves . . . 
[Equality] must be translated into specific action and that transition 
will take place best when people sit around the table and discuss the 
specific problems.”23
Shortly after the April 11 kick-off meeting, Holleman directed 
each agency head to immediately appoint an Employment Policy 
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Officer (EPO) to carry out the requirements of the order regard-
ing federal employment. The EPOs were to be under the immediate 
supervision of the agency head and were not supposed to be con-
nected with the agency’s personnel division. The agencies designated 
high-ranking officials, usually assistant secretaries, to serve as EPOs. 
The larger agencies assigned full-time staff to work with the EPOs.24
The committee began with a staff of forty full-time workers left 
over from the PCGC and PCGEP. There were thirty-one positions in 
Washington, DC, and nine in offices in Chicago and Los Angeles.25 
Funding for the first year came from the unspent budgets of the 
two old committees. After that, as specified under E.O. 10925 and 
in compliance with the Russell Amendment (see chapters 3 and 4), 
the PCEEO received all funding from the contracting departments 
and agencies. No single agency could provide more than 50 percent 
of the committee’s total budget, which was set at $500,000 per year. 
However, the agencies were permitted to contribute staff and other 
nonbudgetary assistance. The Department of Labor provided office 
space and facilities.26
By June 1961 the committee had filled most of its top staff posi-
tions. To serve as executive director, Johnson appointed John Feild, 
a white with roots in the labor movement and civil rights experi-
ence, including service as a staff member with the Michigan Fair 
Employment Practices Commission.27 Other staff appointments 
included John D. McCully Sr. as director of Information; Percy 
Williams as assistant executive director for Contract Compliance; 
John Hope II as assistant executive director for Federal Employment; 
Ward McCreedy as director of Complaint Investigations; Raymond 
Shelkofsky as administrative officer; and Hobart Taylor Jr. as head of 
the Office of Special Counsel (OSC).28
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In the position of Special Counsel, Taylor had the difficult and 
sensitive jobs of interpreting E.O. 10925, developing rules and regu-
lations for the committee, and reviewing discrimination complaints 
before final action by the committee. A successful black lawyer and 
the son of a Houston businessman who had a long-standing politi-
cal and business relationship with Johnson, Taylor was the princi-
pal drafter of the order. He later claimed responsibility for including 
in it the phrase “affirmative action.” Taylor took a methodical and 
nonconfrontational approach that Wirtz, Robert Kennedy, and oth-
ers interpreted as a lack of enthusiasm for the committee. Wirtz 
later stated that Taylor’s was “not a firecracker approach.” Johnson 
appears not to have shared that view. While still vice president, he 
showed enough confidence in Taylor’s capabilities to make him his 
special assistant in the White House.29
Under Taylor, the OSC was designated to be a watchdog on the 
federal agencies as they administered E.O. 10925. The OSC reviewed 
and coordinated agency rules and worked to assure the establish-
ment of uniform procedures throughout the federal government. 
Although many agencies did not want to set specific deadlines for 
processing complaints, the Special Counsel required them to adopt 
a thirty-day time limit for most complaints. Agencies were also 
required to file a copy of each complaint they received with the com-
mittee. The Special Counsel worked to assure that all discrimina-
tion complaints would be reported to the committee so that it could 
review them. When an agency conducted a hearing on a complaint, 
the Special Counsel made sure that the officer investigating the com-
plaint did not also serve as the hearing officer. The Special Counsel 
also saw that complainants’ legal rights under the order were fully 
protected. The OSC stressed that the job of the EPO “was not to 
protect agency personnel, but to find and establish the truth.” The 
OSC also emphasized that employees did not have to go through 
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the supervisory chain of command to file complaints and could 
approach the EPO directly instead.30
Taylor’s main initial task was to draft the permanent rules and 
regulations defining the PCEEO’s procedures. The committee had 
earlier approved a preliminary set of operating rules and regula-
tions that served as a basis for Taylor’s work. After consulting with 
the committee and with interested outside parties, Taylor submitted 
a draft of the rules to the committee in June 1961. The committee 
published them in the Federal Register for public comment and held 
hearings.31
After considering the numerous comments received, the PCEEO 
made a few revisions, developed separate sets of rules governing con-
tractors and federal employment, and published the whole package 
of proposed rules in the Federal Register on July 22, 1961. The rules, 
filling an eighteen-page booklet, spelled out the nuts and bolts of 
administering the order. The principal provision was a set of require-
ments to protect the rights of contract firms accused of violations. 
The proposal also contained wording that somewhat mitigated 
the language of the order setting forth sanctions and penalties.32 
Regarding the spirit of the rules, Taylor later wrote that “the under-
lying philosophy which guided their formulation was a belief that 
greater cooperation could be secured . . . through the development of 
procedures which would eliminate unnecessary paperwork, which 
would be simple to handle, and which would at the same time afford 
an opportunity for a fair and reasonable hearing to all who complain 
of discrimination.”33
Despite Taylor’s efforts to reduce any burdensome impact due 
to the rules or the executive order, Senator Lister Hill, Democrat 
from Alabama, sent a blistering letter to the committee protesting 
both the proposed rules and the very existence of the committee 
itself. Senator Hill charged that the PCEEO “represented both an 
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unauthorized and unwise extension of Federal interference with 
and control of the Nation’s private businesses in the name of so-
called equal employment opportunity.” Furthermore, he charged, 
E.O. 10925 and the rules were “an unconstitutional usurpation of 
the legislative powers of the Congress.” He expressed special con-
cern regarding the potential burden on business and the interference 
in what he viewed as the fundamental rights of persons to set up 
companies and conduct them as they see fit: “This personal free-
dom of contract is the basis of our free-enterprise system and the 
whole American concept of individual freedom. . . . The full power 
of inquiry and investigation authorized will vex and harass those 
doing business with the government to the point where orderly plant 
management and efficient production could well be impossible. . . . I 
strongly urge that . . . the Committee reject and defeat the proposed 
rules and regulations.”34
Hill’s blast seems to have had the opposite effect on the com-
mittee and the rules from what he intended. The PCEEO not only 
adopted their rules proposal virtually verbatim, but the committee 
actually strengthened them. Their most important change was to 
broaden enforcement to include the previously excluded category of 
contracts for standard commercial supplies worth at least $100,000. 
The PCEEO also decided to grant or withdraw exemptions for whole 
categories of contracts, instead of having to deal with each contract 
individually.35
Senator Hill's implicitly racist tirade washed over the PCEEO like 
water off the back of a duck. The question was whether his response 
was a precursor to virulent attacks of the kind that crippled and ulti-
mately destroyed the FEPC.  The PCEEO was even more far-reaching 
and had the power to have a much greater impact on discrimina-
tion in employment. This realization led to a second question: If 
the PCEEO was not crippled, to what extent would this carefully 
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constructed and seemingly well-oiled machine live up to its poten-
tial? These questions must have been on the minds of everyone who 
wished it well as it prepared to enter the fray of race relations in the 
nation’s workplaces.

A s one of its initial tasks, the committee began the jobs of offsetting its critics and of motivating federal agencies and 
the nation on E.O. 10925. PCEEO staff—from Holleman and Feild 
on down—spoke frequently before labor, business, civil rights, social 
service, and student groups.1 To indoctrinate agency personnel, the 
PCEEO held workshops and conferences both in Washington and 
around the country, and conducted training sessions with the coop-
eration of the Brookings Institution and other bodies. Holleman and 
Feild met with federal staff who dealt with contract compliance and, 
separately, with those who dealt with federal employment to discuss 
implementation of the order.2
The PCEEO held the first of several conferences with contract 
compliance officers on April 21, 1961. While the focus of public 
attention was on Washington, DC, with its heavy concentration of 
federally funded jobs, the PCEEO recognized that substantial federal 
employment also existed outside the Washington area. Accordingly, 
the PCEEO, with the aid of the Civil Service Commission, held a 
series of meetings with agency leaders in each of the fourteen federal 
regions, beginning in July 1961, to explain the goals of E.O. 10925 
and to discuss how they could be realized.3
In May 1961, even before the PCEEO’s operating rules were com-
plete, it plunged into the meat of its mandate: compliance work. 
CHAPTER 7
The Committee Gets Underway
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Johnson and Goldberg initiated liaison efforts with the private sec-
tor, holding a group meeting on May 2 with heads of the fifty largest 
defense contractors. The next day they held a similar meeting with 
national labor leaders. President Kennedy addressed both meetings 
and won a pledge from each group to cooperate with the PCEEO. 
At the contractors’ meeting Goldberg reassured them that “this 
Committee was not set up as a ‘policing’ agency. It will not have the 
staff or the facilities—even if we were so inclined—to handle such a 
task.”4
The PCEEO worked with government contractors and the con-
tracting agencies along two tracks: mandatory efforts specified in the 
order, such as filing and processing complaints and providing com-
pliance reports, and voluntary efforts that operated outside the legal 
requirements of E.O. 10925. The complaint process was set in motion 
as soon as the order was issued. By the time the PCEEO held its first 
meeting, there was already a backlog of employee complaints that it 
worked hard to reduce. Over the course of the next year, it developed 
a policy of treating legitimate complaints as indications of the need 
for a company or union to change a policy or practice. A main goal of 
complaint investigations, whether by the agency or the PCEEO, was 
to evaluate—not just the specifics of the case—but the underlying 
circumstances in the workplace to find patterns of discrimination.
Resolution of these complaints led to placing blacks in numerous 
production and other well-paying jobs in oil refineries, metal fab-
rication plants, aircraft manufacturing plants, and numerous other 
industrial facilities.5 By June 30, 1962, after just 15 months of op-
erations, the PCEEO had received 819 complaints from contractor 
employees, equivalent to an annual rate almost 5 times that of the 
old PCGC, which received 1,042 complaints over its 7.5 year history. 
The PCEEO dismissed 105 complaints as being outside its jurisdic-
tion and completed investigations of 291 of the remaining 714. That 
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left action pending in 423 cases as of July 1, 1962. In 108 of the 291 
completed cases, the PCEEO dismissed them as being without cause. 
Corrective action, such as promotions, reinstatements, or hiring of 
minorities, followed in 183 cases, resulting in a correction rate of 63 
percent. By comparison, Eisenhower's PCGC achieved a correction 
rate of only 20 percent.6
Compliance reports were required of any employer with a gov-
ernment contract for $50,000 or more and with at least fifty workers. 
This requirement covered thirty-eight thousand employers with 15.5 
million employees nationwide. The agencies that received the reports 
shared them with the PCEEO. These reports, in addition to indicat-
ing the extent of the discrimination problem in the individual firms, 
provided the PCEEO with detailed patterns of minority employment 
by areas and by industries. The reports also provided a measure of 
past equal opportunity efforts by the contractors and an indicator 
of where further effort was needed. The reporting system also gave 
employers a tool both to evaluate the effect of their personnel policies 
on minorities and also “to afford an opportunity for an affirmative 
approach” by all parties to identify and eliminate discriminatory 
practices.7
The PCEEO was determined to make sure that compliance re-
porting would not place an excessive burden on contractors. It con-
sulted with representatives of business and organized labor in devis-
ing a filing process. The reporting rules, approved on December 1, 
1961, specified that since many contractors held multiple contracts, 
each contractor could file one consolidated report for each operating 
location, regardless of the number of contracts involved. In the case 
of firms working under contracts at multiple sites, a separate report 
would have to be filed for each location. In the case of firms dealing 
with more than one federal agency, the agency holding the largest 
dollar volume of contracts with the contractor would be designated 
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the Predominant Interest Agency (PIA). The PIA would be respon-
sible for enforcing equal opportunity for all government work done 
by that contractor. This designation eliminated the possibility that 
one firm might have multiple agencies enforcing the order.8
In developing the reporting rules, the PCEEO tried to be “very 
mindful of the impact of the reporting system . . . [and] made every 
effort to minimize the reporting burden on Government contrac-
tors.” Contractors were allowed to use a familiar, previously used 
reporting plan developed by the Social Security Administration. To 
make things easier for both the contractors and the agencies, the 
reports could be filed with the PCEEO, which would then process 
them and distribute them to the agencies.9
As an aid to contractors, the PCEEO produced a number of posters 
and other graphic materials. These included an “Equal Employment 
Opportunity” poster which contractors were required to display, a 
leaflet reprinting E.O. 10925, and several short films. In July 1961 the 
PCEEO developed an “Equal Employment Opportunity” emblem 
(oval shaped with the words for all qualified applicants inside) for 
employers to use in recruitment advertising to demonstrate that they 
supported the order.10
In early 1962 the PCEEO took important steps to enforce and 
expand the reporting system. For the first time, Executive Vice 
Chair Jerry Holleman ordered the withholding of federal contracts, 
penalizing two firms until they could provide compliance reports, as 
required under PCEEO rules. This decision came after complaints 
had been filed and the committee had found reasonable doubt that 
the firms were in compliance with the order. In addition, in consul-
tation with the Associated General Contractors and the AFL-CIO’s 
Building Trades Department, the PCEEO began developing a com-
pliance reporting system for the construction industry, which it had 
initially exempted from filing reports.11
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To ease the compliance burden on federal agencies, the PCEEO 
encouraged them to hold discussions with contractors on develop-
ing voluntary affirmative action programs. At the same time, an 
unexpected phenomenon began to appear. The PCEEO began to 
receive evidence of antidiscriminatory actions taken voluntarily by 
a number of companies around the country. Elimination of racial 
barriers at one plant sometimes spontaneously spread to other plants 
and then to companies within and even beyond the local area. The 
PCEEO’s newsletter reported regularly on this "snowballing effect."12
Soon the PCEEO had collected and published anecdatal evidence 
of a “quiet change” taking place in employment policies. At many 
locations around the country, blacks were being hired in occupations 
and industries where they had been seriously under-represented, or 
even completely locked out. Examples of these jobs included produc-
tion work in South Carolina textile plants, tobacco production in 
North Carolina, technical and clerical jobs in oil production facili-
ties in the St. Louis area, and skilled electronics jobs in Dallas.13
“Plans for Progress” and other PCEEO Programs
A surprising early development involving voluntary compliance 
greatly expanded the scope of the PCEEO. It began on April 6, 1961, 
when Herbert Hill of the NAACP filed complaints with the PCEEO 
against Lockheed Corporation’s Marietta, Georgia, aircraft plant on 
behalf of thirty-two employees. The manufacture of the air force’s 
new C-141 jet transport had just begun there. At the time it was the 
largest military procurement ever conducted. The Marietta plant 
was highly segregated, and the small number of black employees was 
concentrated in low-level jobs. Skilled white workers were largely 
organized under an International Association of Machinists (IAM) 
local union. The white local union operated a separate, dual local 
for blacks only, in violation of the national IAM’s equal treatment 
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policy. The white local effectively barred blacks from most skilled 
jobs. The NAACP had complained to the PCGC about the Marietta 
plant, but got little response.14
When the NAACP filed its complaints, the PCEEO launched 
an investigation. John Feild flew to Lockheed headquarters in 
California to meet with company president Courtlandt Gross to try 
to obtain a compliance agreement. At the same time, the national 
IAM forced the two Marietta locals to integrate. Defense Secretary 
Robert McNamara backed Feild and the PCEEO.15 Lockheed quickly 
removed “White” and “Colored” signs from rest rooms, drinking 
fountains, and cafeterias. On May 25, 1961, Gross and Vice President 
Johnson met ceremonially and formally agreed to what they called 
a “Plan for Progress” to eliminate discrimination in hiring and pro-
motions. President Kennedy joined the ceremony. The plan was not a 
contract but a voluntary statement of Lockheed’s intentions. Kennedy 
hailed it as a milestone in civil rights, asserting that it set a pattern 
for voluntary action in achieving equal employment opportunity.16
Kennedy proved to be prophetic. The seed sown by the Lockheed 
agreement landed on fertile ground. The May 1961 White House 
meetings with business and labor leaders helped make the climate 
more favorable to voluntary cooperation with the government. At the 
same time, committee members realized the potential of voluntary 
compliance efforts, like the Lockheed program, to allow the use of 
scarce PCEEO resources in other areas and free agencies to concen-
trate on compliance under the order.17
The PCEEO immediately institutionalized Plans for Progress 
(PFP) and soon won the participation of the bulk of the defense con-
tracting sector. PFP was the most innovative effort of the PCEEO 
and became one of its principal means of implementing affirmative 
action, as it was understood in this period. PFP agreements were tai-
lored to each specific firm, but all included the following elements: 
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a statement of the firm’s policy in support of equal employment 
opportunity; a list of specific steps the firm planned to take to imple-
ment it; and specific types of assistance the PCEEO would provide.
PFP was never meant to be a compliance program. While it 
encouraged voluntary measures to eliminate segregation and dis-
crimination, it did not attempt to identify specific discriminatory 
actions or measure progress by the degree that they were eliminated. 
Rather, progress was measured in terms of employment results. 
The question to be answered was: To what extent did the employer 
increase the numbers of minorities it employed and raise the income 
and skill levels of those already employed? While no racial goals or 
quotas were adopted, employers were expected to exercise affirma-
tive action and go out of their way to recruit and promote blacks 
and other minorities (see related discussion of apprenticeship rule 
in chapter 9).18
The real sparkplug of PFP was prominent white Atlanta attor-
ney Robert Troutman, who had been appointed to the PCEEO to 
add regional balance. Troutman was an ambitious entrepreneur, a 
southern racial progressive, and something of a self-promoter who 
cultivated ties with JFK. He saw the nascent program up close and 
immediately became its most enthusiastic supporter. He may have 
seen PFP as a way to gain prominence in the administration while 
doing good for the nation. He persuaded the PCEEO to set up a spe-
cial committee to administer PFP and got himself appointed chair.19 
To help the program get started, he set up its offices next to his law 
firm in Atlanta and paid the startup expenses himself.20
With Troutman at the helm, PFP grew almost explosively. On 
July 12, 1961, the CEOs of eight major contractors signed PFP agree-
ments at the White House, with Kennedy presiding. In the fall of 
1961, Holleman, Feild, and Troutman met with representatives of 
dozens of major contractors to enlist their participation in PFP. On 
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November 30 twelve more CEOs signed on in a White House cer-
emony. This addition brought the total to twenty-one.21
Troutman soon began to seek the participation of companies that 
did not hold federal contracts and to enlist the voluntary participa-
tion of business leaders who were legally beyond the reach of E.O. 
10925. On January 17, 1962, the PCEEO and a group of existing PFP 
participants held a seminar for officials from 150 large corporations 
from the nondefense sector to share ideas on equal employment 
opportunity and to talk about PFP.22
The roll of participants continued to grow. Before the summer 
of 1962, fifty-two agreements had been signed.23 On June 22, 1962, 
the program reached its apogee. In a White House ceremony, the 
CEOs of thirty-three major corporations signed up, bringing the 
total to eighty-five. The June enrollment culminated the effort to 
expand beyond the defense industry. A large number of these firms 
were purely civilian and doing private sector work, such as com-
munications, metal production, chemicals, and manufacturing. At 
the signing ceremony, President Kennedy reminded the assembled 
CEOs that just signing up was not the end, but the beginning of the 
process. “There is no use in . . . putting out an order,” he told them, 
“and assuming that that is enough. There is no use in all of you doing 
it voluntarily, even though that is important symbolically, then let-
ting it go at that.”24
One of the PCEEO’s major goals was to seek the cooperation 
of labor unions and other employee organizations in opening up 
opportunities for blacks and other disadvantaged groups. Union 
segregation and discrimination had helped perpetuate a situation 
whereby in the South, for example, 45 percent of nonwhite males 
were in laboring jobs, as opposed to only 13 percent of white males. 
Most national labor leaders actually did support E.O. 10925. George 
Meany wrote to Johnson and Goldberg the day after the issuance 
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of the order, endorsing it as a way to “make good on the promise of 
equal opportunity for all Americans enshrined in our Constitution.” 
Meany expressed particular pleasure with the enforcement sanctions 
and penalties provided by the order, and he promised full coopera-
tion. He enclosed a statement on civil rights which the AFL-CIO 
had recently adopted. It termed the denial of equal rights “one of 
the nation’s most grievous problems and certainly its No. 1 moral 
problem.” The statement spelled out steps for organized labor to take 
in eliminating discrimination. It stressed that labor could make a 
major contribution by eliminating segregated locals and all other 
discrimination within its ranks, provided it received cooperation in 
turn from the federal government and also from employers.25
Among the national unions most supportive of the PCEEO 
was the United Steelworkers of America (USWA). Francis Shane, a 
member of its Committee on Civil Rights, reported to Goldberg in 
August 1961 that USWA president David J. McDonald had sent a 
directive on equal rights to all national and local officers. McDonald 
urged them to fully implement the union’s statement of principles 
and observe the requirements of the order. He attached copies of 
both documents to the directive and required that they be posted 
publicly and read aloud to members and employees of the union. He 
also directed officers to investigate discrimination complaints and 
settle them at the local level, while providing copies of the case files 
to the national USWA office.26
In order to promote cooperation from organized labor, the 
PCEEO established a Trade Union Liaison Section in August 1961. 
This body worked both with local unions in connection with indi-
vidual complaints and with national unions on elimination of dis-
crimination within their ranks. It turned out that a large portion of 
the formal complaints under E.O. 10925 involved local or interna-
tional unions, rather than employers. The PCEEO reported in 1962 
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that in every such instance the union in question cooperated fully in 
seeking a resolution.27
The PCEEO worked jointly with the Labor Department and 
national unions to open up equal opportunity in apprenticeship pro-
grams (see chapter 9 for more on apprenticeship). The Bricklayers 
Union joined with the Mason Contractors and the Associated 
General Contractors to voluntarily include an equal opportu-
nity clause in both national and local apprenticeship standards. 
The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers worked with 
the National Electrical Contractors Association to include similar 
clauses in their apprenticeship standards.28
The PCEEO developed an Educational and Community Relations 
(ECR) program to mobilize community organizations and leaders 
and supplement formal compliance efforts. As part of the ECR, the 
PCEEO met and worked with a wide range of groups, including civil 
rights organizations, civic organizations, trade associations, and reli-
gious and educational groups. It sought both to educate organizations 
and community leaders on the PCEEO mission and to help them, in 
turn, provide information on the program to their membership. As of 
May 1962 representatives of the PCEEO had made over 180 appear-
ances before community groups.29
The PCEEO held several special conferences with social ser-
vice organizations in 1962. Among the major events it convened 
was the Community Leaders Conference on Equal Employment 
Opportunity held in Washington, DC, with over six hundred rep-
resentatives of government bodies, social service agencies, and civil 
rights groups. The PCEEO also met with members of the Conference 
of Commissions Against Discrimination (CCAD), an organiza-
tion of state and local commissions enforcing antidiscrimination 
laws, to promote better cooperation between the federal and local 
EEO efforts. The CCAD reported that the PCEEO’s program had 
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produced “increased acceptance by employers and employees of the 
equal employment opportunity concept.”30
The ECR program included several initiatives devoted to educat-
ing and training minority youths. The PCEEO’s major effort in this 
area was a pilot project in Southern California designed to provide 
skilled workers to meet local defense industry needs. The project 
included training for anyone who had difficulty finding employment 
and was not specifically targeted toward blacks. It was conducted 
under a grant through the Manpower Development and Training Act 
of 1962 and administered by the Department of Labor. PCEEO staff 
studied the local employment and training situation and mobilized 
private organizations and government agencies. The bodies involved 
included public school systems, the Los Angeles Urban League, the 
Council of Mexican-American Affairs, religious groups, and twelve 
aircraft manufacturers in the area (all of them PFP participants).31
The PCEEO’s tools for implementing E.O. 10925 within the 
federal government were analogous to those available in the con-
tracting sector. Complaints were a major mechanism for initiating 
compliance review. The PCEEO rules defined the complaint system, 
streamlined processing, and gave the PCEEO the power to review 
and, if necessary, reverse complaints received by the agencies.32
To inform federal employees about the order and their rights 
under it, in July 1961 the PCEEO distributed a poster to be promi-
nently displayed in all agencies. Titled “Your Right to Employment 
Opportunity,” it focused on the right of employees or applicants to 
file complaints. The poster promised fair investigation and remedia-
tion and provided assurance that “there shall be no fear of reprisal 
on the part of the complainant.”33
Months before the poster was distributed, discrimination com-
plaints from federal employees and job applicants started pouring 
in. The Post Office Department and the military services generated 
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the greatest number. By June 30, 1962, the PCEEO and the agencies 
had received 1,413 complaints. Investigations were completed in 908 
of the cases and actions taken on 665 of those. Corrective actions 
followed in 231 cases, or 35 percent of the 665 cases. This statistic 
compared with only a 16 percent corrective rate under the PCGEP.34
By June 1962 the PCEEO had developed what Feild described as 
“a comprehensive affirmative action program” for federal employees. 
It included a series of conferences and training programs, meetings 
with a new subcabinet working group on civil rights, and regional 
meetings at which the PCEEO introduced its program to 1,300 fed-
eral staff at facilities employing half a million federal workers. In 
cooperation with the CSC, the PCEEO developed a series of training 
programs for those federal employees who were assigned to work full 
time on equal employment programs.35
Like government contractors, federal agencies were required to 
survey the racial make-up and structure of their workforces. No 
broad federal survey of this nature had ever been conducted before. 
The first survey provided a benchmark for future progress as mea-
sured by subsequent annual surveys. The PCEEO oversaw comple-
tion of the survey, which was largely accomplished by June 1961, 
and it identified areas where equal opportunity was problematic. 
The survey showed that 12.6 percent of all federal employees were 
African Americans—a very good participation rate. However, these 
workers were overwhelmingly concentrated in the lower-paying job 
series. There were only two blacks in the highest civil service grades 
of GS-17 and GS-18.36
In response to the survey, the CSC and several agencies immedi-
ately launched recruitment programs to hire minority workers at the 
skilled and professional levels, as the Labor Department had begun 
doing earlier. At Johnson’s instigation, the PCEEO instructed agen-
cies to determine whether any of their minority employees had been 
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denied advancement because of race or other personal characteris-
tics. The agencies were then to remedy the situation whenever pos-
sible. Due to such efforts, during fiscal year 1962 blacks constituted 
18 percent of new federal hires, a proportion significantly above the 
10 percent proportion of blacks in the general population. However, 
most were still hired in subprofessional positions. The low overall 
proportion of black federal employees improved only slightly in 
1961.37
On April 3, 1962, Johnson—accompanied by Goldberg and 
Holleman—formally presented to President Kennedy the PCEEO’s 
report on “The First Nine Months,” covering the period through 
January 1962. Later that day, Johnson and Goldberg held a joint 
press conference to discuss the report and highlight the committee’s 
progress. In a press release, Johnson asserted that the PCEEO had 
made substantial progress in equal employment opportunity and 
had laid the groundwork for future advances. He cited that it had 
received almost as many discrimination complaints in its first year 
as the two Eisenhower committees had received together in six years. 
Goldberg argued that the PCEEO had “cut a big hole” in the problem 
and described the first year as one of “tooling up.” The PCEEO, he 
asserted, “has scored . . . tremendous victories against bigotry and 
discrimination.”38
Criticism and Response
Despite the rosy image of progress that Johnson and Goldberg por-
trayed, the PCEEO was drawing a lot of criticism. Unlike the case 
with the FEPC, a program hated by race conservatives, the PCEEO’s 
toughest critics were its friends in the black community. They were 
disappointed that the PCEEO had not made more progress. C. Sum-
ner Stone, editor of the Washington Afro-American, wrote a polite 
but highly critical letter to Johnson. “Plans for Progress” received the 
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brunt of Stone’s criticism, but other aspects of the PCEEO were not 
unscathed. In his March 9, 1962, letter he wrote:
Because of this newspaper’s deep affection and respect for 
you, we are taking the liberty of raising a problem which 
has been disturbing America’s black community . . . These 
are some of the shortcomings of the Committee as we view 
it:
No effective steps have yet been devised or even contem-
plated which would seek to have labor put its racial house 
in order. The Plans for Progress effort has been more of a 
publicity sham than an accomplishment deserving of fur-
ther continuation. Under Robert Troutman, the emphasis 
has been on voluntary compliance with a total absence of 
compulsion. Voluntary efforts should be explored, but not 
to the exclusion of the enforcement’s salutary effect. . . . 
Affirmative action is needed, not paper-made programs 
tailored to the whims of one man. The hard core of racial 
segregation and ongoing discrimination in the Federal 
government has not been attacked. We fail to understand 
how the President’s Committee can expect private indus-
try to move faster than the Federal government in wip-
ing out racial discrimination against employees. There 
has been a criminal lack of executive leadership in the 
President’s Committee. To put it more bluntly, there is 
no leadership. There is no direction. There is no imagi-
native approaches [sic] in attempting to solve the prob-
lems. In short, the . . . executive leadership has a lousy 
corporate image. In the black community, it doesn’t even 
exist. . . . It infuriates us that competent and outstanding 
personnel on the Committee become bogged down in the 
administrative mediocrity and colorless inefficiency of 
the Committee’s major executive [i.e., Jerry Holleman]. 
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To restore public confidence in the Committee, we sub-
mit that changes in its executive personnel are necessary 
. . . While the President’s appointments and your own 
personal actions and convictions have decidedly altered 
the pace at which this country was proceeding . . . we 
still have not kept pace, we believe, with the tempo and 
the demands of the ‘New Frontier’. . . . I do hope you will 
not regard me as importunate in writing to you, but it is 
only this newspaper’s genuine respect and my personal 
affection for you which has permitted this temarious 
gesture.39
About a month later, Herbert Hill of the NAACP sent Goldberg 
an even harsher evaluation. Hill conceded that E.O. 10925 was “a 
vast improvement in policy,” but he argued that:
Policy is not practice. How seriously the provisions of the 
Executive Order will be applied is not yet apparent. What 
is apparent is the presence of dangerously nullifying ten-
dencies in the Administration’s performance to date. . . . 
These tendencies relate to one question: whether fear of 
conservative Southern forces in Congress will be allowed 
to strangle the antidiscrimination employment program 
in its infancy.
Hill gave the PCEEO credit for important accomplishments—
using limited resources—in processing complaints, establishing a 
reporting system, and reducing discrimination in federal employ-
ment. In his opinion, “The present Administration has made much 
of the broad mandate and strengthened powers of its committee. Yet 
it has provided not a single additional man nor a single additional 
dollar with which to do the job.”
Hill saved his strongest words for Robert Troutman and the Plans 
for Progress program that Troutman headed. Hill charged that PFP 
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“yield[s] high returns in press notices and only superficial and token 
results in new job opportunities. . . . Instead, [PFP] divert[s] atten-
tion and energy from the systematic, across-the-board job which it 
is Government’s responsibility to carry out.” He charged that par-
ticipants treat PFP like a grant of immunity from compliance. Hill 
argued that Kennedy and the administration “must decide, quite 
simply, whether the Executive Order on equal employment means 
what it says. And if it does, they must decide to stand up firmly 
against . . . those who are opposed to fair employment practices.” 
Roy Wilkins felt Hill went too far, but Martin Luther King Jr. sup-
ported Hill.40
Hill and Stone had allies within the PCEEO who were also criti-
cal of PFP and Robert Troutman. Compliance-oriented equal rights 
professionals like John Feild felt that Troutman overemphasized 
voluntarism and did not recognize the importance of enforcement. 
Johnson had been following the internal debates and external cri-
tique. After a December 1961 meeting of the PCEEO, Johnson 
appointed a special subcommittee consisting of himself, Goldberg, 
and Robert Kennedy to monitor PFP. In February 1962 the PCEEO 
leadership met with Wilkins and Hill to hear their views on PFP 
firsthand. Johnson’s group also hoped to win their backing for 
the PCEEO’s other programs. Wilkins professed support, but Hill 
refused to ease up on his opposition.
Johnson responded in April by commissioning an independent 
study of the PCEEO as a whole, including recommendations for 
change. To head the effort, he selected Theodore Kheel, a prominent 
labor mediator and one of the advisers in the drafting of E.O. 10925. 
The report was due July 1, 1962.41
By June the controversy had received prominent attention in the 
press. In an attempt to defuse the publicity until Kheel’s report was 
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ready, Johnson wrote a letter to the New York Times that it published 
on June 20, 1962.42 In the letter, he emphasized without specifically 
mentioning PFP, that compliance and voluntarism were comple-
mentary (not competing) aspects of the PCEEO. Downplaying the 
disagreements, he argued that “controversy, like beauty, is in the eye 
of the beholder.” He claimed that the voluntary program enabled the 
PCEEO to economically expand the scope of its actions. He stressed 
that voluntary compliance did not in any way relieve employers of 
the duty to comply with E.O. 10925.
Robert Troutman now recognized that he had become a serious 
public relations liability for the PCEEO and that significant restric-
tions on PFP were likely to come. Accordingly, he announced his res-
ignation from the PCEEO on June 30, 1962, just before what became 
known as the Kheel Report was due out. Troutman’s resignation was 
effective at the end of August. His announcement, however, was pre-
ceded on May 11 by Jerry Holleman’s abrupt resignation from his 
positions at both the PCEEO and the Labor Department. Holleman 
had come under fire from civil rights leaders, but he was actually 
forced to leave the government because of his involvement in a 
Washington corruption scandal involving Billie Sol Estes, a Texas 
businessman and Johnson associate.43
Ironically, on the day of his resignation, Holleman initiated a 
first step toward reform of PFP. In a new guidance memo to all fed-
eral agency heads dated May 11, 1962, he stressed that PFP was try-
ing only to supplement, not supplant, compliance with E.O. 10925. 
PFP was designed, he wrote, “primarily for those companies that 
wish to develop a program which will be perhaps even more posi-
tive than that required by the Order.”44 Holleman’s memo continued 
the policy of exempting contractors from filing compliance reports 
with the PCEEO. However, they were now to file a compliance report 
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with their contracting agency. The memo also required all agencies 
to directly monitor their contractors who participated in PFP. This 
memo, plus the resignations of Troutman and Holleman, helped set 
the stage for the Kheel Report and for reforms, not only in PFP, but 
in the PCEEO itself.
I n July 1962 Ted Kheel submitted his special report on the PCEEO. In preparing the report, Kheel had consulted not only with the 
committee but also with representatives from labor, industry, and the 
civil rights movement. After initially examining the performance of 
the PCEEO as a whole, he decided to limit the scope of his investi-
gation and report to federal contractors only. In his judgment, the 
government was making progress in the arena of federal employ-
ment, and he saw no major problems that required attention. While 
he devoted a substantial portion of the report to the historical back-
ground of the PCEEO, his main purpose was to identify problems 
and recommend improvements in the area of federal contract work.1
First of all, Kheel praised the mission of the PCEEO, asserting 
that “the potential of significant accomplishment is almost without 
limits.” He believed that E.O. 10925 depended primarily on voluntary 
compliance to achieve that potential. He credited employers with 
providing significant cooperation so far, but a higher level of com-
mitment was necessary. In order to provide an incentive for coop-
eration, he argued, the PCEEO needed to make it clear to employers 
that it was fully prepared to use the sanctions of E.O. 10925. This is 
exactly what critics within and outside of the committee had been 
calling for. Accordingly he urged the PCEEO to use “all procedures 
and approaches available to it.”
CHAPTER 8
The Kheel Report and Beyond
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Turning his attention to Plans for Progress (PFP), the preeminent 
voluntaristic effort under E.O. 10925, Kheel was sympathetic to the 
embattled program. “Under the imaginative and energetic leadership 
of Robert Troutman,” he wrote, “this type of activity has been placed 
on a more systematic basis.” Kheel approved of the policy requiring 
all PFP participants to also comply fully with E.O. 10925. He praised 
Troutman for extending the program to employers who did not hold 
government contracts and so were under no legal obligation to com-
ply with the order. Kheel went so far as to argue that the PFP “has 
proved in some ways to be [the PCEEO’s] most notable” program.
However, improvements were badly needed, both to make the PFP 
more effective, and also to assure that it would be more acceptable 
to the civil rights community. To those ends, Troutman himself had 
recommended that the program be separated from the PCEEO and 
operated as an independent, private effort. Kheel, however, rejected 
that approach: “All of the branches of the Committee must be unified 
so that the limited resources of the Committee can best be utilized.” 
He found that the performance of PFP participants often varied 
greatly from one division of a firm to another. This inconsistency 
was partially the result of a lack of adequate follow-through by PFP 
staff with new participants. Another problem was that the PCEEO 
failed to provide promised assistance, such as helping to locate quali-
fied minority job applicants or working with the contracting agency 
to help a firm carry out its plan. He warned that unless companies 
received periodic follow-up visits from the PCEEO, “the initial impe-
tus supplied by the Plan is bound to diminish and then disappear.”
Looking at the PCEEO as a whole, Kheel had a number of 
thoughts and suggestions. Somewhat surprisingly, he did not call for 
any increase in funding over the existing level. Accepting budget-
ary realities, he recommended that the PCEEO maximize its avail-
able resources by concentrating on the elimination of patterns of 
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discrimination that affected large numbers of employees, rather than 
resolving each individual complaint as it came along. He pointed to 
the fact that PCEEO staff were dispersed around several locations in 
Washington and suggested that PCEEO members meet more often. 
To compensate for the lack of paid staff, he suggested that appointed 
members take on more speaking engagements for the PCEEO and 
assist the staff more actively. Another shortcoming he found was the 
PCEEO’s lack of a strong public relations program. He suggested that 
it implement the hitherto neglected “certificates of merit” program, 
broadcast the names of major civil rights offenders, and hold well-
publicized public hearings.
Kheel disapproved of the fact that the executive vice chairman, 
the position with specific responsibility for overall administration 
of the PCEEO, was not a full-time position and lacked the authority 
to do the job effectively. The first incumbent, Jerry Holleman, had 
retained his demanding position as an assistant secretary of labor. 
Kheel called for the position to be reclassified as full time, and he 
also suggested that it include direct supervision of the PFP.
Shortly after Kheel submitted his report, Robert Troutman 
(before leaving his post) provided a report of his own on the goals 
and accomplishments of PFP to President Kennedy and Vice 
President Johnson.2 Troutman’s initial goal, he wrote, was to invite 
150 major contract employers to participate in the voluntary pro-
gram and then obtain PFP agreements from 100 of them. Though 
150 employers were invited, only 85 had actually signed on to the 
program. Troutman argued that, since another 25 were working on 
plans and were expected to sign them shortly, the goal of 100 was 
met and exceeded. He believed that the number of enrollees would 
have been higher, but several firms expressed reluctance to become 
involved because of criticisms of the program and worries that par-
ticipation would offend the black community.
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Troutman documented, as best he could, the costs and benefits of 
the program. He measured hiring using statistics from 38 PFP par-
ticipants. First he calculated the estimated number of African Amer-
icans that they would have hired, which came to 1,200 positions. He 
then looked at actual hires and found that 4,900 African Americans 
had been hired, more than four times the expected number. Accord-
ing to Troutman, the salaries of the additional 3,700 African Ameri-
can hires amounted to $20 million.
On the cost side, Troutman kept complete records of the federal 
budget for the program. The total expenditures were $75,000, of 
which he had personally advanced $50,000 from his own funds. The 
$20 million additional income blacks earned in the 38 firms looked 
very impressive against a public expenditure of only $25,000, a total 
that covered the entire PFP. However, much of the cost of hiring out-
reach was borne by the employers, who, Troutman pointedly noted, 
had received little assistance from the black community in locating 
qualified black applicants. The cost was undoubtedly significant, but 
it was impossible to calculate.
Troutman was convinced that full employment was the key to 
the problems of the black population and that PFP was a valid way to 
accomplish this goal. He won a measure of vindication in his waning 
days with the PCEEO: in a meeting, Roger Wilkins indicated that he 
was impressed with gains in black employment among plan partici-
pants.3 Concluding his report, Troutman mused:
The situation of our black population, once the life and 
concern of but one section, now involves the nation. The 
difficulties are far beyond the knowledge or understand-
ing of almost everyone. Varied and deeply rooted, these 
problems have no single, simple or quick answer . . .  
[T]here must be unity of . . . those who seek solutions. 
Neither lasting answers nor lasting progress can come 
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from divided thought. The problem is now one; the 
nation’s desire in meeting it should also be.4
Troutman’s report and resignation, combined with the Kheel 
Report, defused much of the critical pressure on both the PCEEO 
and PFP. It also provided useful evaluations and benchmarks of 
accomplishments and helped move the PCEEO in a less controver-
sial direction. The Kheel Report had received so much publicity that 
Prentice-Hall published the full text.5
Vice President Johnson immediately implemented Kheel’s rec-
ommendation to make the executive vice chairman job a full-time 
position. In September 1962 he promoted Hobart Taylor Jr. to the 
post. Congressman Adam Clayton Powell (Democrat–New York) 
and Roy Wilkins endorsed the move. The position of director of PFP 
was downgraded, reflecting both a subordination of the program to 
the PCEEO’s control and a stronger emphasis on enforcement. PFP, 
however, still retained strong support from President Kennedy, who 
termed its results impressive and dismissed much of the criticism. He 
expressed concern that participating companies might drop out and 
embarrass the administration if the program was deemphasized or 
weakened.6
Kennedy’s support, the Kheel Report, and the departure of 
Robert Troutman could not, however, inoculate PFP or the PCEEO 
from further criticism. Troutman’s final report provoked a sting-
ing “Special report” from the Southern Regional Council (SRC), a 
civil rights organization of black and progressive white Southerners. 
It was released very shortly after nineteen more firms signed PFP 
agreements in the White House on January 17, 1963.7 Dubious of 
PFP’s voluntaristic approach and Troutman’s claims of significant 
employment gains for blacks, the SRC prepared its own evaluation.
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Noting that Troutman’s numbers were aggregated with no regional 
breakdowns, the SRC focused on the extent of job gains in the South, 
where discrimination was still generally legal. The SRC researchers 
undertook a survey of PFP participants in the Atlanta area, focusing on 
twenty-four firms with a total of twenty-six thousand employees. The 
SRC’s findings were based mainly on interviews with executives from 
the twenty-four companies. Three firms—Lockheed, General Motors, 
and Ford—together employed twenty-three thousand workers, many 
of them in manufacturing. The remaining three thousand workers 
were mostly employed by service, sales, and distribution companies.
The SRC study found that the hiring results were “unimpressive.” 
It charged that, “except for a handful of the companies, the Plans 
for Progress were, for the regional office in Atlanta, largely mean-
ingless.” Of the twenty-four firms, only seven “produced evidence of 
affirmative compliance with their pledges,” and only three of these 
showed “a vigorous desire to create job opportunities.” The attitude 
of the other seventeen firms toward their own PFP programs ranged 
“from ignorance to indifference.” One of the key SRC findings was 
that blacks were generally not considered suitable for customer-
contact jobs such as sales and service, largely because the compa-
nies feared that white customers would not accept them. Some firms 
hired blacks as token affirmative action gestures and placed them in 
janitorial jobs.
The SRC report drew considerable news media attention. An arti-
cle in Newsweek titled “Progress or Publicity?” included numerous 
quotations casting a poor light on the PCEEO and on PFP efforts in 
the Atlanta area.8 Both the report and the article caused great con-
cern in the White House. Kennedy ordered reports from the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Defense Department, 
and the General Services Administration on their experience with 
companies surveyed in the SRC report.9
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Kennedy also asked the PCEEO to analyze the SRC report.10 
Hobart Taylor put John Feild in charge of the effort and sent PCEEO 
staff to Atlanta to gather data. Taylor believed firmly that the PCEEO 
had, if anything, enforced the order more stringently with PFP par-
ticipants than with nonparticipating contractors. However, when 
the investigation was completed, Feild reported that it “confirms 
the findings” of the SRC. The investigators found that the PCEEO 
had received complaints against nineteen of the twenty-four firms 
studied by the SRC, although only three complaints involved opera-
tions in that region. Furthermore, one-third of all the complaints the 
PCEEO received involved PFP firms.
Feild made several recommendations to deal with the problems 
highlighted in the SRC report. First, he urged that PFP discon-
tinue use of its own reporting form and suggested that participants 
instead use the standard form completed by all other federal con-
tractors. Second, he urged discontinuation of further efforts to sign 
up new companies with PFP until the performance of all current 
participants had been adequately evaluated. Third, he called for the 
abolition of the separate PFP staff in Atlanta (set up and funded per-
sonally by Troutman) and the consolidation of all PFP operations in 
Washington. Feild wrote: “I am confident that if these recommenda-
tions are followed, the Plans for Progress program can make a sig-
nificant contribution.”
After seeing Feild’s report, Johnson convened a “Vice President’s 
Study Group” consisting of the leadership of the PCEEO and other 
top federal officials concerned with civil rights. The group endorsed 
Feild’s approach and directed that “the Plans for Progress program 
should be brought along rather slowly, and that our recent gains 
[should] be consolidated before new companies are taken in . . . It 
was also decided to take in any companies with whom we are cur-
rently carrying on negotiations.”11 After the ceremonial induction of 
TO ADVANCE THEIR OPPORTUNITIES
206
nineteen more firms into PFP at the White House in January 1963, 
over the next six months only three more entities signed agree-
ments: American Motors, Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., and Wayne 
State University (the first university to participate). Furthermore, 
there were no more signing ceremonies in the White House until 
after President Kennedy’s death in November 1963. Despite efforts to 
assuage PFP's critics, the administration had temporarily withdrawn 
one of its most publicized civil rights programs from view.12
To develop further ideas for reform, Taylor set up a special advisory 
committee of industrialists headed by G. William Miller, president 
of Textron Corp. The Miller committee proposed the establishment 
of a permanent Advisory Council on Plans for Progress, suggested a 
list of members, and developed a set of goals for the new body. The 
PCEEO endorsed the idea and established the Advisory Council in 
August, appointing nineteen prominent industrialists, with Miller 
serving as chair. The president, the secretary of labor, and the execu-
tive director of the PCEEO served ex officio.13
The Advisory Council promoted and oversaw the expansion of 
the redirected PFP, gave it greater credibility with critics, and re-
stored a measure of public support. Membership in PFP doubled by 
May 1964, from about one hundred to over two hundred companies 
employing seven million workers. The council held several meetings 
with PFP companies and President Johnson at the White House. For-
mal induction ceremonies for new PFP signers were resumed. At a 
January 16, 1964, White House meeting, President Johnson claimed 
strong job gains by PFP companies. As a contrast to the fact that 14.7 
percent of new hires at participating firms were nonwhites, he bor-
rowed a page from Troutman and compared that percentage to an 
“expectable” rate of only 5 percent in nonwhite hires.14
At a meeting of the PCEEO in May 1964, Secretary of Labor 
Wirtz praised the Advisory Council and PFP, asserting that there 
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was “more being done on this front than almost any other.” In later 
years, Wirtz emphasized the more intangible results of PFP. He re-
marked in an oral history interview that “I think there was an at-
titudinal change during that period which probably had a signifi-
cant effect” and helped lay the foundations for the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964.15 PFP had redeemed itself in Wirtz’s eyes. In 1977 historian 
Carl Brauer concluded that:
The Plans for Progress were worthwhile. They did . . . 
establish a valuable yardstick. They resulted in greater 
numbers of blacks being hired. In addition, unnoted 
in 1962, they also softened the attitude of big business 
toward giving the federal government a statutory role in 
the area of hiring. In 1964 large government contractors 
readily acceded to equal employment legislation, but if 
they had not had the Plans experience, they might well 
have constituted a powerful opposition to this concept.16
A Union Counterpart
Paralleling the business sector’s Plans for Progress, but developing 
more slowly, was the PCEEO’s “Union Program for Fair Practices” 
(UPFP). It had its roots in E.O. 10925's inclusion of unions and in 
President Kennedy’s May 1961 meeting with union leaders at the 
White House, held the day after his meeting with business leaders. 
Over the summer and fall of 1961, a group of union leaders and the 
PCEEO took preliminary steps toward a program of voluntary com-
pliance plans for organized labor that would specify what organized 
labor should do to ensure equal opportunity in all union activities 
and how the PCEEO and government agencies could assist.17
Unfortunately, the AFL-CIO was still very divided on racial mat-
ters. In general, the unions from the former CIO supported equal 
opportunity and inclusion of blacks as members. Many unions 
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from the old AFL maintained racial restrictions on membership 
and employment. Because of this division, the PCEEO was forced 
to delay implementation of the UPFP until it could win broader sup-
port from organized labor.
This change took time. At the PCEEO’s February 15, 1962, meet-
ing, Jerry Holleman (at that time still serving as executive vice chair) 
noted that it was still too soon to launch the program. Acknowledging 
the readiness of individual unions to adopt voluntary plans, he 
emphasized that “it was important that this be attacked on a broad 
basis . . . and that it not be a single shot approach.”18
Several unions had already jumped the gun and started their own 
plans. The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers and the 
United Steel Workers of America instituted fair employment plans; 
and the United Auto Workers, the International Union of Electrical 
Workers, and the United Shipbuilding Workers of America had plans 
in the works. The Civil Rights Department of the AFL-CIO, in coop-
eration with the PCEEO, assisted individual unions in this effort.
The PCEEO finally won the support of a critical mass of unions, 
and the UPFP kicked off at a White House ceremony on November 
15, 1962. The leadership of the AFL-CIO—115 affiliated national and 
international unions and 340 affiliated local unions, representing 11 
million union members—signed statements promising to cooper-
ate with the PCEEO in implementing E.O. 10925. The agreements 
provided that the unions would apply equal treatment policies in all 
employment, not just government contract work; accept into mem-
bership and treat equally all applicants without regard to race; work 
to eliminate segregation in local unions; and attempt to include equal 
treatment clauses in collective bargaining agreements. The PCEEO 
promised to assist unions in living up to their agreements.19
The labor movement participated extensively at all levels in the 
UPFP. George Meany appointed a committee to work with the 
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various departments of the AFL-CIO and the local labor councils to 
develop antidiscrimination strategies. He established biracial com-
mittees in more than eight hundred Central Labor Councils. Further, 
he initiated regular consultations by the Civil Rights Department 
with the PCEEO and the international unions to identify problems 
that needed special attention. The Civil Rights Department also 
regularly informed the PCEEO about voluntary actions unions were 
taking and, on the PCEEO’s behalf, investigated complaints filed by 
affiliated unions. By March 1963 eighty participating unions had 
appointed a full-time representative responsible for implementing 
their UPFP. The PCEEO and the AFL-CIO provided support and 
guidance for these representatives.20
A number of unions and councils in all parts of the country, rep-
resenting a wide range of industries, continued to voluntarily pro-
mote equal opportunity. The USWA eliminated discrimination in 
Birmingham, Alabama, steel mills, and the UAW corrected inequities 
in an auto plant in the South where complaints had been lodged with 
the PCEEO. On the West Coast, the Marine and Shipbuilding Workers 
worked with the PCEEO to eliminate segregation in its locals.21
While not as troubled and controversial as PFP, the UPFP was 
not without its problems. In 1963 the PCEEO sent questionnaires 
to all international unions and their locals to complete voluntarily; 
the questionnaires surveyed the racial makeup of their membership 
and any progress made under the UPFP. While many unions read-
ily complied, others objected to questions on racial composition as 
intrusive, or found it onerous to compile data because of their own 
incomplete records. David Dubinsky, president of the International 
Ladies’ Garment Workers Union and a pioneer in civil rights, told 
the PCEEO privately that he did not plan to distribute the question-
naires in his union due to objections from the locals. By November 
1963 only one-third of all union locals participating in UPFP had 
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completed and submitted the questionnaires, which had been due at 
the PCEEO by August 31.22
Although the PCEEO sought in principle to include as many 
unions as possible in UPFP, one union was not welcome: the unaf-
filiated International Brotherhood of Teamsters. Both the union and 
its president, James R. Hoffa, were under investigation by Attorney 
General Robert Kennedy and the Justice Department for alleged cor-
ruption. In a series of letters to the PCEEO, Johnson, and Kennedy 
in 1963, Hoffa repeatedly offered to cooperate with the PCEEO and 
asked to join the UPFP. However, he received only neutral responses, 
and the teamsters remained excluded.23
Despite these glitches, the UPFP mobilized much of organized 
labor to treat black members equally and improve their job opportu-
nities. It played a key role in launching unions in the papermaking 
industry, a southern-based sector that employed large numbers of 
blacks, on a course to eliminate segregated locals.24 By March 1963 
seven more international unions had joined the UPFP, bringing the 
total to 122. Later that year Kennedy set a broader challenge to labor 
unions. In a meeting on civil rights with a large group of labor lead-
ers on June 13, 1963, and in the aftermath of antiblack violence in 
Birmingham, Kennedy called on these leaders to work more actively 
on the economic front to help reduce the disproportionately high 
unemployment rates blacks faced.25
The UPFP survived and continued to develop after Kennedy’s 
assassination in November 1963. President Johnson established a 
Labor Advisory Council (LAC) to the PCEEO, composed of sixteen 
AFL-CIO union presidents. He introduced the LAC to the public at a 
White House ceremony on March 16, 1964. Its purpose was both to 
assist union participation in the UPFP and also to facilitate commu-
nication between the leadership of organized labor and the PCEEO. 
Wirtz believed that direct access to top union officials would be a big 
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help.26 Echoing Kennedy’s exhortation to labor leaders from the pre-
vious June, President Johnson told the sixteen union presidents, “We 
will never have the kind of fair employment we are talking about 
until we have full employment. Our goal is not to reach equality in 
jobs by spreading unemployment, or to replace men who are now 
working with those who are unemployed.”27
Other PCEEO Activities
As it continued its mission before being overshadowed by the Civil 
Rights Act in July 1964, the PCEEO, in the words of historian Hugh 
Graham, “moved with an authority and effectiveness that consid-
erably exceeded the record of all its predecessors.”28 By April 1964 
some 2,444 complaints had been filed against government contrac-
tors. Of the 1,676 that were adjudicated, the employers had taken 
corrective action in 65.5 percent of the cases. The number of com-
plaints filed per month had declined by 1964, and in Hobart Taylor’s 
view, this decline was a positive development. He believed it was a 
result of  increased voluntary compliance, which often averted the 
need to file a complaint.29
After 1962, as indicated earlier, the PCEEO used the complaint 
resolution process to seek broader remedies where patterns of dis-
crimination were revealed. The results were summarized in a special 
study that PCEEO staff conducted of complaints against contractors 
in seven industry groups: petro-chemicals, textiles, steel, tobacco, 
aircraft, shipbuilding, and food processing. About two-thirds of all 
complaints filed under E.O. 10925 in these industries involved pro-
motions and transfers, with initial hiring and discharges accounting 
for the rest. As part of the resolution of specific complaints in the 
seven industries, contracting agencies often succeeded in identify-
ing and eliminating, or weakening, discriminatory patterns in the 
workplace. 
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Complaints resulted in nationwide corrective actions by several 
steel manufacturers. For example, blacks mired in low-level jobs in 
a Texas steel mill also had to endure segregated restrooms and other 
facilities. As a result of a complaint, several blacks were transferred 
into a line of seniority (previously for whites only) that made them 
eligible for higher-level jobs. The company promised to promote, 
transfer, and upgrade without regard to race, and opened bathrooms 
and other facilities to all employees. Similar breakthroughs in dis-
criminatory patterns were reported in other industries covered in 
the special study.30
By 1963 E.O. 10925 had resulted in measurable employment 
gains by African Americans in white-collar contract work. This was 
an area in which blacks had long been underrepresented because of 
both racial discrimination and inadequate education. Unlike the 
stagnant blue-collar labor market, white-collar work was a rapidly 
growing sector that offered blacks the possibility of significant eco-
nomic and social gain. Among the 4,000 federal contractors who 
filed compliance reports in both 1962 and 1963, total white-collar 
employment increased by 17,270 positions, of which 1,830 (or 10.65 
percent) were African Americans. Since they held only 1.14 percent 
of existing white-collar jobs in 1962, the new black hires equaled 
almost ten times the expected number. The percentage also approxi-
mated the 10 percent black proportion of the general population.31
In federal employment, the PCEEO received 2,005 complaints of 
discrimination by March 1963. Of that total, 1,169 cases were settled, 
with corrective action taken in 423 (36.1 percent) of the cases. This fig-
ure matched the trend for the first year of the PCEEO enforcement in 
the federal government. The number of complaints per year was sig-
nificantly higher than the annual number under the PCGEP during 
the Eisenhower administration. This statistic would seem to indicate 
much greater interest in eliminating discrimination in this period.
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Clearer results can be seen in the employment picture for African 
Americans in the federal government during the early 1960s. A total 
of 101,448 new employees were added to federal payrolls from 1961 
to 1963. Of those, 19,273 were black, constituting 19 percent of all 
new hires. This number was considered a credible indicator of sig-
nificant progress.32
In response to Johnson’s request to federal agencies in 1961 to 
identify and upgrade underutilized employees, a number of agencies 
took steps to make better use of their whole workforces, particularly 
African Americans. While the populations of employees identified 
were not large in most cases, the Departments of Defense, Commerce, 
Labor, and others promoted or provided training for hundreds of 
low GS-grade employees, a large portion of them blacks.33 Their 
efforts were bolstered when the PCEEO directed the Civil Service 
Commission to see that all federal employees had equal access to job 
training.34 Government-wide increases were reported in hiring and 
promotion of blacks in professional, managerial, and policy-making 
positions. African Americans were still woefully underrepresented 
in high level federal jobs, but the problem had become much less 
one of outright discrimination, and more one of finding applicants 
who had had the training and education necessary to qualify for the 
work.
After the 1963 violence in Birmingham, the PCEEO faced new 
challenges and pressures. At its May 29th meeting, Secretary Wirtz 
noted that “under the circumstances which obtain in the country 
today, [this meeting] is an opportunity that we have to do what-
ever we can to meet what is surely the most serious domestic prob-
lem facing us.” Attorney General Robert Kennedy, the lead official 
on civil rights in the administration, was a member of the PCEEO 
but until then had not been very active in its operations. After the 
riots in Birmingham, however, he began to play a more active role 
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and demand more action of the committee. At the May 29th meet-
ing, he reproached the leadership for failing to forcefully promote 
compliance. He pointed out that the government’s own statistics on 
Birmingham, hastily compiled after the riots, showed that most gov-
ernment offices there were segregated. Worse yet, of the two thou-
sand nonmenial federal jobs located in Birmingham, fewer than 
1 percent went to blacks, who constituted 37 percent of the local 
population. Kennedy pointed out that this discrepancy would make 
it difficult for the government to require private employers to comply 
with E.O. 10925.35
At Robert Kennedy’s request, the PCEEO prepared a detailed 
report on federal contractors in Birmingham, with recommenda-
tions for assuring more equal treatment and better compliance with 
the order. The PCEEO and several federal agencies also reported on 
black employment by the government in Birmingham. Based on this 
local effort, the PCEEO developed a nationwide program to assist 
federal employers and investigate federal employment patterns. As 
PCEEO member John Macy stated: “We have an obligation to see to 
it that Federal managers become participants in community action 
to create an effort for improvement.”36
The events in Birmingham also prompted a long-contemplated 
expansion of the PCEEO’s jurisdiction. As early as April 1961 the 
president’s subcabinet group on civil rights had agreed that the 
PCEEO's authority over federal construction should be extended to 
the considerable work that was funded by federal grants. By the time 
the Justice Department had drafted a proposed executive order to 
this effect in December 1961, the White House had decided not to 
issue it because it was dealing with stiff resistance from Southern 
Democrats to its broader legislative program of economic recov-
ery.37 After Birmingham, however, the urgency of civil rights action 
overcame the White House’s deference to Southern Democrats. On 
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June 22, 1963, Kennedy issued E.O. 11114 to implement the proposal. 
In an attempt to minimize publicity, and thereby controversy, the 
White House issued it on a Saturday without a statement or public 
ceremony.
The inclusion of grant-funded construction under E.O. 11114 
allowed a fourfold increase in the coverage of workers and work-
places in the construction industry.38 In addition, this order con-
tained another significant broadening of coverage. Buried in it were 
amendments to E.O. 10925 intended “to clarify the authority of the 
[PCEEO].” Included was wording on its jurisdiction over a contract-
ing firm’s facilities that were physically separated from areas where 
work was done on federal contracts. After stating in Section 202 
that the PCEEO had the authority to exempt the separate facilities 
from compliance, E.O. 11114 required that “in the absence of such an 
exemption all such facilities shall be covered by the provisions of this 
order [E.O. 10925].”39 This statement meant that, theoretically, every 
federal contractor—unless specifically granted an exemption—was 
now required to comply with E.O. 10925 in all of their facilities and 
operations, not just those where contract work was performed. The 
practical impact of Section 202 was limited, however, because of the 
permanent limitations placed on the resources of the PCEEO by the 
Russell amendment, which was still in effect. However, an important 
precedent had been set for greater breadth in the federal effort to 
provide equal opportunity on the job.
E.O. 11114 was the last significant expansion in the scope of the 
PCEEO. After enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 
issuance of E.O. 11246 in 1965 governing government contractors, 
the PCEEO was essentially superfluous and was abolished in 1965. 
Addressing the PCEEO in May 1964 at its last meeting before enact-
ment of the Civil Rights Act, President Johnson said that serving as 
its chairman was “as important a job as I have ever been associated 
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with.” He asserted that in the future “they will point to . . . this com-
mittee and say this is when some of the breakthroughs began.” Wirtz 
seemed less sanguine in an assessment of the PCEEO’s achievements 
forty years later, bluntly asserting: “I don’t think it amounted to a 
great deal.” He corrected himself, however, adding that he believed 
it achieved important intangible results. It contributed to “a consid-
erable attitudinal change” on the part of employers and unions and 
helped prepare the way for the Civil Rights Act.40 
Like similar presidential committees from the 1940s and 1950s, 
the PCEEO was severely constrained by its limited powers and 
resources. Nevertheless, it marked the strongest effort of its kind so 
far and no doubt accomplished more, both tangibly and intangibly, 
than its predecessors. Ironically, the African American community, 
which had become more activist and more demanding of govern-
ment in the early 1960s, was more dissatisfied with government fair 
employment efforts than ever. It seemed clear by 1964 that presiden-
tial action via executive orders had reached the limits of its effective-
ness and its ability to satisfy the needs and aspirations of the African 
American community.
W hile the PCEEO was maximizing the potential of presi-dential action to promote fair employment via execu-
tive order, the Department of Labor was treading a different path 
toward the same goal. The department was under the leadership of 
Arthur Goldberg until September 1962, when he resigned to accept 
an appointment to the US Supreme Court. Willard Wirtz, then 
under secretary, succeeded Goldberg and served through the end of 
the Johnson administration.
Early in his term, Goldberg resolved a nettlesome and long-
standing issue that had dogged the USES and annoyed the African 
American community since the 1930s: the practice of accepting 
and honoring employer requests for white-only job applicants. The 
USES, as allowed under the Wagner-Peyser Act, had previously 
adopted standards prohibiting employment offices from accepting 
discriminatory job orders or from making discriminatory referrals 
to fill them. For the most part, it had treated the rules as only advi-
sory. However, beginning in 1961 the USES categorically banned all 
employment offices from accepting any more discriminatory job 
orders.1
In 1962 the very reverse of that issue came up. A number of 
government contractors, in an effort to comply with the PCEEO, 
started submitting job orders requesting black-only job candidates. 
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The USES felt it had no choice but to treat such requests the same 
as those based on racial prejudice, and it refused to accept them. 
However, after consultations with the PCEEO, the USES started to 
work with federal contractors to allow local employment offices to 
honor requests for minority applicants from selected employers.2
The USES initiated a well-meaning but somewhat counterpro-
ductive policy in 1961. In an effort to be completely race-neutral, it 
asked that government employment offices stop recording the race, 
creed, color, or national origin of job applicants. By early 1962 men-
tion of race in applicant files and forms had been virtually elimi-
nated. In May 1962 the policy was made permanent through publi-
cation in the Federal Register. The unfortunate result was that much 
valuable data on race and employment was lost, making compliance 
very hard to measure.3
The USES continued efforts begun in the Eisenhower 
ad ministration to desegregate employment offices in the South. 
Employment offices in Oklahoma and Tennessee were quickly inte-
grated. In Atlanta, employment offices began administering typ-
ing tests for both black and white applicants in the same room. At 
the request of the USES, more state employment services provided 
minority group representatives, modeled on the USES’s Minority 
Groups Representative (MGR) program. In 1962 the department 
achieved a notable success in this effort in Arkansas with Orval 
Faubus, the controversial governor who had attempted to block inte-
gration of Little Rock’s Central High School in 1957. Faubus agreed 
not only to hire an MGR, but also to make sure that that person was 
an African American.4
The Fight for Fairness in Apprenticeships Begins
While the USES and PCEEO worked to integrate federal em ployment 
offices, the status of apprenticeships came under question. By the 
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1960s apprenticeship in a skilled trade was well recognized as a 
potential gateway for African Americans to obtain high-paying, 
secure jobs in the construction industry. The problem was that, 
historically, relatively few apprenticeship slots went to blacks. The 
Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training cooperated with and pro-
moted the privately run system of apprenticeship programs. It also 
registered apprenticeships that sought its recognition, and most did. 
Under Goldberg and Wirtz, the BAT played a much more active 
role in expanding apprenticeship opportunities for blacks than ever 
before.
In the past, the BAT had encouraged apprenticeship plan spo n-
sors to decide to open more training slots for black youths. While not 
completely abandoning that voluntary approach, Goldberg wanted 
to take stronger action. In July 1961 he announced that the BAT 
would begin requiring the inclusion of a statement of nondiscrimi-
nation in all current apprenticeship program plans where govern-
ment contractors were involved. Furthermore, the statement would 
be required in any new apprenticeship program, whether involving 
a government contractor or not. Failure to include the statement 
would disqualify the plan for registration with the BAT. The state-
ment specified that the “selection of persons to be trained through 
apprenticeship will be made from those qualified without regard to 
race” or other extraneous factors. Numerous state apprenticeship 
councils, which registered programs independently of the federal 
BAT, voluntarily adopted the new requirements. By January 1962 
over three hundred apprenticeship programs included the nondis-
crimination provision.5
In August 1961 George Meany added key support to the Labor 
Department’s efforts. He suggested to Johnson that the BAT hire 
several full-time training representatives to work on elimination of 
discrimination in apprenticeships. The suggestion passed through 
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bureaucratic channels, and in November 1961, Ansel Cleary of the 
BAT informed Meany that the bureau was planning to set up posi-
tions of this type in four cities. The BAT asked Roy Wilkins, Whitney 
Young, and A. Philip Randolph to help locate qualified black candi-
dates. The process developed into a mini-affirmative action effort in 
its own right.6
In November 1961 Labor Department officials and leaders of 
major civil rights organizations met to discuss the sensitive issue of 
recruiting for the BAT positions. Addressing the civil rights leaders, 
Arthur Chapin (who was MGR in the USES) pointed out that “talent 
is located by a sort of chain conversation—gossip, if you like,” and 
noted that minorities had often been left out of the circle of gossip. 
Edward McVeigh assured the group that Goldberg was anxious to 
find minority candidates for the training representative positions. 
McVeigh invited the civil rights leaders to get the word out to the 
black community about the available positions and the required civil 
service test. 
McVeigh asked for comments and suggestions at the meeting and 
got a mixed response. The black leaders agreed to support the recruit-
ment plan, but they were skeptical that the apprenticeship training 
representatives would be able to accomplish much, given the extent 
of discrimination that had existed for decades in some regions. They 
also felt that the BAT’s prerequisites for candidates were too rigid 
and would make it difficult to find black candidates who met the 
requirements.7
The hiring effort finally bore fruit in June 1962. The BAT hired 
three black applicants to serve as Industrial Training Advisers (ITAs). 
The newly minted ITAs—Amy Terry of New York City, Cicero Scott 
of Cleveland, and Charles R. Jaymes of San Francisco—had much 
experience in apprenticeship, training, and minority issues. Soon 
after their hire, the BAT hired three more black ITAs, making a total 
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of six. In addition to promoting the acceptance of qualified minori-
ties in apprenticeships and other training for skilled jobs, the ITAs 
worked with unions and employer groups to promote voluntary 
nondiscrimination, and with minority groups to encourage minori-
ties to apply for apprenticeships and training courses.8
In 1963 the Department of Labor established in Washington, DC, 
the first of what eventually developed into a nationwide network of 
Apprenticeship Information Centers (AICs). These resource centers 
were designed to enhance apprenticeship opportunities for local 
minorities. The Washington, DC, AIC came about primarily because 
the federal government wanted to be sure that construction employ-
ment by federal contractors in its own backyard—especially involv-
ing the skilled trades—made the fullest possible use of the large 
local black workforce. Completed in June 1963, the Washington, 
DC, AIC was a joint undertaking of the BAT, the USES, the D.C. 
Apprenticeship Council, and local schools, employers, and labor 
unions. It included a library of apprenticeship information and pro-
vided counseling and testing services for apprenticeship applicants, 
information on employment opportunities in skilled crafts, and 
referrals to apprenticeship providers.9
In November 1963 the Labor Department’s new Manpower 
Administration (MA), which now housed the BAT, began estab-
lishing similar centers in labor market areas with large numbers 
of minorities. The AICs were housed in local employment service 
offices and were administered jointly by the BAT and USES. To sup-
port and oversee their operation and assure local input to deal with 
possible problems, the MA required each center to establish both a 
coordinating group of federal, state, and local officials; and an advi-
sory committee representing local labor, management, minority, 
and civic organizations.10
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To assist the BAT in its growing program of equal treatment of 
minorities, on February 27, 1963, Wirtz established an Advisory 
Committee on Equal Opportunity in Apprenticeship and Training. 
The committee was composed of fifteen members from manage-
ment, labor, the education community, minority groups, and the 
general public. Chaired by the Manpower administrator, the com-
mittee served two main functions: to help the Department of Labor 
devise more effective programs for equal access to apprenticeships 
and skilled occupations; and to recommend specific actions for im-
plementing those policies. At its first meeting in May 1963, it called 
for a number of changes: research on the actual degree of partici-
pation (or lack of same) of minorities in apprenticeship programs; 
adequate enforcement of existing antidiscrimination provisions in 
BAT-registered programs; and the establishment of pre-apprentice-
ship training to help young persons qualify for admission into a 
program.11
The Birmingham violence of May 1963 had galvanized the 
Kennedy administration into almost feverish activity that spilled 
over into apprenticeship. This activity now became a key element 
in the administration’s efforts to overcome racial barriers to better 
jobs. On June 4, 1963, Kennedy ordered Secretary Wirtz to “require 
that the admission of young workers to apprenticeship programs be 
on a completely nondiscriminatory basis.” Kennedy also called for 
an immediate investigation into the current status of minorities in 
apprenticeship programs and into their employment by contractors 
on federal construction projects.12
The next day, Wirtz reported to Robert Kennedy that the depart-
ment had hastily organized a task force of fifty investigators to 
conduct on-site surveys of minority participation both in federal 
construction work and in associated apprenticeship programs in 
fifty cities nationwide. Investigations began on the following day. 
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Wirtz also notified thirty state apprenticeship offices about the sur-
vey, which was a joint effort by the BAT and the PCEEO. The first 
phase of this accelerated effort involved collecting information on 
the supply of employees and apprentices for construction work. The 
second phase involved reviewing apprenticeship programs in which 
black participation was extremely limited and then examining union 
procedures for referring candidates for apprenticeships. A week later 
Wirtz provided the shocking finding to Kennedy that hardly any 
black workers were employed in the construction trades in twenty 
cities that were studied. Outraged, Kennedy met with union leaders 
and sent cabinet officials to a number of cities to promote greater 
opportunities for black workers. The upshot of all this research was 
that on June 22, 1963, Kennedy issued E.O. 11114 banning discrimi-
nation in federal construction work (see chapter 8).13
A Rule is Born
Kennedy’s other June 4 order to Wirtz—to begin opening up mi-
nority access to apprenticeships—led to an almost instantaneous 
and far-reaching result. On June 5 Wirtz issued a departmental rule 
designed to promote fair access for minorities to apprenticeships. 
The enforcement stick was that the BAT would refuse to register 
programs that did not comply. Registration was a seal of approval, 
in effect, and no program wanted to be without it. The PCEEO had 
already begun developing an apprenticeship standard, which Wirtz 
drew on to serve as a basis for the DOL rule. 
Wirtz’s action was destined to arouse strong opposition from both 
business and labor leaders. Typically, apprenticeship programs for 
each skilled trade were operated jointly by the relevant trade unions 
and the major employers, or employer groups, involved. Unions and 
employers valued the relative autonomy and freedom with which 
they administered their programs. The federal government’s only 
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formal involvement was registration with the BAT, heretofore a rou-
tine process. The program operators liked it that way.
More important than the program operators’ preference for 
autonomy was the fact that the children of journeymen in most 
trades had traditionally been given first consideration for appren-
ticeship slots. Many families had been able to pass down the same 
skilled trade from father to son through the family-tie system, which 
had become part of the fabric of their lives. Any interference, how-
ever noble the goal, was bound to arouse fierce opposition. However, 
the practice amounted to de facto racial discrimination since almost 
all journeyman construction workers were white because of many 
years of exclusion of blacks from construction unions. The family-tie 
practice guaranteed that almost all apprentices would be white, an 
intolerable situation for African Americans and for the government 
agencies that wanted to help them.14
Secretary Wirtz announced the rule in identical letters mailed on 
June 5 to state government apprenticeship offices and divisions. The 
two standards that made up the rule itself followed an introductory 
statement:
The elimination of . . . discrimination depends, where 
there are apprenticeship programs involved, on taking 
steps to assure that significant opportunities are pro-
vided to qualified minority group applicants to gain 
admission to these apprenticeship programs.
Such opportunities may be provided:
1. Where the selections made would not themselves 
demonstrate equality of opportunity, by the sel ection 
of apprentices on the basis of merit alone, in accordance 
with objective standards which perm it review, after full 
and fair opportunity for application; and
225
THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR IN THE KENNEDY–JOHNSON ERA
2. By taking whatever steps are necessary, in acting upon 
application lists developed prior to this time, to offset the 
effect of previous practices under which discriminatory 
patterns of employment have resulted.15
The rule seems somewhat opaque at first reading, but it was care-
fully crafted to take into account the process and the social realities of 
the apprenticeship system. Admission to an apprenticeship program 
was a two-stage process: first, lists of applicants who were found eli-
gible for apprenticeships were put together jointly by the program 
administrators; then came the actual selection of apprentices from 
those lists. Standard 2 of the BAT rule addressed the creation of the 
lists. When the BAT determined that a list was discriminatory, the 
program was to offset the effect of past discrimination by any means 
necessary. The implication was that if the program deliberately 
added minorities, the list would then be considered to be in compli-
ance with the standard.
As for minority participation in the apprenticeship program 
itself, it was clear that the presence of a significant number would 
be considered prima facie proof of compliance, just as with the lists. 
The implication, again, is that minorities could be deliberately cho-
sen over whites. If, however, the BAT did not deem minority partici-
pation to be adequate, the program then had to demonstrate that the 
apprentices were selected by a provably fair and objective method. 
Obviously, selection based on family ties would not pass muster. 
Hence, it would be in the interests of the labor and management 
groups operating an apprenticeship program to make sure that they 
placed enough minorities to avoid scrutiny of the father-son system.
While a quota of minorities was not prescribed, the idea of at 
least approximating proportionality to the general population was 
implied. However, this implication was not intended to be a club to 
force equal treatment. Rather, it was designed to make compliance 
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easier for the apprenticeship programs. If they arbitrarily brought 
in enough blacks, their traditional system would not be examined 
and could proceed almost as before. Wirtz and the BAT knew that 
unions and management would fight strenuously against abolition 
of the traditional system. It remained to be seen whether they would 
accept the BAT’s approach.
Wirtz directed that the standard also apply to government con-
tractors, who were required under E.O. 10925 to take “affirmative 
action” to eliminate discriminatory employment practices such as 
limiting apprenticeship opportunities for blacks. He also directed 
the BAT to apply the standard when it evaluated apprenticeship 
programs seeking renewal of their registration. He asked that local 
apprenticeship councils voluntarily apply the rule as well. While 
Wirtz did not characterize the standard itself as “affirmative action,” 
he did urge state apprenticeship offices to give “affirmative consider-
ation” to their implementation.
Wirtz clarified and slightly revised the rule a few days after the 
June 5 announcement. It now required:
1. The selection of apprentices on the basis of merit alone, 
in accordance with objective standards which permit 
review, after full and fair opportunity for application, 
unless the selections otherwise made would themselves 
demonstrate that there is equality of opportunity. [empha-
sis added]
2. The taking of whatever steps are necessary, in act ing 
upon application lists developed prior to this time, to 
offset the effects of previous practices under which dis-
criminatory patterns of employment have resulted.16
Standard number 2 was unchanged from the original rule, but 
number 1 was rearranged for easier understanding. It was made 
clear that the phrase “selections otherwise made,” that is, through 
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deliberate choice of minority candidates, provided an acceptable 
alternative to applying objective standards. A few weeks later, Wirtz 
added a third standard to the rule after being asked whether the 
department also expected the actual training under apprentice pro-
grams be conducted in a fair and objective manner. That had been 
his intention, and Wirtz now made it explicit, requiring
nondiscrimination in all phases of apprenticeship and 
employment during apprenticeship after selections are 
made.17
Wirtz was able to implement the apprenticeship rule almost 
immediately because it was only a departmental rule, not a for-
mal federal standard. The process of issuing the latter would have 
required publication of a proposed rule and an invitation for public 
comments before promulgation. The BAT quickly informed feder-
ally-registered Joint Apprenticeship Committees about the rule and 
started registering only those new apprenticeship programs that 
were in compliance. The BAT was also to review all currently regis-
tered programs and remove from the register (“de-register”) any that 
were not in compliance.
Wirtz asked the BAT to issue a guidance bulletin on the stan-
dards for the use of its staff. He wanted the guidance to make it 
clear that the standards were adopted in response to discrimination 
against blacks. It should stress that, while other forms of discrimina-
tion should be eliminated, “specific attention needs to be directed to 
racial discrimination.” He also provided commentaries on standards 
1 and 2. Regarding the objective selection criteria in standard 1, he 
noted that this did not mean that all programs must have identical 
criteria for admission. Rather, admission was to be based on what-
ever objective factors the operators of a particular program deemed 
appropriate. These factors could include test scores, physical qualifi-
cations, impartial interviews, and so on.
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Wirtz sought to assure that under standard 2, when application 
lists were found to be biased, minorities would be given fair con-
sideration for inclusion:
Necessary action in connection with application lists 
previously developed means that programs whose past 
selections have not demonstrated equality of opportu-
nity will not give such preference or priority in selection 
to those who have previously applied for apprenticeship, 
as to reduce significantly the opportunity for selection 
of those who will be encouraged to apply under the new 
selection procedures.18
The BAT issued the guidance in the form of Circular 64-7 on July 
17, 1963.19 The circular included Wirtz’s three standards verbatim, 
incorporated his guidances, and added a few more explanations. 
The cumulative effect of all the revisions, clarifications, and guid-
ances over the summer of 1963 was to make it abundantly clear that 
neither Wirtz nor the BAT sought the abolition of the traditional, 
father-son selection system. They only wanted to see evidence that 
new apprenticeship opportunities were somehow being opened up 
for African American youths.
However, it soon became clear that, despite the department’s 
calculated concession to the status quo, the bulk of the apprentice-
ship community was not going to accept what it saw as unwarranted 
interference. As soon as the department issued the original rule, it 
started receiving strong objections from both labor and manage-
ment. Opposition was significant even within the enforcing agency—
the BAT itself.
On the day Circular 64-7 was issued, David Christian (an aide to 
Wirtz) sent Manpower Administrator John Donovan a background 
memo on Wirtz’s planned participation in a meeting of BAT regional 
officials in Washington where the new circular was to be presented. 
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Christian’s comments on the culture of the bureau at that time are 
revealing:
We will be confronting a skeptical audience, not because 
they approve of discrimination in these programs. . . . 
They do, however, tend to have a quasi-religious fervor for 
the promotion of apprenticeship. In this way of thinking 
anything which discourages or makes more difficult the 
maintenance and growth of apprenticeship programs is 
prima facie bad. In short, at the moment the psychology 
tends to be that it is more important to develop appren-
tices and apprenticeship than it is to insist on equal 
opportunity. This is the system of relative values that we 
need to change.
In day-to-day operations, the change we must achieve 
is from the historic position of “hands off the selection 
process” to one of active concern and intervention in 
these processes. This will also cause major pains for these 
people who are not only generally conservative but who 
are also basically promoters. It tends to be fundamentally 
distasteful to them to take on an enforcement role and 
quite legitimately they see the latter role as destructive 
of the former.
Even as he expressed these reservations, Christian gave the BAT 
credit for progress in the racial make-up of the field staff. A number 
of blacks had been hired in the professional grades. He found “no 
reluctance at all” to hire staff without regard to race.20
Responding to the growing opposition to its rule, the depart-
ment decided to withdraw it and issue in its place a formal federal 
regulation, which would be published in the Federal Register. This 
was a historic decision. For the first time, the federal government pro-
posed to enforce what amounted to affirmative action in employment 
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through a formal regulation. The department quickly developed the 
proposal, combining and codifying Wirtz’s standards, Circular 64-7, 
and the BAT guidance materials. In a key clarification, Section I speci-
fied that new programs established after the effective date could only 
obtain BAT certification by creating and applying objective, review-
able standards of selection. They would not have the option of comply-
ing purely through showing an acceptable racial composition in their 
classes of apprentices. With this change, the rule constituted a more 
direct attack on the father-son system. To be sure, however, the change 
applied only to new programs. The proposed rule appeared in the 
Federal Register on October 23, 1963. Public comments were invited.21
Comments poured in. Most state apprenticeship councils 
expressed support for the proposed regulation, as they had supported 
the earlier rule. Labor and industry remained strongly opposed to 
federal intervention in the apprenticeship system. Reflecting shared 
goals for the system, their critical comments converged and rein-
forced each other at many points. Some of the objections went 
beyond the specifics of the regulation to concerns that government 
would seek to regulate apprenticeship systems more broadly and 
worries about excessive government power in general.
A case in point was the fifteen-page statement from R. P. Sornsin, 
representing the National Association of Plumbing, Heating and 
Cooling Contractors (PHCC). He opposed the regulation on several 
levels.22 While strongly against discrimination and supportive of the 
federal effort to provide equal opportunity, the PHCC objected to 
using the sanction of deregistration against registered apprentice-
ship programs. Sornsin charged that the regulation improperly 
raised registration to the level of a substantial legal right that brought 
with it new regulatory powers for the BAT. He also feared that BAT 
review of apprenticeship programs would “become a tool for the 
enforcement of fluctuating day-to-day movements of administrative 
231
THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR IN THE KENNEDY–JOHNSON ERA
policy and would, in our opinion, range far beyond the question of 
discrimination.” Noting that the BAT had worked collegially with 
PHCC members in a nonregulatory way for many years, Sornsin 
argued that if the BAT “tries now to speak with two voices urging 
and advising today, commanding tomorrow, neither voice is going 
to be heard.” Additionally, apprenticeship committees were not pre-
pared to deal with, as he put it, “the intricacies of federal regulations 
written in flowing federalese.”
The PHCC’s principal objections, however, dealt with the sub-
stance of the standards. Regarding the “alternative test” under-
standard 2, the association argued that this would produce a quota 
system, in effect, “if program managers conclude that they can save 
themselves a lot of trouble rejecting more qualified majority race 
applicants and selecting a sufficient number of lesser skilled minor-
ity applicants to achieve a favorable ‘racial and ethnic composition.’” 
Sornsin argued that “the government enters forbidden territory when 
it decrees that the private employers, or committees, must first lay 
down ‘objective standards’ from which the ultimate selections will 
follow by mathematical necessity.” Dealing with the preference issue, 
he posed the case of a contractor whose own son is near the top of the 
list of eligibles for an apprenticeship. Under the standards, Sornsin 
posited, “a black boy is 2 points higher than the contractor’s son. So 
the rest of the Committee tells its fellow-member, ‘Sorry, you’ve got 
to take the black boy.’ This is democracy!” Using less colorful lan-
guage, the Colorado Labor Council made almost the identical point, 
claiming also that 5 percent or less of all apprentices were admitted 
because of a father-son relationship.23
Sornsin claimed finally that by tying an antidiscrimination 
program to expanded regulation of apprenticeship training, the 
Department of Labor raised the issue of excessive government con-
trol over the economy:
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Practically every racial fight in the country gets com-
promised by becoming embroiled in the larger issue of 
federal control over the states and federal control over 
free enterprise. We urge the department to avoid this en-
tanglement so far as it possibly can with respect to ap-
prenticeship training.
If the department would only withdraw the proposal, Sornsin wrote, 
the PHCC would be happy to discuss how to achieve an effective 
equal opportunity plan.
Ford Motor Vice President M. L. Katke, a member of the BAT’s 
Advisory Committee on Apprenticeship (ACA) did not reject the 
rule or take an ideological position on it. However, he questioned the 
need to regulate contractors whose apprenticeship programs were 
already covered by E.O.s 10925 and 11114. These additional regula-
tions, Katke feared, would place an unnecessary burden on the con-
tractors, and he recommended that the companies be exempted. He 
was concerned that the regulation implicitly sanctioned numerical 
goals or quotas. If quotas were indeed to be allowed, Katke wrote, 
“it is contrary to the published objective of the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Program.” He too defended the need to give at least some 
weight to familial relationships in selections for apprenticeships.24
Commenters from organized labor were as dissatisfied with the 
regulation as their management counterparts. In November 1963 the 
AFL-CIO’s Building and Construction Trades Department (BCTD), 
without specifically citing the proposed BAT regulations, went on 
record with a resolution
condemning the US Department of Labor for attempt-
ing to create a policing agency within the Bureau of 
Apprenticeship [and Training] and for meddling into 
the internal affairs of the craft unions in attendance at 
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this Convention, to satisfy the ill-directed activities of a 
group of individuals.25
The BCTD maintained that apprenticeship programs had been 
successfully operated independently of the federal government since 
before the establishment of the Department of Labor. It argued that 
the BAT should continue to limit its role to promoting sound appren-
ticeship programs and providing technical assistance to the unions 
and employers who operated them. The resolution pointed out that 
the BCTD had voluntarily adopted a nondiscrimination program on 
June 21, 1963, ordering local unions to accept and refer apprentice-
ship applicants without regard to race and other irrelevant factors. 
BCTD president C. J. Haggerty forwarded the resolution to Wirtz in 
December. Wirtz then met with Haggerty to discuss “further con-
sideration of the points covered by this Resolution.”
In October 1963 B. A. Gritta, president of the AFL-CIO’s Metal 
Trades Department (MTD), added his voice to the opposition to 
the proposed regulations. While affirming the commitment of the 
twenty-two unions of the MTD to fair treatment in apprentice-
ships, he also conveyed their view that apprenticeship should be a 
voluntary “labor-management program grounded in the employ-
ment relationship and mutually worked out and administered by 
management and labor.” Gritta argued that, instead of issuing man-
datory regulations providing the sanction of deregistration, the 
Department of Labor should work on a voluntary basis with unions 
and management to promote nondiscrimination. He noted that the 
department had never before issued a rule providing for revocation 
of registration on the basis of any other aspect of apprenticeship. He 
argued that singling out nondiscrimination as the sole basis “runs 
contrary to past practices and policies of the Department [of Labor 
and] . . . can only do injury to the continued growth and promotion 
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of apprenticeship.” Responding for Wirtz, Under Secretary John 
Henning indicated that nondiscriminatory programs had nothing 
to fear from the regulations and expressed confidence that organized 
labor would work with the department to ensure equal employment 
opportunity. However, turning Gritta’s position against singling 
out the nondiscrimination area on its head, Henning indicated that 
Wirtz agreed and was in favor of a broader policy that would allow 
deregistration for a variety of reasons.26
Michael Fox, president of the AFL-CIO’s Railway Employees’ 
Department, was another labor representative who opposed the reg-
ulation. He pointed out that the ACA, of which he was a member, 
had unanimously rejected the regulation. He expressed his disap-
pointment at the manner in which the whole issue was being han-
dled. Fox argued that the apprenticeship system was premised on 
the assumption that the federal government serves as a cooperative 
facilitator. It appeared to him that the regulations would turn the 
BAT into a policeman.27
Issuing the First Affirmative Action Regulation
After receiving and considering seventeen comments, most of them 
negative, the Department of Labor published the final regulation in 
the Federal Register on December 18, 1963.28 It took effect January 17, 
1964. In the face of a consensus of opposition from management and 
labor, the department made a few significant concessions in the final 
rule. First, it backed away from expressly requiring apprenticeship 
programs to take compensatory action for any past discrimination 
they may have committed when they established the lists of those 
deemed eligible for apprenticeship positions. The proposed regulation 
had required “offsetting” the effects of previous discrimination, that 
is, a lack of blacks on the hiring lists. The final rule simply required 
the “removing” of any discriminatory results without setting any 
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requirements or specifying how it should be accomplished. However, 
the programs still had a duty to rectify the discrimination.
The final regulation also backed away from actually, or implicitly, 
setting racial quotas in apprenticeship programs. Wirtz had decreed 
in June that candidate lists were to be disregarded to the extent 
needed to provide opportunities to minorities for “a significant 
number of positions.” To many, this statement implied the applica-
tion of a quota of black apprentices. The final rule specifically and 
categorically eliminated that possibility. First, it deleted the phrase 
“significant number” and replaced it with a vague assertion that pro-
grams should provide “current opportunities for selection of quali-
fied members” of minority groups. To hammer the point home, the 
rule added a paragraph titled “Quota system barred”:
Nothing contained in this part shall be construed to 
require any program sponsor or employer to select or 
employ apprentices in the proportion which their race, 
color, religion, or national origin bears to the total 
population.
The department, however, held firm on two pillars of the regu-
lation. It retained intact the enforcement “stick”: deregistration of 
programs which the BAT determined were “not in conformity” with 
the standard. It also maintained Wirtz’s basic, two-option approach 
to compliance by existing programs: (1) evidence of opening oppor-
tunities to blacks with, basically, no questions asked; or failing that, 
(2) demonstration of an objective, fair selection system. As was pro-
vided in Section I of the proposed rule, new programs could only 
exercise the second option.
Immediately after the January 18, 1964, effective date of the rule, 
the BAT began applying it to all new apprenticeship programs that 
sought registration. In the first five months of enforcement, the BAT 
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reviewed 383 new apprenticeship programs and determined that all 
were in compliance. In succeeding years, enforcement of the rule 
became an uncontroversial, routine function.29 
The apprenticeship rule was not represented or described as affir-
mative action at the time of issuance. In the process of developing 
the rule, the department had edged toward, and then backed firmly 
away from mandatory quotas or goals. However, it made it clear that 
apprenticeship programs needed to go out of their way to somehow 
include more African Americans and other minorities. This was the 
essence of affirmative action as it was understood at the time. In 
many ways, this historic rule set the tone and parameters for future 
debate on affirmative action, and it broke ground for the raft of equal 
employment opportunity regulations and programs that emerged in 
the years after passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
There are many facts and ideas that a reader might take away from this book. Each reader’s list may be slightly different. 
However, there are three central points that will hopefully appear on 
everyone’s list: first, there were significant, measurable advances for 
African American workers; second, the concept of affirmative action 
was born and underwent significant development before the Civil 
Rights Act; and third, most major actions by the executive branch 
were taken only in response to pressure, direct or indirect, from the 
African American community. It bears repeating some key facts 
from the preceding nine chapters that buttress these points.
First, while data on black employment is fragmentary, there are 
enough examples of progress to indicate that the general tendency 
was toward advancement. Federal employment, including hiring, 
promotions, and working conditions, was the brightest area. The 
Jim Crow practices introduced during the Wilson administration 
gradually loosened their hold, beginning with the desegregation of 
the Commerce Department in the 1920s, and were virtually elimi-
nated by the 1950s. During World War II, the number of black civil 
servants more than tripled, and their percentage rose to approxi-
mate the black percentage in the general population. The push to 
hire African Americans accelerated greatly during the early 1960s. 
Between 1961 and 1963, 19 percent of new federal hires were black. 
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Also, the representation of African Americans in supervisory and 
professional job series, while always lagging that of whites, grew 
from virtually nil to a respectable level by 1964. In the period 1956-
1960 alone, black employment in the middle and upper civil service 
grades grew from 3.7 percent of all employees to 5.9 percent.
Beginning with the New Deal, government-funded projects 
and government contractors began to incorporate principles of fair 
employment. It is true that New Deal racial fairness policies set in 
Washington were often thwarted in the segregated South, and leg-
islation such as the Social Security Act and Fair Labor Standards 
Act were crafted to exclude large numbers of black citizens.1 
Nevertheless, most New Deal work-relief programs had some success 
in providing equal treatment for unemployed African Americans. 
The Public Works Administration (PWA), for example, specifically 
banned discrimination on the basis of race or religion. Fourteen per-
cent of all Work Projects Administration beneficiaries were African 
Americans. Under fair employment executive orders, the black pro-
portion of employment by defense contractors more than doubled 
during World War II, and black employment in white-collar jobs in 
the defense industry gained significantly in the 1960s. Some 10.65 
percent of new hires in 1962 and 1963 in this area were African 
Americans.
Second, affirmative action, while not usually touted under that 
name, began to manifest itself during the New Deal. Harold Ickes 
set racial hiring goals for the PWA, requiring that blacks be hired in 
proportion to the population. Failure to meet what amounted to a 
quota was deemed prima facie proof of discrimination. After World 
War II, the Bureau of Engraving and Printing came under pressure 
from the civil rights community to open its skilled jobs to blacks. 
When the bureau did not act, Truman ordered it to begin placing 
well-qualified blacks in its apprenticeship programs. In 1961 E.O. 
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10925 included the phrase “affirmative action” and required federal 
government contractors to ensure fair treatment of their workers. 
The Department of Labor’s historic apprenticeship regulation of 
1963, while specifically banning quotas, required affirmative action 
in appointments to apprenticeship programs.
Lastly, most federal action, and therefore most progress, resulted 
from direct petitions by African American groups, civil rights 
activism, dramatic violence against blacks, or all of the above. The 
NAACP, William Monroe Trotter, and others objected strongly 
to Woodrow Wilson’s imposition of Jim Crow racial strictures in 
Washington. As a result, the tide of segregation within the federal 
government was stemmed, although it did not fully recede for many 
years. The Division of Negro Economics in World War I was created 
only after civil rights groups demanded establishment of a govern-
ment agency devoted to black problems. African American watch-
dog groups monitored the New Deal’s National Recovery Act and 
denounced it for discriminating against black workers. A. Philip 
Randolph’s mere threat to mount a march of ten thousand blacks 
on Washington convinced FDR to issue E.O. 8802. Postwar violence 
against blacks in the 1940s, including several shocking murders, 
prompted protests by civil rights leaders and led President Truman 
to establish the Committee on Civil Rights. Black leaders clamored 
for another Fair Employment Practices Committee when the defense 
industry started gearing up to meet the Korean War emergency. In 
response, Presidents Truman and Eisenhower established commit-
tees to promote equal treatment in that area.
Both black pressure and the government’s responses escalated 
during the Kennedy administration. In the late 1950s, the NAACP 
and other civil rights groups had called on the Department of Labor 
to open up more apprenticeship opportunities for black youths. 
Initially it had resisted, but in the early 1960s, it took a number of 
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steps on apprenticeship, culminating in Secretary Wirtz’s affirma-
tive action order of 1963. The explosion of the civil rights move-
ment in 1960 prompted the Kennedy administration to establish 
the President’s Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity 
(PCEEO). In 1961, as a result of discrimination complaints filed by 
the NAACP, the PCEEO initiated Plans for Progress. When this 
program did not live up to expectations, black civil rights lead-
ers denounced it. Their denunciation led to the Kheel Report and a 
revamping to orient the program toward compulsory, rather than 
voluntary, compliance. In response to extreme violence against 
civil rights marchers in Birmingham and to the murder of Medgar 
Evers, the government accelerated its antidiscrimination efforts. It 
also began to seek enactment of a comprehensive civil rights law. 
The March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, at which Martin 
Luther King Jr. gave his immortal “I have a dream” speech, provided 
a further push toward passage. President Kennedy’s assassination in 
1963 and a strong effort by LBJ contributed to enactment in 1964.
In his 1963 “Letter from Birmingham Jail,” Martin Luther King Jr. 
wrote, “freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressor; it must 
be demanded by the oppressed.”  Perhaps some day the federal gov-
ernment will routinely do the right thing before African Americans, 
women, gays, and other oppressed groups have had to march, pres-
sure, protest, and beg for their rights. Only when America has 
reached that point will we be able to claim, with any validity, that we 
have finally become an equalitarian society.
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